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 I think it’s fair to say every business lawyer and every business client knows 
trade secrets are vital to business success.  I think it’s also fair to say every busi-
ness lawyer and every business client knows trade secret law is in flux.  Congress’ 
2016 passage of the Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA),1 a largely general law 
creating the first federal private right of action for trade secret misappropriation, 
gives federal courts an opportunity to critically re-examine the field of trade se-
cret regulation.  And they’ll certainly get their chance: more than 825 DTSA cases 
were filed in federal district courts in the two years following the DTSA’s enact-
ment.2  However, few have reached the United States Courts of Appeals and 
even fewer have resulted in published appellate opinions.3  As our federal appeals 
courts are fond of reminding us, federal district court opinions are not preceden-
tial,4 so development of DTSA jurisprudence will likely take years, if not decades, 
as cases “percolate” through the Courts of Appeals on their way to the Supreme 
 
 1 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-39 (2018).   
 2 See Daniel McGavock, Robert Goldman & Jack Roberts, An Update on DTSA and Trade 
Secret Damages, LAW360 1, 1–2 (June 26, 2018, 12:18 PM), http://www.crai.com/sites/de-
fault/files/publications/An%20Update%20On%20DTSA%20And%20Trade%20Secret% 
20Damages.pdf (noting the Northern District of Illinois and the Northern District of Califor-
nia each had 7% of the total DTSA filings during the two-year period, followed by the Central 
District of California and the Southern District of New York, each with 6%); Travis S. Hunter 
& Renée M. Mosley, Better Safe Than Sorry: Experts Should Apportion Damages in Trade Secret Cases, 
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION (Nov. 30, 2018), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litiga-
tion/committees/commercial-business/articles/2018/fall2018-experts-should-apportion-
damages-in-trade-secret-cases/ (placing the total number of DTSA filings at 1,104 for the first 
two years after statute’s passage); David S. Levine & Christopher B. Seaman, The DTSA at 
One: An Empirical Study of the First Year of Litigation Under the Defend Trade Secrets Act, 53 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 105 (2018) (careful examination of nearly 500 cases filed in the DTSA’s first 
year). 
 3 See, e.g., CMI Roadbuilding, Inc. v. Iowa Parts, Inc., 920 F.3d 560, 567 (8th Cir. 2019) 
(affirming summary judgment on statute of limitations defense barring DTSA and related Iowa 
state law claims); DTC Energy Grp., Inc. v. Hirschfeld, 912 F.3d 1263, 1270 n.3 (10th Cir. 
2018) (noting that the DTSA does not create a presumption of irreparable harm for injunction 
purposes); Dunster Live, LLC v. Lonestar Logos Mgmt. Co., 908 F.3d 948, 950 (5th Cir. 2018) 
(DTSA’s fee-shifting provision inapplicable when claims are voluntarily dismissed without 
prejudice); First W. Capital Mgmt., Co. v. Malamed, 874 F.3d 1136, 1143 (10th Cir. 2017) 
(violation of the DTSA does not create presumption of irreparable harm); Waymo LLC v. 
Uber Techs., Inc., 870 F.3d 1342, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting but not deciding federal trade 
secret law claims); United States v. Liew, 856 F.3d 585, 597 (9th Cir. 2017) (noting DTSA 
amended the Economic Espionage Act’s (EEA) definition of “trade secret,” but deciding the 
case under the EEA’s prior definition); United States v. Nosal, 844 F.3d 1024, 1042 n.15 (9th 
Cir. 2016) (noting the DTSA’s minor change to the EEA’s definition of “trade secret”). 
 4 See Hecny Transp., Inc. v. Chu, 430 F.3d 402, 404 (7th Cir. 2005) (Easterbrook, J.) (stating 
district court decisions on state law issues “have neither authoritative nor precedential force 
. . . so we need not analyze them”); Mueller v. Reich, 54 F.3d 438, 441 (7th Cir. 1995) (Posner, 
C.J.) (“[D]istrict court decisions are not authoritative as precedents, even at the district court 
level.”), vacated on other grounds, 519 U.S. 1144 (1997) (mem.). 
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Court.5 
To be sure, Congress did not write on a blank slate in fashioning the DTSA.  
All states except New York now have some type of trade secret statute,6 and 
judicial decisions abound both before and after these statutes’ passage.  Congress 
seems to have borrowed bits and pieces from these and other sources while add-
ing a few specialty provisions of its own, such as the DTSA’s search and seizure 
section,7 its prohibition on injunctions barring employment based on mere 
knowledge alone,8 and its whistleblower and anti-retaliation protections.9  Even 
though the DTSA and virtually all state trade secret statutes are modeled on the 
Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA), the DTSA does not contain a “uniformity” 
provision commanding consistency with these state trade secret laws – perhaps 
because these state laws are themselves inconsistent, or perhaps because the 
DTSA sits in the midst of a criminal statute and hence triggers the rule of lenity 
requiring ambiguous criminal statutes to be read narrowly to protect the ac-
cused.10  Either way, the DTSA does not preempt state law,11 so state trade secret 
and DTSA claims can be paired in federal court under diversity or supplemental 
 
 5 See Box v. Planned Parenthood of Indiana and Kentucky, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 1780, 1784 
(2019) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“Given the potential for abortion to become a tool of eugenic 
manipulation, the Court will soon need to confront the constitutionality of laws like Indiana’s.  
But because further percolation may assist our review of this issue of first impression, I join 
the Court in declining to take up the issue now.”); William P. Barr, Opinion, End Nationwide 
Injunctions, WALL ST. J., Sept. 6, 2019, at A15 (“When the system works as it should, it encour-
ages what one leading jurist has called ‘percolation’ – the salutary process by which many lower 
federal courts offer competing and increasingly refined views on a legal issue before higher 
courts definitively resolve it.”). 
 6 See generally Michael T. Renaud & Nicholas W. Armington, Massachusetts Adopts Uniform 
Trade Secrets Act, NAT’L L. REV. (Sept. 6, 2018), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/mas-
sachusetts-adopts-uniform-trade-secrets-act (noting Massachusetts became the 49th state to 
adopt a version of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act); E.J. Brooks Co. v. Cambridge Sec. Seals, 
105 N.E.3d 301 (N.Y. 2018) (discussing monetary relief under New York trade secret law, 
which rests on Section 757 of the Restatement of Torts). 
 7 Id. at § 1836(b)(2). 
 8 Id. at § 1836(b)(3)(A)(i)(I). 
 9 18 U.S.C. § 1833(b) (1) and (2) (2019).  See, e.g., Christian v. Lannett Co., Inc., CV No. 
16-963, 2018 WL 1532849  (E.D. Pa. Mar. 29, 2018) (plaintiff’s retention of more than 22,000 
pages of confidential documents belonging to her employer, disclosed solely to her attorney 
for use in her discrimination lawsuit against her employer, fell within DTSA’s immunity pro-
vision, 18 U.S.C. §1833(b)). 
 10 See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319, 2333 (2019) (noting that the rule of lenity 
“is founded on ‘the tenderness of the law for the rights of individuals’ to fair notice of the law 
‘and on the plain principle that the power of punishment is vested in the legislative, not in the 
judicial department’”) (internal citation omitted). 
 11 See 18 U.S.C. § 1838 (“Except as provided in section 1833(b), this chapter shall not be 
construed to preempt or displace any other remedies, whether civil or criminal, provided 
by United States Federal, State, commonwealth, possession, or territory law for 
the misappropriation of a trade secret, or to affect the otherwise lawful disclosure of infor-
mation by any Government employee under section 552 of title 5 (commonly known as 
the Freedom of Information Act).”). 
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jurisdiction principles.  As an alternative, if plaintiffs prefer, they can proceed 
solely on state law theories in state court.12 
Unfortunately, like the states, Congress has left the hard questions to the 
courts.  Which questions will emerge first is anyone’s guess, but I think the be-
ginning is a good place to start: establishing jurisdiction and pleading claims un-
der the DTSA.  What should be the consequences of failing to show federal 
jurisdiction in a DTSA case?  Of failing to show a trade secret exists?  Of failing 
to identify it with specificity at the outset?  Of failing to show it’s been stolen?  
Of failing to show the theft was knowing?  Of failing to show the stolen secret 
was disclosed or used?  Of failing to show the stolen secret was knowingly dis-
closed or used?  In short, who can be sued for what?   
These issues may seem elementary, but I suspect they may prove more daunt-
ing than many expect.  As I discuss in Part I, given their location in a criminal 
statute, the DTSA’s definitions of “trade secret” and “misappropriation” may be 
given narrower readings than their counterparts in the UTSA.13  The Supreme 
Court has invoked the rule of lenity in other cases involving statutes sharing the 
same definitions for criminal and civil purposes, and the DTSA fits this descrip-
tion.  Narrow statutory construction may also control close jurisdictional ques-
tions if the DTSA’s jurisdiction grant is challenged under Rule 12(b)(1) in purely 
local disputes, an issue I discuss with other jurisdictional questions in Part II.14   
The role of Rule 12(b)(6) in DTSA cases is the topic of Part III.15  I stress 
there that very few trade secret cases have reached the Courts of Appeals on Rule 
12(b)(6) dismissals, so a number of assumptions about proper pleading are open 
to question, among them whether trade secrets should be alleged with particu-
larity and fully disclosed in sealed appendixes accompanying DTSA complaints.  
I also examine the implications of the DTSA’s “economic value” and “reasona-
ble secrecy measures” requirements from a pleading standpoint.  I end Part III 
with everyone’s favorite trade secret bête noire, inevitable disclosure.  The DTSA 
seems to expressly bar this controversial doctrine in injunction actions “brought 
under” the DTSA, and it may operate to bar it for state law injunction claims 
 
 12 See Abraham Y. Skoff, Tips for Filing a Trade Secret Action After Enactment of the DTSA: 
Opting for a DTSA Claim in Federal Court Is Not Necessarily the Automatic Choice That Many Thought 
It Would Be (July 31, 2017), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/commit-
tees/business-torts-unfair-competition/practice/2017/tips-for-filing-a-trade-secret-action-
after-enactment-of-dtsa/ (arguing that state law and state court advantages may outweigh 
DTSA and federal court advantages in some cases); Dylan W. Wiseman, California Plaintiffs May 
Prefer State Court for Trade Secret Claims (Dec. 9, 2019), https://www.buchalter.com/publica-
tion/california-plaintiffs-may-prefer-state-court-for-trade-secret-claims/ (discussing ad-
vantages of proceeding in California state court under California state trade secret law rather 
than proceeding in federal court under the DTSA, including lack of jury unanimity in Califor-
nia state court and omission of “readily ascertainable by proper means” from California’s state 
law definition of “trade secret”). 
 13 See infra notes 21 to 41 and accompanying text. 
 14 See infra notes 42 to 53 and accompanying text. 
 15 See infra notes 54 to 245 and accompanying text. 
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brought together with DTSA claims.  But the DTSA might be read as prohibiting 
inevitable disclosure for all purposes – not just injunctions – if the Courts of 
Appeals focus on the “knowledge” requirement found in the DTSA’s definition 
of “misappropriation,” as inevitable disclosure claims arguably dispense with 
“knowledge” as an element.  Here, too, the rule of lenity may turn out to play a 
prominent role.   
Part IV discusses a unified theory of pleading under the DTSA and its con-
sequences.16  The upshot there is that district courts should demand proper 
pleading and should mete out sanctions in appropriate cases that fall short of the 
mark.  Part V offers some closing comments to the effect that property is not 
the only thing that matters.17  Employee mobility and market innovation count 
too, and courts should police DTSA pleadings with these competing interests in 
mind. 
There are many other issues and sub-issues when it comes to trade secrets, 
of course, but all depend upon the foundational matters of establishing jurisdic-
tion and stating a claim.  The DTSA does not directly answer the questions I’ve 
posed above, so I explore each below as a matter of first principle.  My thesis is 
that DTSA claims should initially be subject to strict scrutiny from a pleading 
standpoint, so as to protect both competitors and competition.  I have generally 
organized my discussion around two representative district court DTSA deci-
sions, Plastronics Socket Partners Ltd. v. Highrel Inc.18 and Molon Motor and Coil Corp. 
v. Nidec Motor Corp.,19 to illustrate how pleading should and should not work un-
der the DTSA.  My purpose is more to examine than to determine, and to that 
end I offer illustrative rather than exhaustive case law.20 At times I quote at length 
from key sources to enhance reader understanding, as I think paraphrasing fre-
quently undercuts analytic clarity.  Throughout I emphasize practice and policy 
in the hope of encouraging business lawyers and their business clients to partic-
ipate in shaping this critical law.   
I. DEFINITIONS AND THE RULE OF LENITY 
Too often we overlook the obvious: almost anything can be a trade secret 
and almost anyone can be sued for stealing it.  These far-reaching implications 
call for care in assessing trade secret claims; competitors don’t like being sued 
and courts don’t like curbing competition.  Making baseless claims, or simply 
overclaiming, may spell serious trouble for plaintiffs in the form of sanctions or 
 
 16 See infra notes 246 to 267 and accompanying text. 
 17 See infra notes 268 to 272 and accompanying text. 
 18 No. CV-18-03201-PHX-SMB, 2019 WL 2054362 (D. Ariz. May 9, 2019). 
 19 No. 16 C 03545, 2017 WL 1954531 (N.D. Ill. May 11, 2017). 
 20 I’ll skip the more stylish “caselaw.”  See Casey C. Sullivan, Is It Caselaw or Case Law?      
Twitter, and Everyone Else, Weighs In, FINDLAW (Nov. 3, 2015, 5:59 PM), 
https://blogs.findlaw.com/strategist/2015/11/is-it-caselaw-or-case-law-twitter-and-every-
one-else-weighs-in.html (collecting competing views on the correct nomenclature). 
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counterclaims,21 while well-grounded claims may precipitate prosecution of de-
fendants by federal or state authorities.22  These plainly are dangerous claims,23 
and for everyone’s safety I think they should be subjected to procedural rigor 
from the start. 
As to the first point, that anything can be a trade secret, take hospital pricing.  
A recent Wall Street Journal article reported a strikingly-wide range of prices 
hospitals charged employers in the same area for treating injured and sick em-
ployees: “Prices paid to some hospitals, even in the same city, ranged from dou-
ble to more than 300% of what Medicare paid, the study published online Thurs-
day found.”24  Unsurprisingly, the same article observed: “Prices have long been 
a closely guarded secret between hospitals and the health insurers that negotiate 
them.”25  So, treating such information as a trade secret makes sense under the 
 
 21 See, e.g., Tradesmen Int’l, Inc. v. Black, 724 F.3d 1004 (7th Cir. 2013) (holding that the 
Illinois Trade Secrets Act authorized award of attorneys’ fees and costs against the plaintiff 
for wrongfully continuing its trade secret theft action, even assuming the plaintiff was origi-
nally justified in bringing the action); Kenneth J. Vanko, Proving Bad Faith in Trade Secret Cases, 
105 Ill. B. J. 40 (June 2017) (discussing law and strategy for defense recovery of “bad faith” 
fees under the Illinois Trade Secrets Act, including plaintiff’s possible loss of attorney-client 
privilege under the crime-fraud exception). 
 22 See, e.g., Heather Somerville & Robert McMillan, Ex-Google Engineer Faces Federal Charges: 
Anthony Levandowski Accused of Stealing Information from Google Parent and Taking It to Uber, WALL 
ST. J., Aug. 28, 2019, at B1 (reporting 33-count federal indictment of Anthony Levandowski 
as a result of civil trade secret theft litigation Google/Waymo brought against Uber for hiring 
Levandowski in connection with self-driving cars); Heather Somerville, Trade-Secrets Case Seen 
as Warning, WALL ST. J., Sept. 4, 2019, at B4 (“The [Levandowski] indictment reflects the 
Trump administration’s priorities, which include the enhanced protection of U.S. intellectual 
property and more resources to prosecute alleged theft, according to attorneys and federal 
prosecutors.”); Elizabeth Wollman, Ex-Google Car Project Engineer in Plea Deal, WALL ST. J., Mar. 
20, 2020, at B1 (reporting Levandowski’s agreement to plead guilty to a single count of trade 
secret theft in connection with Google’s autonomous vehicle program); 2019 IPEC ANN. 
REP., at 21–23, 120–26, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/IPEC-
2018-Annual-Intellectual-Property-Report-to-Congress.pdf (annual report by the United 
States Intellectual Property Enforcement Coordinator detailing recent federal prosecutions of 
trade secret thieves and economic espionage, primarily against Chinese actors, and observing: 
“The Department of Justice is committed to aggressively investigating and prosecuting indi-
viduals and corporations who undermine American competitiveness by stealing what they did 
not themselves create.” Id. at 21.); Richard L. Cassin, South Korea Company Penalized $360 Million 
for Plot to Steal DuPont Kevlar Trade Secrets, THE FCPA BLOG (May 6, 2015, 12:12 PM) 
http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2015/5/6/south-korea-company-penalized-360-million-
for-plot-to-steal.html (reporting fines and restitution against Kolon Industries). 
 23 See, e.g., In re Muhs, 923 F.3d 377 (4th Cir. 2019) (discussing trade secret judgement of 
more than $20 million and resulting Chapter 7 individual bankruptcy of employee whose con-
duct triggered the theft claim); Elizabeth Wollman, Former Google Self-Driving Engineer Files for 
Bankruptcy: Anthony Levandowski Cites a $179 Million Legal Judgment in Dispute That Involved  Uber, 
https://www.wsj.com (Mar. 5, 2020) (reporting Anthony Levandowski’s bankruptcy filing im-
mediately after Google/Waymo won a $179 million arbitration award against him for trade 
secret theft). 
 24 Melanie Evans, Employers’ Hospital Fees Differ, WALL ST. J., May 10, 2019, at B3. 
 25 Id. 
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DTSA’s broad definition of “trade secret,” found in Section 1839(3): 
[T]he term “trade secret“ means all forms and types of financial, 
business, scientific, technical, economic, or engineering infor-
mation, including patterns, plans, compilations, program devices, 
formulas, designs, prototypes, methods, techniques, processes, 
procedures, programs, or codes, whether tangible or intangible, 
and whether or how stored, compiled, or memorialized physi-
cally, electronically, graphically, photographically, or in writing 
if— 
(A) the owner thereof has taken reasonable measures to keep 
such information secret; and 
(B) the information derives independent economic value, ac-
tual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not 
being readily ascertainable through proper means by, an-
other person who can obtain economic value from the dis-
closure or use of the information; 
(4) the term “owner“, with respect to a trade secret, means 
the person or entity in whom or in which rightful legal or equi-
table title to, or license in, the trade secret is reposed[.]26 
I’ll return to the hospital example a little later to illustrate the interplay be-
tween secrecy measures and independent development, but for the moment, let’s 
focus on who can be sued: virtually anyone who’s had access to the owner’s 
secrets and now stands in conflict with the owner.27  Most often this means ex-
employees who join or form competitors, but sometimes the accused can be 
insiders like consultants, accountants, or bankers, or outsiders like suppliers, 
 
 26 18 U.S.C. § 1839 (3)–(4) (2018); Cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, § 
39 (AM. LAW INST. 1993) (“A trade secret is any information that can be used in the operation 
of a business or other enterprise and that is sufficiently valuable and secret to afford an actual 
or potential economic advantage over others.”). 
 27 Section 1839’s express inclusion of licensees avoids the standing problem licensees have 
faced under state trade secret laws.  See DTM Research, L.L.C. v. AT&T, Corp., 245 F.3d 327, 
332 (4th Cir. 2001) (authorized possession of secrets supplied standing, even if plaintiff did 
not “own” them in a fee simple sense); Alex Reese, Who “Owns” a Trade Secret? Whether Trade 
Secret Licensees Have Standing to Sue in California, THE RECORDER (Apr. 2, 2019), 
https://www.law.com/therecorder/2019/04/02/who-owns-a-secret-whether-trade-secret-
licensees-have-standing-to-sue-in-california/?slreturn=20190504081009 (“The lack of a for-
mal document or process that defines the property interest for trade secret owners has raised 
a question over who, exactly, has enough ‘ownership’ of a trade secret to have standing to sue 
for misappropriation. Yet California courts haven’t yet reached this seemingly basic issue.”). 
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distributors or licensees.28  Potential business buyers who see secrets but walk 
away, only to reemerge shortly thereafter with suspiciously similar products or 
services, also make prime targets.29  Even lawyers can find themselves in this 
uncomfortable position.30  Computer hackers, too, are targets, if one can find 
them and find a place to sue them.31  The list is long when it comes to potential 
wrongdoers because the DTSA in Section 1839(5) broadly defines “misappro-
priation” to include anyone who knows or has reason to know of improper ac-
quisition of a trade secret: 
(5) the term “misappropriation” means— 
(A) acquisition of a trade secret of another by a person who 
knows or has reason to know that the trade secret was ac-
quired by improper means; or 
(B) disclosure or use of a trade secret of another without 
express or implied consent by a person who— 
(i) used improper means to acquire knowledge of the 
trade secret; 
 
 28 See PFS Distrib. Co. v. Raduechel, 574 F.3d 580 (8th Cir. 2009) (discussing trade secret 
claim against commercial bank); William Lynch Schaller, Growing Pains: Intellectual Property Con-
siderations for Illinois Small Businesses Seeking to Expand, 35 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 845, 849-71 (2004) 
(collecting cases); Andrew F. Tuch, Banker Loyalty in Mergers and Acquisitions, 94 TEX. L. REV. 
1080 (2016) (discussing duties of loyalty and confidentiality of investment banks in the wake 
of recent Delaware decisions). 
 29 See, e.g., Destiny Health, Inc. v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 39 N.E.3d 275 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 2015) (rejecting trade secret claim arising out of Connecticut General’s decision to choose 
another supplier after first seeing plaintiff’s secrets during deal due diligence). 
 30 See Robert W. Hillman, The Property Wars of Law Firms: Of Client Lists, Trade Secrets and the 
Fiduciary Duties of Law Partners, 30 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 767 (2003) (discussing potential trade 
secret liability in cases between law partners); Maritrans GP, Inc. v. Pepper, Hamilton & 
Sheetz, 602 A.2d 1277, 1280 (Pa. 1992) (affirming fiduciary duty injunction against law firm 
that had extensive access to Maritrans’ “complete inner-workings . . . along with Maritrans’ 
long-term objectives, and competitive strategies in a number of areas including the area of 
labor costs, a particularly sensitive area in terms of effective competition”—and then sought 
to represent Maritrans’ competitors in labor negotiations). 
 31 See, e.g., Elizabeth A. Rowe, Rats, Traps, and Trade Secrets, 57 B.C. L. REV. 381 (2016) (an-
alyzing intersection of trade secrets, cybersecurity and cyber misappropriation by unknown or 
anonymous offenders); Dave Weinstein, Hackers Hold Baltimore Hostage, WALL ST. J., May 31, 
2109, at A15 (noting “nameless and faceless criminals” have used ransomware to seize control 
of Baltimore’s municipal computers, causing an estimated $18.2 million in damages, and ref-
erencing two Iranian hackers “who, beginning in 2015, allegedly unleashed ransomware on 
more than 200 victims, including municipal governments, state agencies and hospital networks 
in 43 states,” causing $30 million in damages). 
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(ii) at the time of disclosure or use, knew or had reason 
to know that the knowledge of the trade secret was— 
(I) derived from or through a person who had used 
improper means to acquire the trade secret; 
(II) acquired under circumstances giving rise to a 
duty to maintain the secrecy of the trade secret or 
limit the use of the trade secret; or 
(III) derived from or through a person who owed 
a duty to the person seeking relief to maintain the 
secrecy of the trade secret or limit the use of the 
trade secret; or 
(iii) before a material change of the position of the per-
son, knew or had reason to know that— 
(I) the trade secret was a trade secret; and 
(II) knowledge of the trade secret had been ac-
quired by accident or mistake[.]32 
With nothing and no one categorically exempt, we have to look elsewhere for 
limits.  One place worth initial consideration is the rule of lenity.  The criminal 
and civil sections of the federal trade secret statute share the definitions of “trade 
secret” and “misappropriation” quoted above.  This may require courts to nar-
rowly construe the DTSA under the rule of lenity in cases of doubt, as the Su-
preme Court has held in other contexts.33  The Supreme Court has shown 
 
 32 18 U.S.C. § 1839(5) (2018). 
 33 See, e.g., Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 11 n.8 (2004) (“Because we must interpret the 
statute consistently, whether we encounter its application in a criminal or noncriminal context, 
the rule of lenity applies; cf. United States v. Thompson/Center Arms Co., 504 U.S. 505, 517-
518 (1992) (plurality opinion) (applying the rule of lenity to a tax statute, in a civil setting, 
because the statute had criminal applications and thus had to be interpreted consistently with 
its criminal applications).”); accord United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 859 (9th Cir. 2012) (en 
banc) (“Once we define the phrase [‘exceeds authorized access’] for the purpose of [Computer 
Fraud and Abuse Act] subsection 1030(a)(4), that definition must apply equally to the rest of 
the statute pursuant to the ‘standard principle of statutory construction . . . that identical words 
and phrases within the same statute should normally be given the same meaning.’ Powerex 
Corp. v. Reliant Energy Servs., Inc., 551 U.S. 224, 232, 127 S. Ct. 2411, 168 L.Ed.2d 112 
(2007).”); WEC Carolina Energy Solutions LLC v. Miller, 687 F.3d 199 (4th Cir. 2012) (fol-
lowing Leocal and Nosal, invoking the rule of lenity because the CFAA has both criminal and 
civil applications, and therefore narrowly construing CFAA “without authorization” and “ex-
ceeds authorized access” provisions to exclude violations of restrictions on use, as opposed to 
violations of restrictions on access); Justin Levine, Note, A Clash of Canons: Lenity, Chevron, and 
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considerable interest in the rule of lenity in recent criminal cases,34 and this sleepy 
issue could actually turn out to be quite significant in DTSA cases.  As I explain 
later below,35 “inevitable disclosure,” a theory that often applies even when em-
ployees unwittingly disclose or use secrets, may be inconsistent with the DTSA’s 
definition of “misappropriation,” requiring that the defendant “knows or has 
reason to know” of acquisition through improper means.36  In addition, the 
DTSA’s definition limits “trade secret” to “financial, business, scientific, tech-
nical, economic or engineering information,” in contrast to the UTSA’s defini-
tion that potentially covers all information that otherwise meets its terms.37  For 
example, would the DTSA cover details about President Trump’s supposed tryst 
with adult actress Stormy Daniels or the leaked law firm memos about CBS’ set-
tlement with mainstream actress Eliza Dushku?38  Is it true that others “can ob-
tain economic value from the disclosure or use of [such] information” within the 
meaning of the DTSA?  Would disclosure of such information be exempt from 
civil or criminal trade secret prosecution under the whistleblower immunity sec-
tion of the DTSA?  Would the DTSA’s whistleblower immunity provision —
 
the One-Statute, One-Interpretation Rule, 107 GEO. L.J. 1423 (2019) (reviewing Leocal and other 
precedents in the context of conflicting judicial and administrative agency interpretations of 
statutes having both criminal and civil provisions). 
 34 See United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319, 2333 (2019) (noting that the rule of lenity “is 
‘perhaps not much less old than’ the task of statutory ‘construction itself’” and that the rule 
“is founded on ‘the tenderness of the law for the rights of individuals’ to fair notice of the law 
‘and on the plain principle that the power of punishment is vested in the legislative, not in the 
judicial department’”); Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1244 (2018) (Thomas, J., dissent-
ing) (noting that “lenity is a tool of statutory construction, which means States can abrogate 
it—and many have” and that “[l]enity, moreover, applies only to ‘penal’ statutes”). 
 35 See infra Part III(D). 
 36 See William Lynch Schaller, Trade Secret Inevitable Disclosure: Substantive, Procedural & Practical 
Implications of an Evolving Doctrine (Part I), 86 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 336 (May 2004) 
(discussing different versions of inevitable disclosure, including “pure” form that requires no 
bad acts or bad intent and allows injunctions based on inadvertent disclosure alone).   
 37 Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1839(4) (2018) with UNIF. TRADE SECRET ACT WITH 1985 
AMENDMENTS § 1(4) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1985), which provides: 
§ 1(4) “Trade secret” means information, including a formula, pattern, com-
pilation, program, device, method, technique, or process, that: 
(i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not 
being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by 
proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from 
its disclosure or use, and 
(ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances 
to maintain its secrecy. 
 38 See Rebecca R. Ruiz, Stormy Daniels’s Hush Money Lawsuit Is Dismissed by Judge, N. Y. TIMES 
(March 7, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/07/us/politics/trump-stormy-daniels-
lawsuit-dismissed.html; Rachel Abrams & John Koblin, CBS Paid the Actress Eliza Dushku $9.5 
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which by its terms applies to civil or criminal liability only for disclosure of a 
“trade secret,” a defined term under both federal and state law39 — protect dis-
closure of such information against non-trade secret claims like breach of fidu-
ciary duty?40  I would think the answer to some of these might be “no” if the rule 
of lenity compels a restricted reading of the term “trade secret.”41 
II. RULE 12(B)(1) – JURISDICTION 
Given the distinctly local character of some trade secret disputes, one has to 
wonder whether a narrow construction might be given to the DTSA’s provision 
permitting federal jurisdiction only when the misappropriated “trade secret is re-
lated to a product or service used in, or intended for use in, interstate or foreign 
commerce.“42  This language is broader than the jurisdictional phrasing the Sec-
ond Circuit confined under the rule of lenity in United States v. Aleynikov,43 and it 
appears in the purely civil section of the DTSA, unlike the criminal code language 
at issue in Aleynikov.  However, the DTSA’s civil  “commerce” and “relatedness” 
language is identical to the criminal theft “commerce” and “relatedness” juris-
diction language in the EEA,44 and Congress tucked the DTSA into the EEA, 
 
 39 See William Lynch Schaller, Illinois Trade Secret Law: The Peculiar Problem of Preemption, 43 S. 
ILL. U. L. J. 243 (2019) (discussing variation among state trade secret statutes on whether they 
preempt all claims relating to competitively significant information or whether they just dis-
place claims meeting the statutorily-defined term “trade secret”). 
 40 Cf. Kristen Rasmussen, Employer Responds to Qui Tam Suit with Fiduciary Duty Breach Claim 
Against Whistleblower, CORPORATE COUNSEL (May 10, 2019), https://www.law.com/corpcoun-
sel/2019/05/10/employer-responds-to-qui-tam-suit-with-fiduciary-duty-breach-claim-
against-whistleblower/?slreturn=20190411053359  (discussing complaint in Wheeling Hospi-
tal, Inc. v. Longo, 5:19-CV-32 (N.D. W. Va. Mar. 13, 2019) (Stamp, J.), in which hospital-
employer alleged that whistleblower-executive breached his fiduciary duties by failing to inter-
nally report physician misconduct and by then using that information in an effort to extract a 
False Claims Act settlement from hospital); Peter S. Menell, Tailoring a Public Policy Exception to 
Trade Secret Protection, 105 CAL. L. REV. 1 (2017) (examining the historic interplay of trade se-
crecy protection and reporting of illegal activity). 
 41 See Sharon K. Sandeen & Christopher B. Seaman, Toward a Federal Jurisprudence of Trade 
Secret Law, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 829, 858-86 (2017) (discussing rule of lenity and other 
statutory construction rules that might be used in construing the DTSA). 
 42 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(1) (2018). 
 43 676 F.3d 71, 79-82 (2d Cir. 2012) (reversing trade secret theft conviction; company’s 
internal computer code was not “related to or included in a product that [was] produced for 
or placed in interstate or foreign commerce” under the narrow construction demanded by the 
rule of lenity); United States v. Agrawal, 726 F.3d 235 (2d Cir. 2013) (reaching jurisdictional 
result contrary to Aleynikov on similar facts, over Judge Pooler’s dissent). 
 44 See 18 U.S.C. §1832(a) (2018) (criminalizing theft of a trade secret “related to a product 
or service used in or intended for use in interstate or foreign commerce”); Conor Tucker, The 
DTSA’s Federalism Problem: Federal Court Jurisdiction Over Trade Secrets, 28 FORDHAM INTELL. 
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1 (2017) (exploring the jurisdictional limits of the DTSA based on a 
careful parsing ot its language and history, and emphasizing that the DTSA does not purport 
to reach the full extent of Congress’ power to regulate interstate commerce). 
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thereby bringing us right back to the rule of lenity calling for a narrow construc-
tion of terms shared in statutes with criminal and civil provisions.  Will the rule 
of lenity apply to the DTSA’s jurisdictional provision, given its location in the 
civil section of the EEA?  Even if the rule of lenity does not apply, will this new 
language reach, say, a purely local trade secret fight between two Chicago doctors 
over a list of their Chicago patients?45  Will the Supreme Court’s new majority 
hold that such completely local interests fail to “substantially affect interstate 
commerce” for purposes of DTSA jurisdiction?46   
A separate jurisdictional tangle concerns inevitable disclosure.  I work 
through this issue under the DTSA in detail much later below in the context of 
a specific case, Molon Motor and Coil Corp. v. Nidec Motor Corp.47  For now, it is 
enough to say that most inevitable disclosure cases are brought as injunction 
actions to prevent unavoidable leaks by “the man (or woman) who knew too 
much,” yet the DTSA explicitly forbids injunctions based “merely on the infor-
mation the person knows.”48  If diversity jurisdiction does not exist and federal 
court jurisdiction is predicated exclusively on the DTSA, federal courts may lack 
subject matter jurisdiction in inevitable disclosure cases.  Given this pleading 
configuration, attentive federal courts might disregard or strike inevitable disclo-
sure allegations, block discovery, and then dismiss such DTSA cases pursuant to 
Rule 12(b)(1) or sua sponte as outside their limited jurisdictional authority.49 
 
 45 See DLMC, Inc. v. Flores, No. CV 18-00352 DKW-RT, 2019 WL 309754, at *2 (D. Haw. 
Jan. 23, 2019) (order granting motion to dismiss) (finding lack of interstate commerce connec-
tion and dismissing healthcare firm’s DTSA action against ex-employee for customer list mis-
appropriation where all involved were from Hawaii); Aurora Internal Medicine, Ltd. v. Moore, 
2011 IL App (2d) 101042-U (non-precedential order affirming finding that patient list was a 
trade secret in litigation exclusively among local Illinois doctors); Prentice Medical Corp. v. 
Todd, 495 N.E.2d 1044 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) (patient list was a trade secret that registered nurse 
misappropriated from local medical practice); Sara Ghantous, Making the List: What Does It 
Take to Make a Patient List a Trade Secret?, 18 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 83, 86 n.19 
(2018) (internal citation omitted) (noting federal jurisdiction language in 18 U.S.C. § 
1836(b)(1)). 
 46 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559 (1995).  See also Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Enforcing 
Principled Constitutional Limits on Federal Power: A Neo-Federalist Refinement of Justice Cardozo’s Juris-
prudence, 60 WM. & MARY L. REV. 937, 962 (2019) (“The Rehnquist and Roberts Courts have 
been unwilling to overrule this [Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942)] precedent, which has 
stymied their efforts to impose meaningful originalist restrictions on the Commerce Clause.”); 
Martin J. Salvucci, Note, A Federalist Account of the Law of Trade Secrecy, 29 STAN. L. & POL’Y 
REV. 183, 191-99 (2018) (discussing jurisdictional implications of the DTSA’s “commerce” 
and “relatedness” requirements). 
 47 No. 16-C-03545, 2017 WL 1954531 (N.D. Ill. May 11, 2017). 
 48 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(3)(A)(i)(I) (2018). 
 49 See, e.g., Gov’t Employees Ins. Co. v. Nealey, 262 F. Supp. 3d 153, 172, 173 (E.D. Pa. 
2017) (noting federal court’s duty to sua sponte consider its jurisdiction, discussing legislative 
history of DTSA jurisdiction provision, and holding: “GEICO’s complaint does not allege any 
nexus between interstate or foreign commerce and the alleged trade secrets contained within 
the Antonacci affidavit. This deficiency, in itself, warrants dismissal of plaintiffs’ DTSA 
claim.”). 
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Timing presents another, though more modest, jurisdictional issue.  The 
DTSA expressly states it applies only to claims arising on or after its effective 
date, May 11, 2016, or begun before and continuing after that date.50  This raises 
a question: Does a claim “arise” when the theft takes place, or is a new claim 
triggered each time a defendant discloses or uses the stolen secret?  The DTSA’s 
three-year statute of limitations, found in Section 1836(d), states that “[f]or pur-
poses of this subsection, a continuing misappropriation constitutes a single claim 
of misappropriation,”51 but by its terms, this language is limited to “this subsec-
tion.”  Some courts have held that continued use after the DTSA’s enactment 
implicates the DTSA, even when the original misappropriation occurred before 
May 11, 2016.52  Molon Motor, which I discuss more fully below in connection 
with “identification,” “misappropriation” and “knowledge,” went so far as to 
extend the trade secret “inevitable disclosure” doctrine to find continuous use 
after the DTSA’s effective date.53  This jurisdictional timing problem will fade as 
new acts of misappropriation take place well after the DTSA’s passage, but in 
these first few years a limited subset of pending cases may turn on it. 
III. RULE 12(B)(6) – FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM  
The pro-defendant policy animating the rule of lenity should carry over to 
assessment of DTSA claims at the threshold stage of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to 
dismiss.  While courts use varying formulations to describe trade secret claim 
elements,54 whether under the DTSA or state law, all amount to requiring (1) a 
 
 50 Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-153, 130 Stat. 376, 381-82 (2016) 
(“(e) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by this section shall apply with respect 
to any misappropriation of a trade secret (as defined in section 1839 of title 18, United States 
Code, as amended by this section) for which any act occurs on or after the date of the enact-
ment of this Act.”). 
 51 18 U.S.C. § 1836(d) (2018). Cf. Allied Erecting & Dismantling Co. v. Genesis Equipment 
& Mfg., Inc., 805 F.3d 701, 705 (6th Cir. 2015) (applying Ohio law) (trade secret claim against 
a given defendant arises only once, at the time of misappropriation, subject to the discovery 
rule). 
 52 See, e.g., Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandhu, 291 F. Supp. 3d 659, 674-75 (E.D. Pa. 2018) 
(observing that “one who acquired and used a trade secret before enactment of the DTSA and 
continues to use it after enactment is liable”); Yeiser Research & Dev. LLC v. Teknor Apex 
Co., 281 F. Supp. 3d 1021, 1057 (S.D. Cal. 2017) (DTSA applies to the misappropriation of 
trade secrets before its enactment date “as long as the misappropriation continues to occur 
after the enactment date”). 
 53 Molon Motor and Coil Corp. v. Nidec Motor Corp., No. 16 C 03545, 2017 WL 1954531 
at *7 (N.D. Ill. May 11, 2017) (motor design and quality control trade secrets allegedly misap-
propriated in June 2013 would not necessarily become stale quickly, and thus it was plausible 
defendant would continue to use them after the DTSA’s effective date in May 2016). 
 54 See, e.g., Raytheon Co. v. Indigo Systems Corp., 895 F.3d 1333, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2018) 
(applying California law) (“Raytheon was required to prove, among other things: (1) it owned 
a trade secret; and (2) Indigo misappropriated the trade secret, either by acquisition, use, or 
disclosure.”); Sargent Fletcher, Inc. v. Able Corp., 110 Cal. App. 4th 1658, 1665 (2003) (“Un-
der the UTSA, a prima facie claim for misappropriation of trade secrets requires the plaintiff 
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trade secret, (2) misappropriation, and (3) actual use or disclosure, or at least 
threatened use or disclosure.55  Courts have occasionally pared down the ele-
ments to just two or have even dispensed with explicit elements altogether, as in 
Plastronics Socket Partners Ltd. v. Highrel Inc.,56 where the district court framed the 
Arizona state law test as having two parts – “(1) the existence of a trade secret 
and (2) actual or threatened misappropriation” – and then implicitly applied the 
same two-part test to the DTSA claims without announcing a distinct federal 
standard.  Regardless of how the elements are expressed, the Supreme Court’s 
decisions in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly57 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal58 hold that to with-
stand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint must offer sufficient factual 
matter to state a claim that is “plausible on its face.”59  But what does this really 
mean in the trade secret context?60 
A. TWOMBLY, IQBAL AND EQUIPOISE 
Actually, it should mean a lot.  I can capture the concern in a single word: 
equipoise.  In law, as in medicine, equipoise is defined as an equal balance of 
interests.61  Simply put, to avoid losing, a plaintiff must allege some fact which, 
if believed, makes it more likely than not a wrong has been committed.62  Con-
duct as consistent with innocence as with guilt — a tie — is not enough; it leaves 
 
to demonstrate: (1) the plaintiff owned a trade secret, (2) the defendant acquired, disclosed, or 
used the plaintiff’s trade secret through improper means, and (3) the defendant’s actions dam-
aged the plaintiff.”). 
 55 See, e.g., Learning Curve Toys, Inc. v. PlayWood Toys, Inc., 342 F.3d 714, 728 (7th Cir. 
2003) (applying Illinois Trade Secrets Act). 
 56 No. CV-18-03201-PHX-SMB, 2019 WL 2054362 at *2 (D. Ariz. May 9, 2019). 
 57 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 58 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
 59 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.   
 60 See Daniel A. Epstein, How Probable Is “Plausible”?, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. ONLINE 34 (2018) 
(offering a theoretical model assigning probabilities and expected values to Rule 12(b)(6) mo-
tions to dismiss under Twombly and Iqbal); Bradley Lipton, Comment, Trade Secret Law and the 
Changing Role of Judge and Jury, 120 YALE L.J. 955 (2011) (arguing Twombly and Iqbal suggest 
stricter scrutiny of trade secret claims at the summary judgment stage, but overlooking the 
more direct impact of those Supreme Court cases on Rule 12(b)(6) attacks on trade secret 
claims). 
 61 See, e.g., Burt I. Huang, The Equipoise Effect, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1595 (2016) (discussing 
equipoise in the legal remedies context); Chad Cook & Charles Sheets, Clinical Equipoise and 
Personal Equipoise: Two Necessary Ingredients for Reducing Bias in Manual Therapy Trials, 19 J. MANUAL 
& MANIPULATIVE THERAPY 55 (2011) (“Clinical and personal equipoise exists when a clinician 
has no good basis for a choice between two or more care options or when one is truly uncer-
tain about the overall benefit or harm offered by the treatment to his/her patient.”). 
 62 Cf. Director, Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs v. Greenwich Collieries, 512 U.S. 267, 
272 (1994) (“Burden of proof was frequently used to refer to what we now call the burden of 
persuasion—the notion that if the evidence is evenly balanced, the party that bears the burden 
of persuasion must lose.”). 
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the parties in equipoise.63  Indeed, the Supreme Court in Twombly and Iqbal actu-
ally put it in these terms: “Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely con-
sistent with’ a defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility 
and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’”64 
A great many trade secret cases fit this description all too painfully, since vir-
tually all trade secret cases involve someone with past access to secrets embarking 
on a course that could conceivably, but not necessarily, result in unauthorized 
use or disclosure of those secrets.  Without something more, without some “trig-
ger” fact, the parties stand in equipoise and a lawsuit is not justified.65  In such 
cases, to borrow from the Seventh Circuit’s famous trade secret opinion in Pep-
siCo, Inc. v. Redmond, “[a]ll that is alleged, at bottom, is that defendants could mis-
use plaintiff’s secrets, and plaintiffs fear they will.  This is not enough.  It may be 
that little more is needed, but falling a little short is still falling short.”66 
Although the Supreme Court did not use the word, equipoise was very much 
on the Court’s mind in Twombly, an antitrust case involving parallel conduct of 
competitors.  Indeed, this context prompted the Court’s most famous passages 
in Twombly: 
In applying these general standards to a § 1 claim, we hold that 
stating such a claim requires a complaint with enough factual 
matter (taken as true) to suggest that an agreement was made. 
Asking for plausible grounds to infer an agreement does not im-
pose a probability requirement at the pleading stage; it simply 
calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that dis-
covery will reveal evidence of illegal agreement. And, of course, 
a well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy 
judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable, and “that a 
recovery is very remote and unlikely.” [Id.] In identifying facts 
that are suggestive enough to render a § 1 conspiracy plausible, 
we have the benefit of the prior rulings and considered views of 
leading commentators, already quoted, that lawful parallel con-
duct fails to be-speak unlawful agreement. It makes sense to say, 
therefore, that an allegation of parallel conduct and a bare asser-
tion of conspiracy will not suffice. Without more, parallel con-
duct does not suggest conspiracy, and a conclusory allegation of 
 
 63 Cf. United States v. Hoffman, 901 F.3d 523 (5th Cir. 2018)(in criminal cases the “equi-
poise rule” means no rational factfinder could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt), cert. denied, 
139 S. Ct. 2615 (2019).   
 64 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007)). 
 65 See William Lynch Schaller, Russell Beck & Randall E. Kahnke, Trade Secret “Triggers”: 
What Facts Warrant Litigation?, 19 SEDONA CONF. J. 625, 660 (2018) (explaining equipoise under 
Twombly and Iqbal in the trade secret misappropriation context). 
 66 PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1268-69 (7th Cir. 1995) (quoting Teradyne, Inc. 
v. Clear Commc’ns Corp., 707 F. Supp. 353, 357 (N.D. Ill. 1989)). 
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agreement at some unidentified point does not supply facts ade-
quate to show illegality. Hence, when allegations of parallel con-
duct are set out in order to make a § 1 claim, they must be placed 
in a context that raises a suggestion of a preceding agreement, 
not merely parallel conduct that could just as well be independent 
action. 
The need at the pleading stage for allegations plausibly suggest-
ing (not merely consistent with) agreement reflects the threshold 
requirement of Rule 8(a)(2) that the “plain statement” possess 
enough heft to “sho[w] that the pleader is entitled to relief.” A 
statement of parallel conduct, even conduct consciously under-
taken, needs some setting suggesting the agreement necessary to 
make out a § 1 claim; without that further circumstance pointing 
toward a meeting of the minds, an account of a defendant’s com-
mercial efforts stays in neutral territory. An allegation of parallel 
conduct is thus much like a naked assertion of conspiracy in a § 
1 complaint: it gets the complaint close to stating a claim, but 
without some further factual enhancement it stops short of the 
line between possibility and plausibility of “entitle[ment] to re-
lief.” Cf. DM Research, Inc. v. College of Am. Pathologists, 170 F.3d 
53, 56 ([1st Cir.] 1999) (“[T]erms like ‘conspiracy,’ or even ‘agree-
ment,’ are border-line: they might well be sufficient in conjunc-
tion with a more specific allegation—for example, identifying a 
written agreement or even a basis for inferring a tacit agreement, 
. . . but a court is not required to accept such terms as a sufficient 
basis for a complaint”). 
We alluded to the practical significance of the Rule 8 entitlement 
requirement in Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336  
(2005), when we explained that something beyond the mere pos-
sibility of loss causation must be alleged, lest a plaintiff with “‘a 
largely groundless claim’” be allowed to “‘take up the time of a 
number of other people, with the right to do so representing 
an in terrorem increment of the settlement value.’” Id., at 
347 (quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 
741 (1975)). So, when the allegations in a complaint, however 
true, could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief, “‘this basic 
deficiency should . . . be exposed at the point of minimum ex-
penditure of time and money by the parties and the court.’” 5 
Wright & Miller § 1216, at 233-234 (quoting Daves v. Hawaiian 
Dredging Co., 114 F. Supp. 643, 645 ([D. Hawaii] 1953)); see 
also Dura, supra, at 346; Asahi Glass Co. v. Pentech Pharmaceuticals, 
Inc., 289 F. Supp .2d 986, 995 ([N.D.] Ill. 2003) (Posner, J., sitting 
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by designation) (“[S]ome threshold of plausibility must be 
crossed at the outset before a patent antitrust case should be per-
mitted to go into its inevitably costly and protracted discovery 
phase.”).67 
Federal court trade secret misappropriation pleading presents complexities 
comparable to those plaguing antitrust pleading under Twombly.  First, direct 
proof is in short supply in both settings.  Second, conspiracies are common if 
not the norm in both situations.  Third, the line between fair and unfair compe-
tition is often barely discernable in both.  Fourth, both generate enormous ex-
pense because of legal, factual, and discovery complications and thus produce 
more than their fair share of in terrorem settlement value.68  These difficulties, 
however, do not excuse improper pleading in trade secret cases any more than 
they excuse it in antitrust cases.  If anything, a powerful argument can be made 
that strict adherence to Twombly is even more important in trade secret cases be-
cause thousands of people jump ship to competitors every day, prompting hun-
dreds of trade secret lawsuits each year69 — a number that has increased signifi-
cantly with the passage of the DTSA.70  By comparison, antitrust violations and 
 
 67 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556-58 (footnotes omitted); cf. Comcast Corp. v. Nat’l Assoc. Afri-
can American-Owned Media, 140 S. Ct. 1009, 1014 (2020) (examining “but for” tort causation 
requirement as an element of  42 U.S.C. § 1981 claims: “[T]o determine what the plaintiff must 
plausibly allege at the outset of a lawsuit, we usually ask what the plaintiff must prove in the 
trial at its end.”). 
 68 See, e.g., SKF USA Inc. v. Bjerkness, Nos. 08 C 4709, 09 C 2232, 2011 WL 4501395 (N.D. 
Ill. Sept. 27, 2011) (awarding plaintiff over $1 million in fees under the Illinois Trade Secrets 
Act based on 2,700 hours billed for successful injunction work against ex-employee, even 
though plaintiff only won compensatory damages of $41,068 and punitive damages of $40,000, 
and even though plaintiff rejected multiple settlement offers higher than plaintiff’s ultimate 
monetary recovery); James H. Pooley, The Uniform Trade Secrets Act: California Civil Code 3426, 
1 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH L.J. 193, 203 (1985) (“Trade secret litigation is very expensive and 
disruptive, especially for the start-up technology company which must struggle to achieve 
credibility with customers, employees and sources of financing. As a result, trade secret law-
suits are very effective in the hands of unscrupulous plaintiffs who would pursue a claim not 
to achieve protection of a legitimate trade secret, but simply to harass and possibly destroy a 
new competitor.”). 
 69 See David S. Almeling, Darin W. Snyder, Michael Sapoznikow, Whitney E. McCollum, & 
Jill Weader, A Statistical Analysis of Trade Secret Litigation in State Courts, 46 GONZ. L. REV. 57, 
69 (2010) (study finding almost 60% of trade secret cases involved departing employees and 
more than 30% involved divorcing business owners). 
 70 See Rachel Bailey, Lex Machina: Trade Secret Litigation Report 2018 at 3, Lex Machina (July 
2018), https://www.gordonrees.com/Templates/media/files/pdf/Trade_Secret_Litiga-
tion_Report_2018.pdf (“Trade Secret case filings in federal district court were steady at around 
900 cases per year until 2017, when filings increased sharply by over 30% over the previous 
year. A significant factor for this increase is likely the passing of the Defend Trade Secrets Act 
[.]”). 
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antitrust litigation, though profoundly important, are far less common.71  The 
case for Twombly vigilance in trade secret cases is all the more compelling when 
one considers that most departing employees and divorcing business owners 
have only modest means to fund litigation defense costs compared to the far 
deeper pockets of antitrust defendants.   
Unfortunately, with the exception of statutes of limitations questions, federal 
appeals courts have seldom published opinions exploring trade secret pleading 
issues under Twombly/Iqbal,72 and they have yet to do so in the DTSA context.73  
One of the few, indeed the only one I can find on general pleading issues, ABB 
Turbo Systems AG v. TurboUSA, Inc.,74 was a pre-DTSA case under Florida law 
involving a misappropriation scam spanning twenty years.  Defendant Hans 
Franken left plaintiff ABB in 1986 to found rival firm TurboNed, and later 
founded sister firm TurboUSA in the 1990s.  According to the complaint, “[f]or 
more than twenty years, from 1986 until the sale of TurboNed to a third party in 
2009, Hans Franken and employees of TurboNed paid at least one ABB em-
ployee for confidential information related to ABB parts, servicing, and pric-
ing.”75  The stolen ABB information was later passed along to TurboUSA, and 
in 2008 TurboUSA hired another former ABB employee who had stolen still 
more ABB trade secrets before quitting.76 TurboNed employees thereafter 
 
 71 See Civil Antitrust Litigation Continues to Decline, TRAC REPORTS (June 2019), 
https://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/civil/563/ (reporting 567 federal court antitrust suits in 
2018, with a projected decline to 536 suits in 2019).  In rare instances trade secret misappro-
priation and antitrust claims can even intersect, as in Premier Comp Solutions LLC v. UPMC, 
377 F. Supp. 3d 506, 538 (W.D. Pa. 2019) (misappropriation of trade secrets did not constitute 
per se violation of the Sherman Act). 
 72 See, e.g., Tension Envelope Corp. v. JBM Envelope Co., 876 F.3d 1112, 1122–23 (8th Cir. 
2017) (applying Missouri law) (affirming Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of trade secret claims and 
holding that the “identity of [Tension’s] customers and their unique requirements” were not 
protectable trade secrets, with no discussion of Twombly or Iqbal). 
 73 See Coda Dev. S.R.O. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 916 F.3d 1350, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 
2019) (applying Ohio law) (trade secret misappropriation statute of limitations dismissal de-
termination from face of complaint reversed); Brand Coupon Network, LLC v. Catalina Mktg. 
Corp., 748 F.3d 631 (5th Cir. 2014) (applying Louisiana law) (noting that the district court’s 
dismissal of plaintiff’s trade secret claim, on statute of limitations grounds, was not appealed 
by plaintiff); Cygnus Telecommc’ns. Tech., LLC v.  Telesys Commc’ns., LLC, 536 F.3d 1343, 
1344 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (applying Minnesota law) (affirming Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of trade 
secret claim based on statute of limitations defense apparent from face of complaint); Michelle 
Evans, Plausibility Under the Defend Trade Secrets Act, 16 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 188 
(2017) (citing no federal appellate cases discussing Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of trade secret 
claims); Ronald T. Coleman, Jr., Pleading Plausible Trade-Secret Claims under Twombly and Iqbal, 
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION (May 20, 2014), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litiga-
tion/committees/intellectual-property/articles/2014/pleading-plausible-trade-secret-claims-
under-twombly-iqbal/ (citing no federal appellate cases discussing Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of 
trade secret claims).   
 74 774 F.3d 979 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
 75 Id. at 982. 
 76 Id. at 983. 
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“altered confidential ABB documents in their possession to obscure references 
to ABB, in part to conceal the source of the information, in connection with the 
sale of TurboNed to a new owner in 2009.”77  TurboNed and TurboUSA were 
named as defendants since they were under Hans Franken’s control at all relevant 
times, and Hans’ son Willem, TurboUSA’s manager, was joined as a defendant 
as well.  The district court dismissed the complaint, ruling that ABB was on suf-
ficient inquiry notice to trigger the statute of limitations barring ABB’s claims 
and (somewhat inconsistently) that ABB could not have used reasonable secrecy 
efforts given ABB’s failure to discover the theft scheme for decades.   
The Federal Circuit reversed, holding that both the statute of limitations de-
fense and the reasonableness of ABB’s alleged secrecy measures could not be 
definitively determined on a Twombly Rule 12(b)(6) motion.  On the limitations 
question, the Court of Appeals thought defendants’ secret payments and acqui-
sition concealment efforts spoke for themselves, and “nothing in the amended 
complaint ma[de] clear that the trade secrets were the kind that would readily 
reveal themselves in the marketplace conduct of the users of the information.”78 
These circumstances went beyond “conclusory” and “factually neutral” to make 
ABB’s lack of actual or constructive discovery affirmatively plausible for Twombly 
purposes, the Federal Circuit held, although it stressed that ABB didn’t even have 
to satisfy Twombly to survive the limitations dismissal motion: “It is enough that 
ABB’s amended complaint certainly does not state facts making apparent that 
ABB actually or constructively discovered the alleged misappropriations by June 
2009.”79   
The reasonableness of ABB’s secrecy measures was equally easy to resolve.  
After listing the measures ABB alleged,80 the appeals court noted that the com-
plaint stage is not well-suited for determining what secrecy steps are reasonable 
in a given context.81  It then rejected the district court’s rationale that it was 
“highly unlikely” ABB was “actually restricting physical and electronic access to 
the information and taking other protective measures” in light of the repeated 
 
 77 Id. at 982. 
 78 Id. at 985-86. 
 79 Id. at 986. 
 80 Id. at 986 (ABB’s secrecy measures “include[ed] imposing confidentiality and nondisclo-
sure obligations on ABB employees that have access to ABB’s Turbocharger Trade Secrets, 
marking documents constituting ABB’s Turbocharger Trade Secrets with confidentiality des-
ignations and/or other indicia prohibiting the reproduction or dissemination of such docu-
ments or information to third parties, [and] restricting physical and electronic access by third 
parties to ABB’s Turbocharger Trade Secrets”)(internal citation omitted)(alteration in origi-
nal). 
 81 Id. at 986-87 (citing Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc. v. DEV Indus., Inc., 925 F.2d 174, 179 
(7th Cir. 1991) (Posner, J.) (“[O]nly in an extreme case can what is a ‘reasonable’ precaution 
be determined on a motion for summary judgment, because the answer depends on a balanc-
ing of costs and benefits that will vary from case to case and so require estimation and meas-
urement by persons knowledgeable in the particular field of endeavor involved.”(alteration in 
original)). 
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thefts: 
Protections may be legally adequate to confer legal status as se-
crets, but still not perfectly prevent misappropriation. Indeed, 
trade-secret law is premised on that possibility; there would be 
no actionable misappropriation otherwise. Moreover, once the 
protections are overcome by those engaged in misappropriation, 
detectability turns on the acts of the miscreants, such as their 
furtiveness and concealment efforts. But those acts have no par-
ticular bearing on whether the actions of the secret owner in 
seeking to protect against disclosure were adequate. The sheer 
number and scope of misappropriations, considered apart from 
detectability, may well have a logical bearing on assessing the rea-
sonableness of protective measures. But that presents a classic 
factual question turning on the details of the misappropriations. 
It cannot be answered by judicial assessment at the complaint 
stage in this case. 
ABB’s specific factual allegations of protective measures are 
enough to survive a motion to dismiss. To be 
sure, Twombly and Iqbal indicate that, in separating conclusions 
from facts and deciding whether the alleged facts make affirma-
tively plausible the asserted basis of liability, Twombly, 550 U.S. at 
557 n.5 . . .  courts deciding a motion to dismiss for insufficient 
pleading may consider the strength of alternative explanations of 
the alleged facts. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 567-68. . . (claim of 
parallel business conduct not enough to support conspiracy 
claim where no facts alleged that suggested reason something 
other than individual self-interest); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681-82 
. . . (claim of discriminatory policy insufficient where no official 
communications or other facts alleged beyond allegation of dis-
proportionate effect on Arab Muslim men from investigation of 
9/11 attacks carried out by Arab Muslim men). But such consid-
eration is limited, because the court’s role is only to determine if 
the factual allegations go beyond being “merely consistent with” 
liability to “plausibly suggest[ing]” liability. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 
557 . . . Making that distinction requires a “context-specific” as-
sessment of the particular complaint, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, . . . 
made with the recognition that “a well-pleaded complaint may 
proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of the 
facts alleged is improbable,” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, . . . In this 
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case, for the reasons given, the factual allegations meet the plead-
ing standard regarding protection of the alleged trade secrets.82 
I am particularly interested in two issues raised on appeal but not addressed 
by the district court: (1) whether ABB alleged sufficient facts to show its secrets 
had “economic value” and (2) whether ABB alleged sufficient facts to show de-
fendants TurboUSA and Willem Franken (as opposed to defendants TurboNed 
and Hans Franken) had the “knowledge of the misappropriations required for 
liability,”83 a reference to the “knew or had reason to know” standard set forth 
in the “misappropriation” definition found in the UTSA (and now found in the 
DTSA).  The Federal Circuit noted but did not comment on ABB’s “economic 
value” allegations, which claimed its secrets were not susceptible to reverse en-
gineering and were the subject of significant investment for creation and protec-
tion, but the Court of Appeals did comment on ABB’s “knowledge” allegations, 
which suggested Hans Franken exerted control over TurboUSA (and presuma-
bly over his son Willem).  Without deciding the sufficiency of the pleadings on 
this knowledge issue, the Federal Circuit noted: 
[T]he importance of a “context-specific” application of Rule 
8, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, . . .  and the particular need to apply the 
plausibility standard with a recognition that direct evidence of 
some facts—such as guilty knowledge, in some cases—may be 
distinctively in the defendant’s possession, requiring that the 
threshold standard of plausibility be applied to more circumstan-
tial evidence. See Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, [563 U.S. 27, 
49 & n.15] (2011) (holding, even under a special statutory height-
ened pleading standard requiring a “strong inference” of scienter, 
that plaintiff’s claim could not be dismissed where it pleaded 
facts “sufficient to render the inference of scienter at least as 
compelling as the inference” of innocent conduct; and stating 
that determining guilty knowledge requires courts to review “all 
the allegations holistically” (quotation marks and citation omit-
ted)); Lamm v. State Street Bank & Trust, 749 F.3d 938, 945 (11th 
Cir. 2014) (finding insufficient pleading in a particular case after 
noting: “We are also mindful of the challenge a plaintiff faces in 
establishing a defendant’s mental state without the benefit of dis-
covery.”); Honorable Mark R. Kravitz, Report of the Civil Rules Ad-
visory Committee 53 (May 2, 2011) (“How much fact is required to 
support a reasonable inference of liability varies with context, 
and in many types of action can be rather scant.”); McCauley v. 
 
 82 Id. at 987-88. 
 83 Id. at 988. 
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City of Chicago, 671 F.3d 611, 619 n.2 (7th Cir. 2011) (highlighting 
commentary).84 
I dwell on ABB Turbo Systems because it’s the only appellate precedent we 
have to measure trade secret allegations under Twombly and Iqbal.  As I show 
below, ABB Turbo Systems foreshadowed a number of important trade secret 
pleading issues under the DTSA, not least “reasonable [secrecy] measures” and 
“economic value” when alleging a trade secret, and “knew or had reason to 
know” when alleging misappropriation.85  The ABB Turbo Systems framework 
should be kept in mind as we work through Plastronics and Molon Motor, two 
pleading cases I give close consideration below. 
B. ALLEGING A TRADE SECRET 
Plastronics focused exclusively on the first element, the existence of a trade 
secret, so it is a good place to start, even though it did not cite ABB Turbo Systems.  
The scenario was standard: two employees, one of whom was Plastronics’ Chief 
Technology Officer, quit to form a rival.86  Although establishing a protectable 
trade secret in a complaint should be routine, plaintiff in Plastronics failed to suf-
ficiently identify the secret at issue and struggled to allege the statutory element 
of “economic value” embedded in both the Arizona and DTSA definitions of 
“trade secret.”87  The Plastronics court ruled that plaintiff’s complaint at least 
needed to identify the secrets in issue by category or by reference to documents 
containing them.  The court also rejected plaintiff’s bare recital of the statutory 
definition of economic value; no facts were alleged to show how or why Plas-
tronics’ vague information had independent economic value by virtue of not be-
ing generally known in the industry.  However, the court did uphold plaintiff’s 
“reasonable secrecy measures” allegations based solely on the ex-employees’ 
confidentiality agreements with Plastronics.88  The Plastronics court’s rulings at 
first blush seem to be consistent with the notice-pleading purpose of Rule 8(a) 
and the issue-narrowing function of Rule 12(b)(6) as glossed by Twombly and Iq-
bal,89 but these rulings deserve a closer look. 
 
 84 Id. at 988-89. 
 85 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3)(A)–(B), (5)(B)(ii) (2018). 
 86 Plastronics Socket Partners Limited v. Highrel Inc., No. CV-18-03201-PHX-SMB, 2019 
WL 2054362 at *1 (D. Ariz. May 9, 2019). 
 87 Id. at *2-*4 (citing ARIZ REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-401(4)(b);18 U.S.C. § 1839(3)(B) (2018)). 
 88 Id. at *4.   
 89 See Rebecca Love Kourlis, Jordan M. Singer, & Natalie Knowlton, Reinvigorating Pleadings, 
87 DENVER U.L. REV. 245, 262 (2010) (“From our perspective, the degree of departure from 
prior caselaw—and even whether the ‘plausibility’ standard [in Twombly and Iqbal] is the right 
one—is less important than the unmistakable message of both cases that the issue-narrowing 
function of current pretrial procedure is broken. The Court’s announcement of a ‘plausibility’ 
standard for pleadings was an overt admission that the long-held assumption that discovery 
could compensate for the loss of issue-narrowing at the pleadings stage is simply not true for 
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C. IDENTIFICATION 
  Every case must start somewhere, and the place to start is with the one thing 
plaintiff knows: its secrets.  Indeed, the existence of a trade secret is an indispen-
sable element of every trade secret claim.90  Every trade secret complaint, there-
fore, should specifically identify the secret(s) the plaintiff initially claims to be in 
issue, even if additional secrets turn out to have been stolen.  This provides a 
fixed target for trade secret discovery.91  But insisting on pleading trade secret 
identity with specificity does more: it prevents plaintiff from using vaguely de-
scribed secrets as a means to bully competitors through baseless litigation and 
lays down a marker to measure plaintiff’s shifting descriptions of its secrets for 
sanction purposes.92  After all, as part of its reasonable secrecy measures, the 
owner should have been cataloging its secrets93 and monitoring their use long 
before a lawsuit,94 and simple fairness dictates that employees and other 
 
at least some types of cases.”); Yoichiro Hamabe, Functions of Rule 12(b)(6) in the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure: A Categorization Approach, 15 CAMPBELL L. REV. 119, 127 (1993) (lamenting no-
tice-pleading regime before Twombly and Iqbal and arguing, presciently, that Rule 12(b)(6) can 
eliminate or narrow “issues concerning substantive law or sufficiency of the complaint which 
would promote a resolution on the merits, or disposing of an unmeritorious claim”). 
 90 See Julie A. Henderson, The Specifically Defined Trade Secret: An Approach to Protection, 27 
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 537, 550 (1987) (“In the context of trade secret litigation, proof of the 
existence of a trade secret has been characterized as the ‘sine qua non’ of a misappropriation 
claim.”) (quoting MELVIN JAGER, TRADE SECRETS LAW §5.02 (1985)). 
 91 See, e.g., Imax Corp. v. Cinema Tech., Inc., 152 F.3d 1161, 1164-68 (9th Cir. 1998) (sum-
mary judgment decision discussing without deciding Imax’s need to identify its projector sys-
tem’s “dimensions and tolerances” trade secrets with particularity under California law, as set 
forth in Cal. Civ. Code  §3426.1(d)); Combined Metals of Chi. Ltd. P’ship v. Airtek, Inc., 985 
F.Supp. 827, 832 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (ruling that disputes concerning scope of trade secret would 
not be tolerated beyond pleading stage). 
 92 See DeRubeis v. Witten Tech., Inc., 244 F.R.D. 676, 680 (N.D. Ga. 2007) (“[I]f discovery 
on the defendant’s trade secrets were automatically permitted, lawsuits might regularly be filed 
as ‘fishing expeditions’ to discover the trade secrets of a competitor.”) (quoting Kevin R. Ca-
sey, Identification of Trade Secrets during Discovery: Timing and Specificity, 24 AIPLA Q.J. 191, 204 
(1996)); Cypress Semiconductor Corp. v. Maxim Integrated Products, Inc., 236 Cal. App. 4th 
243, 255 (2015) (confronted with trade secret identification discovery concerning its alleged 
in-house list of employees working on touchscreen technology, plaintiff Cypress voluntarily 
dismissed its misappropriation complaint; court nevertheless sanctioned Cypress with a fee 
award of over $180,000, rejecting Cypress’ appeal as “a kind of carnival fun house in which 
the facts of the case are distorted into grotesque and nearly unrecognizable shapes”). 
 93 See R. Mark Halligan, The Next Revolution in Intellectual Property Law: Automated Trade Secret 
Asset Management, LANDSLIDE, May/June 2019, at 10–12 (discussing automation options for 
recording and maintaining secrets). 
 94 See GE Betz, Inc. v. Moffit-Johnston, 885 F.3d 318, 322 (5th Cir. 2018) (“GE installs 
monitoring software on the computers of all GE employees, which captures and logs certain 
actions taken, including emails sent and files copied to external hard drives. According to a 
report generated by the software on Moffitt-Johnston’s computer (the DLP report), on Sep-
tember 24, 2012, days after she announced her resignation, someone using Moffitt-Johnston’s 
computer downloaded over 27,000 files to an external hard drive . . . Subsequently, on Octo-
ber 9, 2012, another download was attempted to the same external hard drive but was blocked 
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authorized users should have been put on notice as to concrete, identifiable in-
formation they were not permitted to copy or take with them for their own pur-
poses as part of their general skill and knowledge.95  As Professor Deepa Vara-
darajan has observed: 
[C]lear communication or notice about one’s claim to property 
is important because it helps facilitate trade, minimizes conflict 
over resources, and prevents wasted labor by others. 
. . . . 
. . . In trade secret law, these concerns take on an additional di-
mension because insufficient notice about the boundaries of 
trade secrets can impact employee mobility and freedom.  If em-
ployees cannot discern the boundaries of trade secret-protected 
 
by exit controls that had been installed on Moffitt-Johnston’s computer in the interim . . . 
Additionally, according to the DLP report, in the days prior to her departure, Moffitt-Johnston 
sent GE files via email to herself at outside email addresses.”); United States v. Aleynikov, 785 
F. Supp. 2d 46, 51 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“Goldman Sachs has implemented many security 
measures to maintain the secrecy of its high frequency trading system. In order to protect the 
firm’s computer systems from intrusion, the firm maintains a fire-wall. It monitors its employ-
ees’ use of internet sites and also blocks access to certain websites. A banner that appears 
whenever employees log in to their computers advises them of prohibited uses of the internet 
and accepted behaviors. Access to Goldman Sachs’ buildings is restricted to employees with 
proper identification cards; access to firm computers is also restricted. Only those few em-
ployees with administrative access, including Aleynikov at the time of his employment with 
the firm, are permitted to use USB flash drives.”). 
 95 See GlobalTap LLC v. Elkay Mfg. Co., No. 13 C 632, 2015 WL 94235 at *6 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 
5, 2015) (rejecting witness testimony that “every word” of a 101-page document was a trade 
secret; to be a protectable trade secret, an idea or concept must be “concrete”); Electro-Craft 
Corp. v. Controlled Motion, Inc., 332 N.W.2d 890, 902-03 (Minn. 1983) (“ECC’s [secrecy] 
efforts were especially inadequate because of the nonintuitive nature of ECC’s claimed secrets 
here. The dimensions, etc., of ECC’s motors are not trade secrets in as obvious a way as a 
‘secret formula’ might be. ECC should have let its employees know in no uncertain terms that 
those features were secret.  Instead, ECC treated its information as if it were not secret. None 
of its technical documents were marked ‘Confidential,’ and drawings, dimensions and parts 
were sent to customers and vendors without special marking. Employee access to documents 
was not restricted. ECC never issued a policy statement outlining what it considered to be 
secret.”); Camilla A. Hrdy, The General Knowledge, Skill, and Experience Paradox, 60 B.C.L. Rev. 
2409 (2019) (examining cases and arguing on historical and public policy grounds that the gen-
eral skill and knowledge defense should be given sweeping effect in employee cases, in order 
to protect employee mobility); Kurt M. Saunders & Nina Golden, Skill or Secret? – The Line 
Between Trade Secrets and Employee General Skills and Knowledge, 15 N.Y.U.  J. L. & BUS. 61, 75-84 
(2018) (discussing different approaches courts have taken in distinguishing trade secrets from 
employee general skill and knowledge).  But see Sharon K. Sandeen, The Evolution of Trade Secret 
Law and Why Courts Commit Error When They Do Not Follow the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 33 
HAMLINE L. REV. 493, 525 (2010) (discussing UTSA drafters’ decision to omit a “tangibility” 
condition from the “economic value” requirement in the UTSA definition of “trade secret”). 
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information ex ante, they may be overly cautious to move jobs 
and start new entrepreneurial endeavors, taking their existing 
skills and knowledge with them.96 
These circumstances demand particularity in pleading, but at the federal level 
there is no specific statute or rule addressing trade secret identification require-
ments for pleading or discovery. The DTSA itself is silent on the issue.  The 
Supreme Court has never considered the issue from a pleading standpoint, and 
the Courts of Appeals also appear not to have analyzed identification as a matter 
of pure pleading.  As a result, federal district courts have been sporadic at best 
in calling for identification pleading.97  Combined Metals of Chicago Ltd. Partnership 
v. Airtek,98 a Northern District of Illinois case decided before Twombly and Iqbal, 
is representative.  Airtek hired Combined Metals to fabricate catalytic converters 
pursuant to Airtek’s proprietary designs and blueprints for tooling.  Combined 
Metals began making converters for other firms, prompting Airtek to bring trade 
secret theft and other counterclaims.  On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, 
Combined Metals argued Airtek had failed to sufficiently allege its precise trade 
secrets in issue.  The district court rejected Airtek’s “notice pleading” response 
as well as Airtek’s reliance on Conley v. Gibson99 before noting that Airtek appeared 
to be identifying two trade secrets – “the die and the knowledge of producing 
the catalytic converter shells.”100  The district court then recounted its own un-
happy experience with insufficient identification one year before in Thermodyne 
Food Service Products, Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp.,101 where defense confusion arose at 
summary judgment when the plaintiff redefined its claimed secrets.  Citing no 
appellate authority on trade secret identification pleading, the Airtek court ruled: 
Airtek will be held to those trade secrets, i.e., it will not be per-
mitted to change or narrow them as the case progresses. If there 
is a more specific technology underlying the die or the knowledge 
of producing the catalytic converter shells that Airtek desires to 
claim as a trade secret, Airtek better put Combined Metals on 
notice of such technology now (by filing an amended 
 
 96 Deepa Varadarjan, Trade Secret Precautions, Possession, and Notice, 68 HASTINGS L.J. 357, 382, 
385-86 (2017). 
 97 See, e.g., AutoMed Techs., Inc. v. Eller, 160 F. Supp. 2d 915, 925 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (noting 
plaintiff promised to identify its trade secrets with more particularity in its amended complaint, 
and then finding plaintiff’s “general allegations of software, designs and research” to be “in-
sufficient,” without citing any law). 
 98 985 F. Supp. 827 (N.D. Ill. 1997). 
 99 See id. at 831; id. at 829 (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)). 
 100 Id. at 832. 
 101 940 F. Supp. 1300, 1304-05 (N.D. Ill. 1996). 
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counterclaim) or forfeit the right to claim such technology as a 
trade secret at a later time in this case.102 
Some states have provided more definitive guidance on trade secret identifi-
cation for pleading purposes.  California, a fact-pleading jurisdiction, has long 
imposed a reasonable “particularity” pleading standard in trade secret cases, start-
ing with the famous decision in Diodes, Inc. v. Franzen.103  There, Stump and Fran-
zen, both directors and officers of Diodes, refused to divulge their secret re-
search and departed to form a rival semiconductor firm.  Uncertain as to what 
research Stump and Franzen had been doing, Diodes in its third amended com-
plaint was only able to vaguely allege that they had developed a “secret process” 
having something to do with manufacturing diodes.  The California Court of 
Appeal held this was not sufficient to meet California’s fact-pleading standards: 
Before a defendant is compelled to respond to a complaint based 
upon claimed misappropriation or misuse of a trade secret and 
to embark on discovery which may be both prolonged and ex-
pensive, the complainant should describe the subject matter of 
the trade secret with sufficient particularity to separate it from 
matters of general knowledge in the trade or of special 
knowledge of those persons who are skilled in the trade, and to 
permit the defendant to ascertain at least the boundaries within 
which the secret lies.104 
Diodes eventually led the California legislature to pass a California Civil Code 
of Procedure provision requiring the party alleging misappropriation to identify 
its trade secrets with reasonable particularity before commencing discovery.105  
This statute, as one might expect, has resulted in battles over whether plaintiff 
has made too little disclosure or whether defendant has demanded too much.106  
 
 102 Combined Metals, 985 F. Supp. at 832. 
 103 260 Cal. App. 2d 244 (1968).  See also MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 
511, 522 (9th Cir. 1993) (applying California law and citing Diodes) (“[A] plaintiff who seeks 
relief for misappropriation of trade secrets must identify the trade secrets and carry the burden 
of showing that they exist.”). 
 104 Diodes, 260 Cal. App. 2d at 253. 
 105 Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 2019.210 (“[B]efore commencing discovery relating to a trade 
secret, the party alleging the misappropriation shall identify the trade secret with reasonable 
particularity. . .”); Pooley, supra note 68, at 203, 215 (discussing legislative history of the Cali-
fornia Code of Civil Procedure “reasonable particularity” section and its tie to Diodes). 
 106 Perlan Therapeutics, Inc. v. Superior Court, 178 Cal. App. 4th 1333, 1350 (2009) (“Perlan 
is not entitled to include broad, ‘catch-all’ language as a tactic to preserve an unrestricted, 
unilateral right to subsequently amend its trade secret statement. If Perlan does not know what 
its own trade secrets are, it has no basis for suggesting defendants misappropriated them. Nor 
is Perlan entitled to hide its trade secrets in ‘plain sight’ by including surplusage and volumi-
nous attachments in its trade secret statement.  If, through discovery, Perlan uncovers 
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It has also prompted federal court decisions debating whether this disclosure 
requirement constitutes substantive law, implicating Erie in California diversity 
jurisdiction cases.107  Other states, by statute or judicial decision, have imposed 
similar particularity disclosure requirements on plaintiffs, either in complaints or 
at least before discovery commences,108 with Massachusetts the latest to act on 
both fronts.109  The net effect of these scattered state and federal district court 
 
information suggesting defendants misappropriated additional trade secrets, it may have good 
cause to amend its trade secret statement under appropriate circumstances.”) (footnotes omit-
ted); Brescia v. Angelin, 172 Cal. App. 4th 133, 143 (2009) (“Absent a showing that the details 
alone, without further explanation, are inadequate to permit the defendant to discern the 
boundaries of the trade secret so as to prepare available defenses, or to permit the court to 
understand the identification so as to craft discovery, the trade secret claimant need not par-
ticularize how the alleged secret differs from matters already known to skilled persons in the 
field.”); Advanced Modular Sputtering, Inc.  v. Superior Court, 132 Cal. App. 4th 826, 834 
(2005) (“‘Reasonable particularity’ mandated by section 2019.210 does not mean that the party 
alleging misappropriation has to define every minute detail of its claimed trade secret at the 
outset of the litigation. Nor does it require a discovery referee or trial court to conduct a 
miniature trial on the merits of a misappropriation claim before discovery may commence . . . 
The degree of ‘particularity’ that is ‘reasonable’ will differ, depending on the alleged trade se-
crets at issue in each case. Where, as here, the alleged trade secrets consist of incremental 
variations on, or advances in the state of the art in a highly specialized technical field, a more 
exacting level of particularity may be required to distinguish the alleged trade secrets from 
matters already known to persons skilled in that field.”). 
 107 Compare Funcat Leisure Craft, Inc. v. Johnson Outdoors, Inc., No. S-06-0533 GEB 
GGH, 2007 WL 273949 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2007) (ruling that Section 2019.210 is procedural 
and hence not binding in federal court under Erie) with Comput. Econ., Inc. v. Gartner Grp., 
Inc., 50 F. Supp. 2d 980 (S.D. Cal. 1999) (holding Section 2019.210 constituted substantive 
state law applicable to federal court diversity jurisdiction proceedings under Erie) and E.J. Gallo 
Winery v. Instituut Voor Landbouw-En Visserijonderzoek, No. 1:17-cv-00808-DAD-EPG, 
2018 WL 3062160, at *2-*4 (E.D. Cal. June 18, 2018) (collecting conflicting cases on Erie 
treatment of Section 2019.210 and then following Section 2019.210 under the court’s inherent 
authority to sequence discovery). 
 108 SmithKline Beecham Pharms. Co v. Merck & Co., 766 A.2d 442, 447 (Del. 2000) (“In 
cases involving trade secrets, the plaintiff is required to disclose, before obtaining discovery of 
confidential proprietary information of its adversary, the trade secrets it claims were misap-
propriated . . . The plaintiff must disclose the allegedly misappropriated trade secrets with rea-
sonable particularity.” (citation omitted)); MSCI Inc. v. Jacob, 36 Misc. 3d 211, 213-14 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 2012) (adopting reasonable particularity standard for discovery purposes: “[T]he court 
is persuaded that the law requires that a trade secret plaintiff identify trade secrets with rea-
sonable particularity early in the case . . . Only by distinguishing between the general 
knowledge in their field and their trade secrets will the court be capable of setting the param-
eters of discovery and will defendants be able to prepare their defense.”)(citation omitted); 
Krawiec v. Manly, 811 S.E.2d 542, 548 (N.C. 2018) (following SmithKline Beecham and adopting 
reasonable particularity for pleading a trade secret); ECT Int’l, Inc. v. Zwerlein, 597 N.W.2d 
479, 482 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999) (endorsing Diodes pleading “particularity” standard for assessing 
trade secret complaints). 
 109 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93, § 42D(b) (2018) (“In an action . . . alleging trade secrets 
misappropriation a party must state with reasonable particularity the circumstances thereof, 
including the nature of the trade secrets and the basis for their protection.  Before commencing 
discovery related to an alleged trade secret, the party alleging misappropriation shall identify 
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standards has been to require modest identification in complaints followed by 
more searching identification inquiries during discovery.  Since state and federal 
trade secret identification law has thus far favored discovery over complaints, 
since no federal statute or rule speaks to trade secret identification, and since 
federal notice pleading could hardly have been more lax until Twombly and Iqbal, 
it is unsurprising that the very capable commentators who have weighed in on 
aspects of identification have given relatively short shrift to the federal court 
pleading issue, focusing instead on state and federal court discovery.110  I confess 
I’ve been guilty of the same sin.111 
As matters stand, with so few trade secret cases reaching the federal Courts 
of Appeals on pleading questions, it is easy to assume that a “short and plain 
statement” for purposes of Rule 8(a) means general pleading standards in federal 
court “require plausibility as opposed to particularity.”112  Or, in what amounts 
to only a small improvement, a court might say Rule 8(a) calls for something like 
the brief trade secret description the Plastronics court suggested, with the details 
left for the discovery process.  I think both approaches miss the Supreme Court’s 
“context-specific” emphasis in Iqbal.  The North Carolina Supreme Court, con-
struing North Carolina Rule of Civil Procedure 8 on notice pleading in Krawiec v. 
Manly, adopted the rule federal courts should follow: “To plead misappropriation 
 
the trade secret with sufficient particularity under the circumstances of the case to allow the 
court to determine the appropriate parameters of discovery and to enable reasonably other 
parties to prepare their defense.”). 
 110 DAVID W. QUINTO & STUART H. SINGER, TRADE SECRETS: LAW AND PRACTICE, ch. 2, at 
83-87 (Oxford 2009) (in Chapter 2 describing the “reasonable particularity” pleading standard 
as “relatively minimal” and citing only one case, Diodes, but then cautioning in Chapter 3 that 
“[t]he argument that a plaintiff should always identify its allegedly misappropriated trade se-
crets with reasonable particularity at the outset may gain support from the Supreme Court 
decision in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly”); Casey, supra note 92, at 245-53 (discussing federal 
court notice pleading under Conley and state court particularity standard under Diodes, but of-
fering no pleading particularity decision other than Diodes and writing long before Twombly and 
Iqbal); Richard F. Dole, Jr., Identifying the Trade Secrets at Issue in Litigation Under the Uniform Trade 
Secrets Act and the Federal Defend Trade Secrets Act, 33 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 470, 480-
81 (2017) (discussing only one identification pleading case, Diodes, without discussing potential 
impact of Twombly and Iqbal); Charles Tait Graves & Brian D. Range, Identification of Trade Secret 
Claims in Litigation: Solutions for a Ubiquitous Dispute, 5 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 68, 79-80 
(2006) (devoting a single paragraph to identification pleading while citing Diodes and a handful 
of pleading cases, but writing before Twombly and Iqbal); Pooley, supra note 68, at 203  (men-
tioning Diodes in two-paragraph discussion of the provision that ultimately was codified as 
§2019.210, but focusing exclusively on California state law and writing long before Twombly 
and Iqbal). 
 111 See William Lynch Schaller, Secrets of the Trade: Tactical and Legal Considerations from the Trade 
Secret Plaintiff’s Perspective, 29 REV. LITIG. 729, 772-73, 801 (2010) (discussing whether Twombly 
and Iqbal might herald “greater factual specificity for [pleading] federal court [trade secret] 
cases” and later collecting Seventh Circuit and other trade secret identification discovery cases, 
but offering no explicit identification pleading discussion). 
 112 Physician’s Surrogacy, Inc. v. German, No. 17cv0718-MMA (WVG), 2018 WL 638229, 
at *5 n.4 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2018) (rejecting California-style “particularity” pleading for DTSA 
cases). 
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of trade secrets, a plaintiff must identify a trade secret with sufficient particularity 
so as to enable a defendant to delineate that which he is accused of misappropri-
ating and a court to determine whether misappropriation has or is threatened to 
occur.”113 
Assuming Congress leaves the DTSA as is for the foreseeable future, federal 
courts should at least adopt a reasonable particularity pleading standard, whether 
by local rule, by appellate decision, or by amendment to the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure.114  I would go further and require plaintiffs to file their secrets 
under seal simultaneously with the complaint.  This is what the plaintiff did in 
Molon Motor, for example, so it certainly can be done, albeit with leave of court.115  
The DTSA generally authorizes courts to make whatever orders are necessary to 
protect secrets116 and provides a specific example for court custody of secrets 
impounded under a search and seizure order.117  In fact, the DTSA expressly 
alludes to complaints being filed under seal in its whistleblower immunity sec-
tion.118  Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, of course, also has 
long empowered courts to enter protective orders to shield trade secrets from 
unnecessary disclosure.119  And in the absence of any specific statute or rule, 
 
 113 Krawiec, 811 S.E.2d at 547–48 (quoting Washburn v. Yadkin Valley Bank & Trust Co., 
660 S.E.2d 577, 585 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008)). 
 114 Indeed, some federal Courts of Appeals have read Twombly and Iqbal to require factual 
particularity of a sort in other contexts.  See, e.g., Doe v. Columbia College Chi., 933 F.3d 849, 
854 (7th Cir. 2019) (stating in a Title IX case: “A plaintiff must plead particularized factual 
content, not conclusory allegations, that allows the court to plausibly infer the defendant is 
liable for the alleged misconduct.”) (citation omitted); Bethany A. Corbin, Riding the Wave or 
Drowning?: An Analysis of Gender Bias and Twombly/Iqbal in Title IX Accused Student Lawsuits, 85 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2665 (2017) (discussing whether Twombly and Iqbal are being applied cor-
rectly in the Title IX context).  
 115 Molon Motor & Coil Corp. v. Nidec Motor Corp., No. 16 C 03545, 2017 WL 1954531, 
at *4 (N.D. Ill. May 11, 2017) (“Nidec acknowledges that, in a sealed appendix to the Third 
Amended Complaint, Molon has added details – file names and summaries – of the alleged 
stolen trade secrets.”); cf. CleanFish, LLC v. Sims, No. 19-CV-03663-HSG, 2020 WL 1274991, 
at *9 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 2020) (on Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss in case brought under 
DTSA and California law, court refused to wade through alleged trade secrets “further identi-
fied in [plaintiff’s] Motion to Seal,” on the ground that the court “cannot consider extrinsic 
evidence outside the [complaint] at the motion to dismiss stage”). 
 116 See 18 U.S.C. §1836(b)(3)(A)(ii) (2018) (“In a civil action brought under this subsection 
with respect to the misappropriation of a trade secret, a court may grant an injunction if de-
termined appropriate by the court, requiring affirmative actions to be taken to protect the trade 
secret.”). 
 117 See 18 U.S.C. §1836(b)(2)(D). 
 118 See 18 U.S.C. § 1833(b)(1)(B) (2018) (an individual shall not be criminally or civilly liable 
under any federal or state law for disclosing a trade secret “in a complaint or other document 
filed in a lawsuit or other proceeding, if such filing is made under seal”). 
 119 See  FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1), 26(c)(1)(G) (“The court may, for good cause, issue an order 
to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or 
expense, including one or more of the following . . . requiring that a trade secret or other 
confidential research, development, or commercial information not be revealed or be revealed 
only in a specified way.”). 
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federal courts possess inherent authority “to manage their own affairs so as to 
achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases”120 — authority that in-
cludes sealing a complaint or its relevant exhibits upon a proper “good cause” 
showing of trade secret necessity.121  All of these address the often-expressed 
concern that requiring specificity in complaints runs the risk of public disclosure 
and hence destruction of secrets.122 
When I speak of attaching plaintiff’s secrets to the complaint (under seal, of 
course), I mean attaching the actual secret defendant was supposedly shown and 
supposedly stole.  This is, in essence if not in fact, a chain of custody require-
ment.123  We live in an age of heightened corporate security and careful computer 
monitoring; employers practically brag about their ability to track employee com-
puter activity down to the keystroke, to analyze data about their employees, and 
to predict an employee’s every move.124  Blockchain technology is rapidly gaining 
popularity, too, with its ability to validate and track transactions in a reliable and 
indeed self-authenticating manner;125 it’s only a question of time until this tech-
nology is adapted for internal trade secret recordkeeping purposes.126  In these 
 
 120 Dietz v. Bouldin, 136 S. Ct. 1885, 1891 (2016) (quoting Link v. Wabash R.R. Co, 370 
U.S. 626, 630-31 (1962)). 
 121 See Sherwin Williams Co. v. Courtesy Oldsmobile Cadillac, Inc., No. 1:15-cv-01137 MJS, 
2015 WL 8665601 at *2 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 2015) (denying motion to seal supply agreement 
exhibit because plaintiff merely made “conclusory arguments” and “blanket” claims that sup-
ply agreement contained trade secrets). 
 122 See, e.g., Mission Measurement Corp. v. Blackbaud, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 3d 915, 921 (N.D. 
Ill. 2016) (denying Rule 12(b)(6) trade secret identification motion in DTSA case, ruling that 
“[a]t the pleading stage, plaintiffs need only describe the information and efforts to maintain 
confidentiality of the information in general terms” and that “trade secrets need not be dis-
closed in detail in a complaint alleging misappropriation for the simple reason that such a 
requirement would result in public disclosure of the purported trade secrets”) (alteration in 
original) (internal quotations omitted). 
 123 See, e.g., Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 306, 311 n.1 (2009) (discussing chain 
of custody as a Confrontation Clause requirement in criminal cases); Jared S. Hopkins & Stacy 
St. Clair, Mysterious Bag in Patrick Kane Case Was a Hoax, DA Says, Chicago Tribune (Sept. 25, 
2015 3:58 PM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/breaking/ct-patrick-kane-investiga-
tion-20150925-story.html (reporting on “rape kit” hoax against famous Chicago Blackhawks 
hockey player Patrick Kane: “At a news conference on Friday, Erie County District Attorney 
Frank Sedita III said the bag was given to the accuser’s mother when she accompanied her 
daughter to a local hospital to have a rape kit done on Aug. 2. She was the last known person 
to have the bag, he said. Sedita methodically walked reporters through a detailed timeline and 
surveillance video, showing the chain of custody of the rape kit. Video recordings, Sedita said, 
showed the kit was put in a box and never placed in [the] bag.”). 
 124 See Sarah Krouse, The New Ways Your Boss Is Spying on You, WALL ST. J., July 20, 2019, at 
B1.   
 125 See Jason Tashea, Best Evidence, 105 A.B.A. J. 22 (2019) (reporting on new laws in Arizona, 
Delaware, Ohio and Vermont, and noting blockchain may constitute self-authenticating evi-
dence under Rule 902 of the Federal Rules of Evidence). 
 126 See Christina M. Jordan, Navigating Discovery with Blockchain Technology, 44 LITIG. NEWS. 2 
(2019) (“Because the ledger is an ongoing, validated, and secure log of all transactions rec-
orded, blockchain can be useful for transactions involving proof and chain of title and 
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circumstances, a diligent trade secret owner should know exactly what its secrets 
are, should know exactly who was given access to them, should know exactly 
when they were accessed, and through proper pre-litigation investigation, should 
know exactly which trade secrets it thinks were stolen and why.  In other words, 
trade secret identification at the time of authorized access should present a ques-
tion of law for Rule 12(b)(6) purposes; either the secret was sufficiently identified 
at access or it was not.127  The complaint can easily tell this tale by attaching the 
secret exactly as disclosed and by attaching computer logs detailing the time and 
place of disclosure. 
Trade secret theft is a serious crime.  Such an accusation can instantly derail 
a new employee’s career or tank a pending business deal.  No one should need 
to guess about what was allegedly taken in these and other settings involving 
controversies crucial to our free market economy.  Ending such uncertainty at 
the outset should be the very purpose of “notice” pleading.  In my view, Twombly 
and Iqbal command it in trade secret cases.128 
D. ECONOMIC VALUE 
Aside from knowing what its secrets are, plaintiff should also know why its 
secrets would be valuable to others in the trade.  As suggested in ABB Turbo 
Systems, a brief description of the time and effort it took to create them and why 
they provide a competitive edge should be enough to withstand attacks under 
Twombly and Iqbal.129  Plastronics was somewhat unusual in that plaintiff merely 
made boilerplate economic value allegations.  Assuming most plaintiffs will offer 
at least some facts on this topic, few trade secret cases should be subject to 
 
ownership of property. These features also make blockchain effective for providing current 
and accurate audit trails and identifying parties to transactions.”). 
 127 See Genentech, Inc. v. JHL Biotech, Inc., No. C 18-06582, 2019 WL 1045911, at * 8 
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2019) (in DTSA case, granting Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, in part, and 
ordering plaintiff Genentech to provide a detailed description of who it shared its trade secret 
documents with, emphasizing that “he who seeks equity must do equity”). 
 128 See Javo Beverage Co., Inc. v. California Extraction Ventures, Inc., No. 19-CV-1859-
CAB-WVG, 2020 WL 886527, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 2020)(waiting until preliminary injunc-
tion stage before determining that plaintiff’s asserted trade secrets differed substantially from 
defendants’ patent disclosures; accordingly, court denied preliminary injunction seeking “to 
prohibit Defendants from further using Javo’s trade secrets and other confidential information 
in connection with: CEV’s process or selling any products derived from such information; 
raising money from investors; filing any new patent applications; and taking any steps to li-
cense or grant to third parties any rights in any issued patents or pending patent applications 
claiming priority to the 497 Provisional application.”).   
 129 Cf. MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Comput., Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 521 (9th Cir. 1993) (ruling on 
summary judgment appeal: “MAI contends its Customer Database is a valuable collection of 
data assembled over many years that allows MAI to tailor its service contracts and pricing to 
the unique needs of its customers and constitutes a trade secret.  We agree that the Customer 
Database qualifies as a trade secret.  The Customer Database has potential economic value 
because it allows a competitor like Peak to direct its sales efforts to those potential customers 
that are already using the MAI computer system.”). 
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challenge on economic value grounds at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage — unless the 
“secret” information has no value because it’s in the public domain,130 or, per-
haps, because it amounts to general skill and knowledge.131  In effect, such a 
motion to dismiss would ask the court to take judicial notice of industry or com-
mon knowledge.  If it’s in a book, published by the government or the company 
itself,132 available on the internet, or perhaps just common sense, I suppose the 
court could do so,133 and I suspect this angle of attack will sharpen as online 
 
 130 See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1002 (1984) (“Information that is public 
knowledge or that is generally known in an industry cannot be a trade secret.”); Kewanee Oil 
Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481 (1974) (“The Court has also articulated another policy 
of the patent law: that which is in the public domain cannot be removed therefrom by action 
of the States.”); Yellowfin Yachts, Inc. v. Barker Boatworks, LLC, 898 F.3d 1279, 1298 (11th 
Cir. 2018) (affirming Rule 56 summary judgment that suppliers’ identities were not secret: 
“[T]he identities of Yellowfin’s suppliers are typically well known—indeed, ‘the photos in the 
record show that many [of the suppliers] prominently brand their products.’” (alteration in 
original) (citation omitted)); Accent Packaging, Inc. v.  Leggett & Platt, Inc., 707 F.3d 1318 
(Fed. Cir. 2013) (affirming Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of trade secret claims based on public dis-
closure in United States patents); Ultimax Cement Mfg. Corp. v. CTS Cement Mfg. Corp., 587 
F.3d 1339, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (affirming Rule 56 summary judgment on trade secret claims 
based on public disclosure in Japanese patent); Capricorn Mgm’t Sys., Inc. v. Gov’t Employees 
Ins. Co., 15 CV 2926 (DRH)(SIL), 2020 WL 1242616, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2020) (ruling, 
on summary judgment, that unredacted source code deposits on file with Copyright Office 
were “public” and hence not entitled to trade secret status). 
 131 Cf. Comput. Care v. Serv. Sys. Enter., Inc., 982 F.2d 1063 (7th Cir. 1992) (the idea of 
sending service-reminder letters to customers was well known and in the public domain); Sys. 
Dev. Serv’s., Inc. v. Haarmann, 907 N.E.2d 63, 74 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009) (customer list consisting 
of nothing more than names, addresses and telephone numbers lacked sufficient secrecy to be 
a trade secret under the Illinois Trade Secrets Act); Serv. Ctr’s. of Chi., Inc. v. Minogue, 535 
N.E.2d 1132, 1136–37 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (plaintiff’s “rules of thumb” used in pricing medical 
records storage space were not protected under the Illinois Trade Secrets Act; plaintiff failed 
to show they were not generally known in the industry or not part of defendant-employee’s 
general skill and knowledge); Cent. Bldg. & Cleaning Co. v. Vodnansky, 406 N.E.2d 32, 35 
(Ill. App. Ct. 1980) (tuckpointing and restoration firm’s bid estimation method was not a trade 
secret; employee “learned to estimate through his day-to-day experience and training on the 
job”). 
 132 See, e.g., CouponCabin, Inc. v PriceTrace, LLC, No. 18 C 7525, 2019 WL 1572448, at *3 
(N.D. Ill. Apr. 11, 2019) (denying DTSA trade secret protection because plaintiff’s complaint 
admitted its website and coupon codes were “generally accessible” to the public). 
 133 See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009) (in determining plausibility, the court must 
“draw on its judicial experience and common sense”); Rowe v. Gibson, 798 F.3d 622 (7th Cir. 
2015) (majority opinion by Judge Posner taking judicial notice of medical subjects based on 
court’s own internet search, prompting a vigorous partial dissent by Judge Hamilton); Henry 
S. Noyes, The Rise of the Common Law of Federal Pleading:  Iqbal, Twombly and the Application of 
Judicial Experience, 56 VILL. L. REV. 857, 871-89 (2012) (discussing judicial  experience and 
common sense within the meaning of Twombly and Iqbal); Coleen M. Barger, Challenging Judicial 
Notice of Facts on the Internet Under Federal Rule of Evidence 201, 48 U.S.F. L. REV. 43 (2013) (ex-
ploring the limits of judicial notice via the internet); Debra Cassens Weiss, May Judges Search the 
Internet for Facts? ABA Ethics Opinion Sees Problems, ABA JOURNAL (Dec. 8, 2017, 7:02 AM) 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/may_judges_search_the_inter-
net_for_facts_aba_ethics_opinion_sees_ethics_pro  (discussing ABA Formal Opinion 478 
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information expands.134  Otherwise this opposition should await proof.135 
However, pleading “economic value” may be complicated by the “identifica-
tion” standard federal courts ultimately adopt.  The California state court deci-
sion in Diodes and the North Carolina state court decision in Krawiec, for example, 
carry very different implications for pleading “economic value.”  With its em-
phasis on “sufficient particularity to separate it from matters of general 
knowledge in the trade or of special knowledge of those who are skilled in the 
trade,” Diodes in effect requires plaintiff to plead and prove a negative to show 
economic value — what others in the trade don’t know.136  The Krawiec formu-
lation, by contrast, merely demands that plaintiff identify the misappropriated 
secret with sufficient particularity to enable a meaningful defense.  It does not 
explicitly inject the Diodes “general knowledge/special knowledge” inquiry into 
the pleading stage. 
 
and cautioning against judicial notice of adjudicative facts—i.e., facts that are either not gen-
erally known or subject to reasonable dispute); Cheryl D. Stein, Judicial Notice: A Useful Tool to 
Consider, ABA JOURNAL (May 20, 2019), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litiga-
tion/committees/criminal/articles/2019/spring2019-judicial-notice-a-useful-tool-to-con-
sider/ (May 20, 2019) (“An adjudicative fact can be judicially noticed if it ‘is not subject to 
reasonable dispute.’ FED. R. EVID. 201(b). There are two categories of these facts: (1) those 
that are ‘generally known within the trial court’s territorial jurisdiction’ and (2) those that ‘can 
be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be ques-
tioned.’ Id.”). 
 134 See, e.g., Colin T. Reardon, Note, Pleading in the Information Age, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2170, 
2183–87 (2010) (arguing that Twombly and Iqbal challenges should become increasingly com-
mon as the internet makes public information more readily available to plaintiffs and defend-
ants); Dave Michaels & Alexander Osipovich, VC Firm Battles Crypto Crackdown, WALL ST. J., 
Sept. 3, 2019, at B5 (quoting Netscape founder and well-known investor Marc Andreessen as 
saying the internet has evolved into the world’s information hub and an engine for commerce). 
 135 See, e.g., Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, 264 U.S. 543, 548-49 (1924) (Holmes, J.) (the Court 
could take judicial knowledge of the fact that no housing shortage justifying District of Co-
lumbia wartime rent controls continued to exist in 1924, but remand was necessary to decide 
whether a sufficient emergency existed during 1922 in the immediate aftermath of World War 
I); Cedars-Sinai Medical Center v. Quest Diagnostics, Inc., No. CV 17-5169-GW, 2018 WL 
2558388 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2018) (denying Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss in DTSA case on 
the ground that the court could not say Cedars-Sinai’s patent filings had publicly disclosed 
everything about its trade secrets; expert testimony was necessary to determine scope of Ce-
dars-Sinai’s public disclosures). 
 136 See, e.g., CleanFish, LLC v. Sims, No. 19-CV-03663-HSG, 2020 WL 1274991, at *9 (N.D. 
Cal. Mar. 17, 2020) (granting Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss in case brought under DTSA 
and California law: conclusory allegations of trade secrets concerning “niche clientele of end-
run buyers” were “indistinguishable from matters of general knowledge within the parties’ 
industry”); Pellerin v. Honeywell, Inc. 877 F. Supp. 2d 983, 988 (S.D. Cal. 2012) (complaint must 
describe “the subject matter of the trade secret with sufficient particularity to separate it from 
matters of general knowledge in the trade or of special knowledge of those persons who are 
skilled in the trade, and to permit the defendant to ascertain at least the boundaries within 
which the secret lies”); Victor de Gyarfas, Pleading a Claim for Misappropriation of Trade Secrets in 
California: A Problem of Particularity, Foley & Lardner LLP (Feb. 27, 2018), https://www.fo-
ley.com/en/insights/publications/2018/02/pleading-a-claim-for-misappropriation-of-trade-
sec (collecting cases). 
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Like the UTSA, and like the common law and Restatement of Torts before 
the UTSA, the DTSA in its definition of “trade secret” plainly prohibits protec-
tion of generally known or readily ascertainable information; no one questions 
this.  But this does not speak to the issue of who has to plead and prove what.  
To me, this should be a matter of relative convenience.  I suppose courts could 
force plaintiffs to canvass the known universe in an effort to prove what is not 
there,137 but I think this gets the inquiry exactly backwards.  If defendants can 
“readily ascertain” (as the DTSA puts it) secrets from the public domain or from 
comparable, non-confidential sources, it would be far easier to simply require 
defendants to produce  source evidence as exhibits to their Rule 12(b)(6) motions 
to dismiss.138  Courts and parties can then focus their attention on the public 
source evidence with minimal expense and delay.  In other words, I would place 
the initial burden of production on the defendant,  with respect to public domain 
or industry knowledge, even though I would leave the ultimate burden of per-
suasion on the plaintiff, as with reverse engineering and independent develop-
ment.139  Krawiec is consistent with this pleading approach; Diodes is not.   
I am aware of no case requiring plaintiffs to explicitly negate reverse 
 
 137 Based on his confirmation hearing experience, I would think Justice Kavanaugh would 
have little interest in forcing anyone to “prove a negative.”  See Theodore Dalrymple, A Glad-
iatorial Soap Opera: The Kavanaugh Hearings, Through the Eyes of a British Psychiatrist, CITY JOURNAL,  
(Winter 2019), https://www.city-journal.org/brett-kavanaugh-hearings (“Kavanaugh was in 
the impossible position of trying to prove a negative, when the only way of doing so would 
have been to establish conclusively that he spent the entire period in, say, the Amazon jungle. 
The allegations against him did not meet the civil, much less the criminal, standard of proof; 
and if everyone seeking high office had to prove his innocence beyond reasonable doubt of 
any accusation leveled by anyone against him, we should soon have no holders, or even seek-
ers, of high office.”). 
 138 See Putnam Res. v. Patemen, 958 F.2d 448, 461 (1st Cir. 1992) (“If the rule were other-
wise, every similarly situated suitor would be left in an epistemological quandary, required, in 
effect, to do the impossible, that is, to prove a negative by direct evidence.”); JEFF KOSSEFF, 
THE TWENTY-SIX WORDS THAT CREATED THE INTERNET 218 (Cornell Univ. Press Ithaca & 
London, 2019) (cross-examination of TheDirty.com operator Nik Richie on how defamation 
victim Sarah Jones would be able to disprove his website’s assertion that she had sex with 
every member of the Cincinnati Bengals as a team cheerleader: “‘How do you prove you didn’t 
have sex with every Bengal football player?’ [Jones’s lawyer Eric] Deters asked.  ‘I don’t know,’ 
Richie replied.”). 
 139 Cf. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs v. Greenwich Collieries, 512 U.S. 267, 272-
76 (1994) (discussing historical development of burden of proof and burden of production in 
interpreting a federal statute that used the phrase “burden of proof”); Moore v. Kulicke & 
Soffa Indus., Inc., 318 F. 3d 561, 569-72 (3d Cir. 2003) (applying Pennsylvania law) (defendant 
has the burden of production on independent development, but plaintiff has the ultimate bur-
den of proof since plaintiff must prove wrongful “use” of a trade secret); Sargent Fletcher, 
Inc. v. Able Corp., 110 Cal. App. 4th 1658, 1669 (2003) (“It is the plaintiff’s burden to show 
improper use as a part of its prima facie case. Proof that defendant’s use resulted from inde-
pendent derivation or reverse engineering is evidence that there was no improper use on its 
part. The defendant does not have a ‘burden of proof’ to make that showing. But it acts at its 
peril if it fails to present evidence that rebuts the plaintiffs showing. In some cases, its failure 
to do so may require judgment in plaintiff’s favor.”) (citation omitted). 
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engineering or independent development (or any other legitimate means of ac-
quisition) as a matter of pleading,140 so I will keep my focus here on the public 
domain defense.  Under the “property” conception of trade secret law, the public 
domain eliminates the alleged “trade secret” (just as reverse engineering and in-
dependent development eliminate the alleged “misappropriation”), thereby de-
feating a trade secret misappropriation claim.  More precisely, under this theory 
it does not matter whether the defendant actually obtained the secret legitimately, 
so long as the defendant could have obtained it legitimately, in this instance from 
the public domain.141  As an example, consider Ultimax Cement Manufacturing Corp. 
v. CTS Cement Manufacturing Corp.,142 a Federal Circuit case applying the California 
“property” approach to trade secret law in response to a public domain defense.  
Affirming summary judgment for the defense, the Court of Appeals observed: 
Ultimax argues that the court erred in dismissing the trade secret 
claims. According to Ultimax, a secret’s availability from a pub-
lished source is not a defense to trade secret theft under Califor-
nia law unless CTS also obtained the secret from the published 
source, which CTS did not do. Instead, Ultimax argues, CTS il-
legally obtained the secret from Ultimax. Ultimax adds that, con-
trary to CTS’s argument, the secret was not disclosed in the 684 
patent . . . 
Under California law, a trade secret must “(1) [d]erive[] inde-
pendent economic value, actual or potential, from not being gen-
erally known to the public or to other persons who can obtain 
economic value from its disclosure or use; and (2) [be] the subject 
of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to main-
tain its secrecy.” Cal. Civ. Code § 3426.1(d). Thus, a trade secret 
must not have already been “generally known to the public.” 
“Public disclosure, that is the absence of secrecy, is fatal to the 
existence of a trade secret.” In re Providian Credit Card Cases, 96 
Cal.App.4th 292, 304. . . (2002). Further, “[i]t is well established 
that disclosure of a trade secret in a patent places the information 
comprising the secret into the public domain. Once the 
 
 140 Unlike the UTSA, the DTSA includes a catch-all exclusion of “any other lawful means 
of acquisition” in its definition of “improper means.”  See 18 U.S.C. § 1839(6)(b) (2018) (im-
proper means “does not include reverse engineering, independent derivation, or any other 
lawful means of acquisition”). 
 141 The same would also be true for reverse engineering and independent development un-
der the property principle.  See, e.g., Moore, 318 F.3d at 570-71  (applying Pennsylvania law) 
(discussing “property” view of trade secrets adopted by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court: 
“The Court held that under Pennsylvania law, there is no trade secret if, ‘at the time of disclo-
sure or use by a misappropriator, the allegedly secret information could have been ascer-
tained by inspection of sold articles or by reverse engineering.’”) (internal citation omitted). 
 142 587 F.3d 1339, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (applying California law). 
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information is in the public domain and the element of secrecy 
is gone, the trade secret is extinguished and the patentee’s only 
protection is that afforded under the patent law.” Stutz Motor Car 
of Am. v. Reebok Int’l, 909 F. Supp. 1353, 1359 
(C.D.Cal.1995) (quotation marks, citations, and footnote omit-
ted); see also Forcier v. Microsoft Corp., 123 F.Supp.2d 520, 528 
(N.D.Cal.2000). 
Ultimax’s argument focuses on how CTS obtained the alleged 
secret information, attempting to rebut a possible defense to a 
trade secret claim, but that is irrelevant if there is no secret. Here, 
Ultimax has not shown that it had a secret. Information disclosed 
in a patent, even a foreign one, is “generally known to the pub-
lic,” especially the relevant public in the cement industry. Indeed, 
one of the primary purposes of patent systems is to disclose in-
ventions to the public. See Bruckelmyer v. Ground Heaters, Inc., 445 
F.3d 1374, 1379 (Fed.Cir.2006) (finding a foreign patent, like a 
U.S. patent, “publicly accessible” because “one skilled in the art 
exercising reasonable diligence” could find it and it was “classi-
fied and indexed” in the foreign patent office). We therefore af-
firm the district court’s grant of summary judgment with respect 
to Plaintiffs’ trade secret claims, as Ultimax cannot prove the ex-
istence of a secret.143 
There is another way to look at this problem: the “breach of confidence” 
theory.144  On this view the important issue is the defendant’s conduct: actual 
theft is not excused based on what the defendant could have done but did not 
do.145  In E.I. DuPont de Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland,146 Justice Holmes offered 
the most famous (and most pointed) expression of the breach of confidence 
theory: 
The case has been considered as presenting a conflict between a 
right of property and a right to make a full defen[s]e, and it is 
said that if the disclosure is forbidden to one who denies that 
there is a trade secret, the merits of his defen[s]e are adjudged 
 
 143 Id. at 1355-56. 
 144 Other, less persuasive approaches that try to capture the investment incentive and wrong-
doer deterrence policies behind trade secret law include contract, commercial morality, and 
privacy.  See generally Mark A. Lemley, The Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets As IP Rights, 
61 STAN. L. REV. 311 (2008) (surveying and exploring trade secret theories). 
 145 See Group One, Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 254 F.3d 1041, 1050-51 (Fed. Cir. 2001) 
(collecting cases); American Can Co. v. Mansukhani, 728 F.2d 818, 820 (7th Cir. 1984) (col-
lecting cases). 
 146 244 U.S. 100 (1917). 
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against him before he has a chance to be heard or to prove his 
case. We approach the question somewhat differently. The word 
property as applied to trade-marks and trade secrets is an unan-
alyzed expression of certain secondary consequences of the pri-
mary fact that the law makes some rudimentary requirements of 
good faith. Whether the plaintiffs have any valuable secret or not, the de-
fendant knows the facts, whatever they are, through a special confidence that 
he accepted. The property may be denied but the confidence cannot be. There-
fore the starting point for the present matter is not property or 
due process of law, but that the defendant stood in confidential 
relations with the plaintiffs, or one of them. These have given 
place to hostility, and the first thing to be made sure of is that 
the defendant shall not fraudulently abuse the trust reposed in 
him. It is the usual incident of confidential relations. If there is 
any disadvantage in the fact that he knew the plaintiffs’ secrets 
he must take the burden with the good.147 
Is Masland still good law?148  Erie buried federal common law secrecy, but the 
DTSA may have resurrected it, and with it, Masland.149  If so, defendants who 
 
 147 Id. at 102 (emphasis added). Justice Holmes said much the same thing in an earlier trade 
secret case, Board of Trade of the City of Chicago v. Christie Grain & Stock Co., 198 U.S. 236, 250–
51 (1905): “In the first place, apart from special objections, the plaintiff’s collection of quota-
tions is entitled to the protection of the law. It stands like a trade secret. The plaintiff has the 
right to keep the work which it has done, or paid for doing, to itself. The fact that others might 
do similar work, if they might, does not authorize them to steal the plaintiff’s.” Cf. Bleistein v. 
Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 249, 250 (1903) (noting the plaintiff does not lose its 
rights by communicating the result to persons, even if many, in confidential relations to itself, 
under a contract not to make it public, and strangers to the trust will be restrained from getting 
at the knowledge by inducing a breach of trust and using knowledge obtained by such a 
breach). 
 148 See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 497-98 (1974) (quoting the famous 
Masland “breach of confidence” passage in full and then observing—somewhat confusingly—
that “[a] suit to redress theft of a trade secret is grounded in tort damages for breach of a 
contract”); Sharon K. Sandeen, The Evolution of Trade Secret Law and Why Courts Commit Error 
When They Do Not Follow the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 33 HAMLINE L. REV. 493, 515-20 (2010) 
(recounting history of UTSA drafting efforts and how the Supreme Court’s Kewanee decision, 
holding that federal patent law does not preempt state trade secret law, cleared the way for 
completion and approval of the initial version of the UTSA in 1979). 
 149 See TianRui Grp. Co. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 661 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (pre-DTSA 
decision creating federal trade secret common law for International Trade Commission cases); 
Sharon K. Sandeen & Christopher B. Seaman, Toward a Federal Jurisprudence of Trade Secret, 32 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 829, 867 (2017) (“As the history of U.S. trade secret law reveals, there 
is a rich body of common law related to trade secrets dating back nearly two centuries, making 
the common law’s application to the DTSA plausible.”) (footnotes omitted); Caleb Nelson, 
The Legitimacy of (Some) Federal Common Law, 101 VA. L. REV. 1, 45 (2015) (“The idea that judges 
create the common law out of whole cloth also has ripple effects on the interpretation of 
federal statutes that borrow terms from the common law.”); Jay Tidmarsh & Brian J. Murray, 
A Theory of Federal Common Law, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 585 (2006) (discussing federal common 
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wish to invoke the public domain defense may find themselves unable to chal-
lenge “economic value” allegations on Rule 12(b)(6) motions because, limited to 
the face of the complaint and judicially noticeable facts, they will be unable to 
show they actually acquired secrets from the public domain.  They may instead 
have to wait until summary judgment, only to face “breach of confidence” head-
winds there, too, if they in fact copied material but wish to defend based on what  
 
they “could have” found in the public domain.  On the other hand, if the prop-
erty view prevails — as it did for Fifth Amendment “takings” purposes in Ruckel-
shaus v. Monsanto Co.150 — plaintiffs can and should suffer sanctions for claiming 
trading secret status with respect to public domain information,151 no matter 
what the defendants may or may not have done.152  Such obvious deficiencies 
are the very essence of bad faith.153 
How should we resolve this tension in DTSA cases?  The UTSA features 
aspects of both theories: the “property” view can be seen in the “economic 
value” clause found in Section 1.4 (on display in Ultimax Cement) and in the “head 
start” injunction limitation found in Section 2(a) (a result of the famous Shellmar-
Conmar-Winston debate),154 while the “breach of confidence” theory dominates 
the “misappropriation” definition set forth in Section 1.2 (discussed at length 
below).  The DTSA is a curious mix of these elements; it takes “economic value” 
and “misappropriation” almost verbatim from the UTSA, but it drops the explicit 
“head start” injunction limitation and adds significant restrictions on injunctions 
against employees based on their mere knowledge alone.155  On balance, this 
 
law outside of Erie); Richard L. Revesz, Restatements and the Federal Common Law, AMERICAN 
LAW INSTITUTE (Sept. 27, 2016) https://www.ali.org/news/articles/restatements-and-fed-
eral-common-law/; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §39(AM. LAW INST. 
1995), https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/3745/dba7a672e7bea c1dd52143136f85d574751 
9.pd (discussing potential role of Restatements in shaping federal common law). 
 150 467 U.S. 986, 1000-04 (1984). 
 151 See BDT Products, Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 602 F.3d 742 (6th Cir. 2010) (applying 
Kentucky law) (discussing Rule 11 sanctions for misappropriation of trade secrets that had 
been publicly disclosed long before the litigation). 
 152 See Rockwell Graphic Systems, Inc. v. DEV Industries, Inc., 925 F.2d 174, 179 (7th Cir. 
1991) (Posner, J.) (“The remedial significance of such [reasonable secrecy] efforts lies in the 
fact that if the plaintiff has allowed his trade secret to fall into the public domain, he would 
enjoy a windfall if permitted to recover damages merely because the defendant took the secret 
from him, rather than from the public domain as it could have done with impunity . . .  It 
would be like punishing a person for stealing property that he believes is owned by another 
but that actually is abandoned property.”) (citations omitted). 
 153 See Charles Tait Graves, Bad Faith and the Public Domain: Requiring a Pre-Lawsuit Investigation 
of Potential Trade Secret Claims, 8 VA. J.L. & TECH. 12 (2003) (discussing public domain proof 
via internet searches and expert opinions). 
 154 See William Lynch Schaller, Secrets of the Trade: Tactical and Legal Considerations from the Trade 
Secret Plaintiff’s Perspective, 29 REV. LITIG. 729, 813 (2010). 
 155 See Synergetics, Inc. v. Hurst, 477 F.3d 949, 961 (8th Cir. 2007) (applying Missouri law) 
(“A defendant should be enjoined only for the time it would take to produce and market the 
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amalgam seems to side with the “property” approach, mainly because the 
DTSA’s “economic value” reference to “not generally known” points away from  
 
what a particular defendant knows in favor of what others in the industry gener-
ally know or can find in the public domain.  The rule of lenity buttresses this pro-
defendant view by demanding in all DTSA cases a strict construction of “trade 
secret” in general and “economic value” (and “not generally known”) in partic-
ular, as does to a lesser extent the DTSA’s explicit restriction in employee cases 
on injunctions tied solely to employee knowledge.  If I am correct in thinking 
“identification” can and should come to the fore in light of Twombly and Iqbal, 
the “property” theory takes on added force, as the threshold inquiry will focus 
on what was taken rather than — as in Masland — the defendant’s conduct. 
For the hardy souls who have made it this far, I finally return to the hospital 
pricing example I mentioned earlier, just after I quoted the DTSA’s definition of 
“trade secret.”156  The Wall Street Journal article I quoted on hospital pricing as 
a “closely guarded secret” went on to report that area employers, in an effort “to 
curb rising costs,” had banded together to share data about what their local hos-
pitals were secretly charging them.157  The same article noted the “Trump admin-
istration is considering a requirement for hospitals and doctors to reveal negoti-
ated prices.”158  If published at the behest of government, such secrets would fall 
into the public domain, of course; but what if such pricing was widely shared 
among employers and hospitals knew it?  On these facts, a hospital might have 
a very hard time alleging its pricing was “not generally known,” and a contrary 
allegation might even be subject to a Rule 12(b)(6) challenge.  How?  Consider 
the Rule 12(b)(6) standard the Second Circuit offered in Cortec Industries, Inc. v. 
Sum Holding L.P.: “Plaintiffs’ failure to include matters of which as pleaders they 
had notice and which were integral to their claim — and that they apparently 
most wanted to avoid — may not serve as a means of forestalling the district 
court’s decision on the motion.”159 
 
competitive product, absent the misappropriation.”); Wyeth v. Natural Biologics, Inc., 395 
F.3d 897, 898 (8th Cir. 2005) (applying Minnesota law) (affirming permanent injunction with-
out time limitation to protect trade secret: “Wyeth’s trade secret process for producing bulk 
natural conjugated estrogens used in the development of  Premarin, the only hormone re-
placement therapy drug on the market derived from a natural source.”); Richard F. Dole, Jr., 
Permanent Injunctive Relief for Trade Secret Misappropriation Without an Express Limit Upon Its Dura-
tion: The Uniform Trade Secrets Act Reconsidered, 17 B.U. J.  SCI. & TECH. L. 173, 190 (2011) (sur-
veying statutes and cases following and departing from the UTSA’s “head start” limitation on 
permanent injunctive relief). 
 156 See Part I, supra. 
 157 Melanie Evans, Employers’ Hospital Fees Differ, WALL ST. J., May 10, 2019, at B3. 
 158 Id. See also Stephanie Armour & Anna Wilde Mathews, New Push Calls for Disclosing Medical 
Price, WALL ST. J., Mar. 8, 2019, at A1. 
 159 Cortec Indus., Inc. v. Sum Holding L.P., 949 F.2d 42, 44 (2d Cir. 1991). 
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E. REASONABLE SECRECY EFFORTS 
In general, the more measures a firm takes to protect its secrets, the more 
likely a court will treat those secrets as having economic value.160  The reasona-
bleness of plaintiff’s secrecy measures should rarely be subject to a Rule 12(b)(6) 
motion, as the Federal Circuit held in ABB Turbo Systems, unless plaintiff took no 
secrecy steps at all.161  In Food Marketing Institute v. Argus Leader Media,162 for ex-
ample, the Supreme Court had no difficulty in finding commercial or financial 
information that is customarily and actually kept private to constitute “confiden-
tial” information for Freedom of Information Act exemption purposes.163  Plas-
tronics furnishes another example: allegations that defendants signed confidenti-
ality agreements will usually get plaintiffs past “failure to state a claim” 
contentions.   
There are three potential twists here, however.  One, as the Court noted in 
Food Marketing Institute,164 is that the information must actually be confidential;165 
an agreement saying it’s so doesn’t make it so if the information is in the public 
domain.166  A second is when confidentiality agreements are facially void for 
some reason, such as vagueness or lack of geographic or temporal limits.167  
 
 160 See Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc. v. DEV Indus., Inc., 925 F.2d 174, 179 (7th Cir. 1991) 
(Posner, J.) (“The information contained in the drawings cannot have been worth much if 
Rockwell did not think it worthwhile to make serious efforts to keep the information secret.”). 
 161 See ABB Turbo Systems AG v. TurboUSA, Inc., 774 F.3d 979, 986 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (re-
versing Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal; confidentiality agreements, confidentiality legends, and re-
stricted access allegations showed reasonable secrecy measures); Fail-Safe, LLC v. A.O. Smith 
Corp., 674 F.3d 889, 893 (7th Cir. 2012) (applying Wisconsin law) (affirming defense summary 
judgement: “We agree with the district court that FS failed to take reasonable steps under the 
circumstances to maintain the secrecy required for trade secret protection. Indeed, FS failed 
to take any steps to protect its information.”). 
 162 139 S. Ct. 2356 (2019). 
 163 Id. at 2366 (“At least where commercial or financial information is both customarily and 
actually treated as private by its owner and provided to the government under an assurance of 
privacy, the information is ‘confidential’ within the meaning of Exemption 4.”). 
 164 Id. at 2363 (“[I]t is hard to see how information could be deemed confidential if its owner 
shares it freely.”). 
 165 M.C. Dean, Inc. v. City of Miami Beach, 199 F. Supp. 3d 1349, 1355-57 (S.D. Fla. 2016) 
(granting Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for lack of secrecy measures under the DTSA and 
the Florida trade secret statute; disclosures to government officials without restriction fell 
short of reasonable secrecy measures as a matter of law). 
 166 See Tax Track Sys., Corp. v. New Inv’r World, Inc., 478 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2007) 
(applying Illinois law) (confidentiality agreement could not protect information that was not 
actually confidential); Delta Med. Sys. v. Mid-America Med. Sys., Inc., 772 N.E.2d 768, 775, 
781–83 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) (customer information was in the public domain or part of defend-
ants’ general skill and knowledge and hence not protectable under the Illinois Trade Secret 
Act). 
 167 See AssuredPartners, Inc. v. Schmitt, 44 N.E.3d 463, 475-76 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015) (holding 
that confidentiality agreement was overbroad and hence unenforceable because it purported 
to cover vague information regarding “the business or affairs” of the company or its affiliates).   
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Whether these drafting defects would negate the confidentiality notice functions 
of agreements for trade secret protection purposes is unclear, even assuming the 
agreements themselves are independently unenforceable as contracts.168 A third 
is plaintiff’s failure to comply with contractual requirements calling for confiden-
tiality designations or some other secrecy measure, such as a written demand for 
return or destruction of documents.169  Plaintiff’s noncompliance might be 
teased out on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion by citing documents attached or referred 
to in the complaint;170 the motion might argue, for example, that plaintiff failed 
to place “confidential” legends on its engineering drawings attached (albeit under 
seal) to the complaint,171 that plaintiff failed to allege it made a document demand 
in accordance with the parties’ nondisclosure agreement,172 or that plaintiff failed 
to retrieve its documents as contractually required.173  Or the motion might flip 
the script and argue plaintiff’s referenced contract affirmatively allowed defend-
ant’s accused use.174 
 
 168 See Metallurgical Indus., Inc. v. Fourtek, Inc. 790 F.2d 1195, 1206-07 (5th Cir. 1986) 
(applying Texas law) (nondisclosure agreement and purchase orders were admissible to show 
notice of confidentiality, even if those documents were unenforceable as contracts); Deepa 
Varadarajan, The Trade Secret-Contract Interface, 103 IOWA L. REV. 1543, 1561 (2018) (arguing 
that the mere existence of confidentiality agreements should not be equated with notice). 
 169 Christine Streatfeild, Kevin M. O’Brien, Marc R. Paul & Nathaniel A. Douglas,  The De-
fend Trade Secrets Act in Business Transactions: Risks in Auction Data Rooms and Best Practices for Trade 
Secrets Protection, BAKER MCKENZIE (June 18, 2019), https://www.bakermckenzie.com/en/in-
sight/publications/2019/06/defend-trade-secrets-act-in-business-transactions (discussing 
steps sellers should take before disclosing information to auction bidder, including nondisclo-
sure agreements “that require the return or destruction and certification of non-use and non-
disclosure, of any information received in the transaction”). 
 170 See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007) (on a Rule 
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, court may consider “documents incorporated into the complaint 
by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial notice”); Aimee Woodward 
Brown,  Pleading in Technicolor: When Can Litigants Incorporate Audiovisual Works into Their Com-
plaints?, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1269 (2013) (reviewing Rule 12(b)(6) motion cases on incorporation 
by reference); Lawrence A. Steckman & Rita D. Turner, Determining When Extrinsic Evidence Not 
Attached to or Incorporated by Reference in a Pleading May Be Considered on a Rule 12 Dismissal Motion, 
31 TOURO L. REV. 115 (2014) (discussing Second Circuit precedent on use of extrinsic evi-
dence in Rule 12(b)(6) motions). 
 171 See, e.g., Hoover Panel Sys., Inc. v. HAT Contract, Inc., No. 3:17-CV-3283-C, 2019 WL 
2743589 (N.D. Tex. May 9, 2019) (granting summary judgment in favor of defendant and 
finding no misappropriation occurred when defendant sent prototypes to overseas supplier 
who then made products strikingly similar to plaintiff’s products; plaintiff/trade secret owner 
failed to mark documents as “confidential” as required by confidentiality agreement). 
 172 See, e.g., CMBB LLC v. Lockwood Mfg., Inc., 628 F. Supp. 2d 881, 886-87 (N.D. Ill. 2009) 
(trade secret status precluded where plaintiff failed to take reasonable steps to ensure departing 
employees returned, destroyed or agreed not to use plaintiff’s customer information). 
 173 See William Lynch Schaller, Trade Secret Law: The Role of Information Governance Professionals, 
18 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. 27, 38-44 (2018) (discussing consequences of owners’ 
failure to retrieve their secrets). 
 174 See Texas Advance Optoelectronic Sol’s., Inc. v. Renesas Elec’s. America, Inc., 895 F.3d 
1304, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (applying Texas law) (“Although it is undisputed that Intersil used 
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Although a summary judgment decision, Yellowfin Yachts, Inc. v. Barker Boat-
works, LLC,175 a case decided under Florida law, well illustrates the risk of inad-
equate secrecy measures.  Simplified, the unremarkable facts showed that Barker 
broke away from Yellowfin to form a rival boat firm, copying hundreds of Yel-
lowfin documents on his last day.  Even though Yellowfin employed such famil-
iar secrecy measures as limiting employee access to secrets and using passwords 
on its computer network, “Yellowfin compromised the efficacy of these 
measures by encouraging Barker to keep the Customer Information on his cell-
phone and personal laptop.”176  Making matters worse, “Yellowfin neither 
marked the Customer Information as confidential nor instructed Barker to se-
cure the information on his personal devices. And when Barker left Yellowfin, 
the company did not request that Barker return or delete any of the infor-
mation.”177  The Court of Appeals rejected out of hand Yellowfin’s “implicit 
understanding” with Barker that its information was to be kept secret: Barker 
had refused to sign a confidentiality agreement, and there was no evidence cor-
roborating their supposed “implicit understanding.”178  Given these many se-
crecy deficiencies, one has to wonder how Yellowfin could have alleged sufficient 
facts to withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion challenging the reasonableness of its 
secrecy measures. 
“Bring your own devices” (BYOD) is a serious security problem at many 
companies,179 and it seemed to be the problem in Yellowfin Yachts to the extent 
Barker was using his own devices for his massive, last-minute copying efforts.180  
The truth is companies often exercise little or no control over information stored 
on such devices.  It is not hard to imagine an employer pleading itself out of 
court by referring to personal cell phones and personal laptops without alleging 
 
TAOS’s information for the ‘Build vs. Buy’ analysis, that use was contractually permitted and 
therefore not a proper basis of liability for trade secret misappropriation.”); James H. Pooley, 
Trade Secret Diligence in M & A, LANDSLIDE, July/August 2019, at 14-16 (2019) (discussing pro-
buyer nondisclosure agreement terms designed to protect against “information contamina-
tion,” including “residuals” clause allowing the putative buyer to develop its own competing 
products, to shop for other firms, and to use information retained in the “unaided memory” 
of its employees). 
 175 Yellowfin Yachts, Inc. v. Barker Boatworks, LLC, 898 F.3d 1279 (11th Cir. 2018). 
 176 Id. at 1300. 
 177 Id. 
 178 Id. 
 179 See The Sedona Conference, The Sedona Conference Commentary on BOYD: Principles and Guid-
ance for Developing Policies and Meeting Discovery Obligations, 19 SEDONA CONF. J. 495, 516-17 (2018) 
(“Traditional risks from theft, hacking, and user negligence are ever present on an organiza-
tion’s non-BYOD devices and networks.  BYOD enhances those risks, however, because 
technical and administrative protections are substantially more difficult to develop and imple-
ment in a BYOD environment.”); Hope A. Comisky & Tracey E. Diamond, The Risks and 
Rewards of a BYOD Program: Ensuring Corporate Compliance Without Causing “Bring Your Own Dis-
aster” at Work, 8 CHARLESTON L. REV. 385, 395-401 (2014) (discussing need for and limitations 
of confidentiality agreements and BYOD policies in protecting trade secrets). 
 180 See Yellowfin Yachts, 898 F.3d at 1300. 
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that company confidentiality legends were stored on those devices and/or with-
out alleging return or destruction of company information kept on those devices.  
A clever defendant might convince a sympathetic court that confidentiality leg-
ends and return of property are essential allegations when an employer admits 
unfettered use of BYOD devices occurred. 
Very much related to this BYOD problem, and perhaps a more serious con-
cern on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, is overclaiming of secrecy.  Sophisti-
cated trade secret owners know their information will end up on company-spon-
sored and BYOD devices; it’s how business is done today.  They also know not 
all devices will be collected and scrubbed when business relationships end, de-
spite well-intentioned exit interviews and reminder letters.  For mid-level man-
agers and corporate IT staff, the knee-jerk reaction is prophylactic: at least make 
sure to mark everything “confidential” or “trade secret.”  Is this a prudent prac-
tice, or is it fatal overclaiming? 
As an example, let’s look at GlobalTap LLC v. Elkay Mfg. Co.,181 a Chicago 
federal court case involving sophisticated parties and a sophisticated judge.  
Greatly simplified, GlobalTap developed a bottle-filling station design for verti-
cally held bottles, approached Elkay about manufacturing and selling its pro-
posed station, and then entered into an elaborate confidentiality agreement with 
Elkay in February 2009.  Among other things, GlobalTap shared a confidential 
business plan spanning some 101 pages.  The relationship soured the following 
year for a variety of reasons, especially after Elkay released a similar product of 
its own in 2010, and litigation ensued.  Multiple secrets were at issue, and the 
parties battled intensely over identification during discovery.  I want to empha-
size a single secret in the interest of analytic clarity — the mega-business plan — 
because it represents the risk of overclaiming: rejection.  Here is the district 
court’s evaluation of the 101-page plan: 
Elkay argues that GlobalTap has not met its burden because the 
Business Plan and other documents are “general areas of infor-
mation,” not concrete or particularized secrets. The list of cor-
porate and municipal partners is insufficiently specific, Elkay 
continues, because “GlobalTap has not identified what aspect of 
a mere existence of a relationship with a third party is actually 
protectable as a trade secret.” (Elkay’s Mem. of Law in Supp. of 
its Mot. for Summ. J. [88-4], hereinafter “Elkay’s Mem.,” 11.) 
The court agrees. In IDX, the Seventh Circuit held that a 43-
page description of a software program was insufficient because 
it included items such as descriptions of the appearances of com-
puter screens that were readily ascertainable and the plaintiff did 
not specify any line of computer code or an algorithm that might 
actually be a trade secret. [IDX Systems Corp v. Epic Systems 
 
 181 GlobalTap LLC v. Elkay Mfg. Co., No. 13 C 632, 2015 WL 94235 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 5, 2015). 
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Corp., 285 F.3d 581, 584 (7th Cir. 2002)]. With respect to the 
information in the Business Plan in this case, GlobalTap has 
done nothing more than point to the entire 101-page docu-
ment. Even more broadly, Mr. Whitman testified that “every 
word” in the Business plan is a GlobalTap trade secret. (30(b)(6) 
Dep. of Mr. Whitman, Ex. C to Smolczynski Decl., hereinafter 
“30(b)(6) Whitman Dep.,” 48:10-13.) 
Plaintiff’s vagueness is fatal to its claim for trade secret protec-
tion of its Business Plan. Plainly, much of the information con-
tained in that Plan is not a GlobalTap trade secret. For example, 
the Business Plan includes statistics on “global water issues” 
from the Blue Planet Run Foundation, such as the fact that “un-
safe drinking water is the world’s leading cause of death” and 
that “one in six of all humans. . . lack safe drinking water.” (Busi-
ness Plan at 23.) Another page provides examples of govern-
ments around the world that have regulated bottled water. (Id. at 
25.) Finally, another page includes a cartoon sourced from “car-
toonstock.com.” (Id. at 57.) GlobalTap has merely pointed to the 
101-page Business Plan and “invited the court to hunt through 
the details in search of items meeting the statutory defini-
tion.” IDX, 285 F.3d at 584. There may well be trade secrets 
within the 101-page Business Plan, but it was Plaintiff’s burden 
to identify those secrets and it has repeatedly failed to do so.182 
“Every word” of it?  GlobalTap was too clever by half I would say, as would 
some Courts of Appeals.183  Instead of covering all of the bases, GlobalTap 
ended up covering none.  Now imagine if the same business plan had been at-
tached (under seal) to the complaint, as I contend Twombly and Iqbal mandate.  
Would it have survived a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss?  Much of its infor-
mation was plainly public domain material lacking any “economic value” and 
therefore unprotectable under any theory. Further, what little of it that could 
have warranted protection was not isolated and highlighted as “confidential.”  
These were not reasonable secrecy measures as a matter of law; hence the Glob-
alTap court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defense. 
All of this takes us back to where we started: “identification.”  If federal 
Courts of Appeals read Twombly and Iqbal as I do, they may demand identification 
not only in the complaint, but at the time of access as well — as part of their 
 
 182 Id. at *6-*7. 
 183 See, e.g., Methodist Hosp., Inc. v. Sullivan, 91 F.3d 1026, 1032 (7th Cir. 1996) (Easter-
brook, J.) (“To say that particular information is confidential is not to say that the entire docu-
ment containing that information is confidential.”). 
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“reasonable secrecy” analyses.184  Some companies have hundreds or even thou-
sands of secrets,185 and identification during business relationships will no doubt 
be a burden for them.  Limiting identification to actual secrets without over-
claiming will place an even greater burden on them.  But who should bear the 
risk of failure to mark or — in some ways worse — overmarking?  The company 
that owns the secrets, that claims them as “crown jewels,” and that employs com-
puters and administrators galore to protect them?  Or hapless employees and 
other authorized users who only know what they are told?  In all instances, the 
question reduces to the sufficiency of notice, and generalized descriptions are no 
more useful in business settings than in litigation settings.  Indiscriminately 
stamping everything “confidential” suffers from the same flaw; it is an inherently 
“unreasonable” practice that shields information with “no economic value.”  
Worse, it has an enormous negative value — it impedes employee mobility, casts 
a cloud over competition, and enables false pleading.  Here I part company with 
Judge Posner.  If someone is to be placed on the “razor’s edge” in the event of 
“overclaiming,” as he put it in Rockwell Graphic Systems,186 it ought to be the one 
 
 184 See, e.g., Abrasic 90 Inc. v. Weldcote Metals, Inc., 364 F. Supp. 3d 888, 902 (N.D. Ill. 
2019) (“It takes virtually no effort and little sophistication to include a header on an Excel 
spreadsheet identifying a  document as ‘proprietary’ or ‘confidential,’ yet [plaintiff] CGW failed 
even to do that much with respect to the information at issue in this case.”); Victoria A. Cun-
diff, Reasonable Measures to Protect Trade Secrets in a Digital Environment, 49 IDEA: THE INTELL. 
PROP. L. REV. 359, 365 (2009) (“Trade secret owners should work to ensure that those to 
whom they do grant access know that particular information is confidential. One way to do 
so is by explicitly legending highly confidential documents with precautionary language warn-
ing that they are not to be used or disclosed except as authorized by the identified owner. Such 
legends may help reduce improper disclosures. They may also help a victimized trade secret 
owner establish that an unauthorized third-party recipient of the trade secret had ‘reason to 
know’ that it was not free to use them, a necessary step to prevail on a claim under the Uniform 
Trade Secrets Act.”) (footnote omitted). 
 185 See, e.g., TianRui Grp. Co. v. Int’l Trade Comm., 661 F.3d 1322, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2011) 
(“Following a 10-day evidentiary hearing, the administrative law judge found that TianRui had 
misappropriated 128 trade secrets relating to the ABC process from Datong.”); E.I. DuPont 
de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., No. 12-1260, slip op. at 3  (4th Cir. Apr. 3, 2014) 
(per curiam) (“After a seven-week trial, the jury returned a verdict finding that Kolon willfully 
and maliciously misappropriated 149 DuPont trade secrets and awarded DuPont $919.9 mil-
lion in damages.”). 
 186 Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc. v. DEV Indus., Inc., 925 F.2d 174, 176-77 (7th Cir. 1991) 
(Posner, J.): 
DEV suggests that if a firm claims trade secret protection for information 
that is not really secret, the firm forfeits trade secret protection of infor-
mation that is secret. There is no such doctrine—even the patent misuse 
doctrine does not decree forfeiture of the patent as the sanction for mis-
use—and it would make no sense. This is not only because there are any 
number of innocent explanations for Rockwell’s action in “overclaiming” 
trade secret protection (if that is what it was doing)—such as an excess of 
caution, uncertainty as to the scope of trade secret protection, concern that 
clerical personnel will not always be able to distinguish between assembly 
and piece part drawings at a glance, and the sheer economy of a uniform 
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in the best position to mitigate the risk – the owner.  This should be true of all 
businesses, large and small.187 
F. ALLEGING MISAPPROPRIATION 
Misappropriation is much trickier to allege than the existence of a trade se-
cret.  Every plaintiff knows why it thinks defendant has taken or wrongfully ob-
tained its secrets, but the accused’s conduct is usually cloaked, and thus plaintiff’s 
beliefs are almost always uncertain.  Compounding the problem, every defendant 
knows what it did and didn’t do, thereby enabling defendants to point with pre-
cision to what’s missing from or hazy in the complaint with respect to defend-
ant’s supposed misappropriation.  So begins a game of cat and mouse at the 
pleadings stage.   
Misappropriation actually presents two inquiries.  First, did defendant have 
access to plaintiff’s secrets?  Second, if so, did defendant knowingly and wrong-
fully obtain, disclose or use them, i.e., steal them itself or acquire them through 
someone else’s theft and then disclose or use them?188  Sometimes these separate 
questions converge and become difficult, as seen in cases where a person with 
authorized access mysteriously begins accessing secrets on the eve of depar-
ture,189 but more often the first is easy to answer.  Still, the first question needs 
to be asked because every now and then it turns out a defendant had no access 
to the secrets — a recipe for disaster when the plaintiff has alleged the 
 
policy—but also because it would place the owner of trade secrets on the 
razor’s edge. If he stamped “confidential” on every document in sight, he 
would run afoul of what we are calling (without endorsing) the misuse doc-
trine. But if he did not stamp confidential on every document he would lay 
himself open to an accusation that he was sloppy about maintaining se-
crecy—and in fact DEV’s main argument is that Rockwell was impermissi-
bly sloppy in its efforts to keep the piece part drawings secret. 
 187 Cf. Jermaine S. Grubbs, Note, Give the Little Guys Equal Opportunity at Trade Secret Protection: 
Why the “Reasonable Efforts” Taken by Small Businesses Should Be Analyzed Less Stringently, 9 LEWIS 
& CLARK L. REV. 421, 437-38 (2005) (“Courts should first determine whether the small busi-
ness seeking trade secret protection was able to identify the information as requiring or being 
subject to trade secret protection. If the small business was reasonably able to identify the 
information as a potential trade secret, the small business will have a heavier burden to show 
why it did not employ protective measures to maintain the secrecy of the information. If the 
small business was not reasonably able to identify the information as a potential trade secret, 
the burden on the small business to show that its efforts were reasonable will be lessened.”). 
 188 See Aarti K. Wilson, What to Expect When You’re (Not) Expecting Misappropriation, 
LANDSLIDE, July/August 2019, at 20 (“Misappropriation can take three forms: (1) improper 
taking, (2) improper use, or (3) improper disclosure, and the degree of ‘improper’ conduct can 
run the gamut.”). 
 189 See, e.g., United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (discussing whether 
departing employee exceeded authorized access to company computers by downloading con-
fidential information shorty before quitting to join a rival); WEC Carolina Energy Sol’s., LLC 
v. Miller, 687 F.3d 199 (4th Cir. 2012) (same); Int’l Airport Centers, LLC v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 
418 (7th Cir. 2006) (same). 
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opposite.190 
The far harder issue is whether plaintiff has enough facts to allege a knowing 
and wrongful taking, disclosure, or use.  As I discussed earlier, “plausible on its 
face” for misappropriation purposes must mean something more than just ac-
cessing someone’s secrets and then leaving them to compete. Otherwise, all em-
ployee mobility cases would become employee liability cases and all business sep-
aration cases would become business reparation cases.191  So the question is how 
much more, which takes us along the actual/threatened/inevitable continuum.192  
Actual theft is easy if someone is lucky enough to see it;193 threatened theft is 
simple if someone is dumb enough to say it;194 and inevitable theft is impossible 
— at least in injunction  cases brought solely under the DTSA against employees 
— because Section 1836 bars it.195  But what about the far more common case 
of clandestine conduct? 
 
 190 See, e.g., Wolters Kluwer Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Scivantage, 525 F. Supp. 2d 448 (S.D.N.Y. 
2007) (publicly reprimanding attorney and plaintiff Wolters Kluwer where trade secret case 
proceeded through discovery and multiple hearings over defendants’ protest at the outset that 
as management-level employees they had no access to plaintiff’s computer code — a defense 
objection the court later determined to be valid), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 564 F.3d 110 (2d 
Cir. 2009). 
 191 See William Lynch Schaller, Method Matters: Statutory Construction Principles and the Illinois 
Trade Secrets Act Preemption Puzzle in the Northern District of Illinois, 39 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 195 
(2019) (surveying approximately 50 Illinois federal district court opinions that struggled with 
trade secret and related claims in a wide range of employee mobility and business divorce 
settings). 
 192 See William Lynch Schaller, Russell Beck & Randall E. Kahnke, Trade Secret “Triggers”: 
What Facts Warrant Litigation?, 19 SEDONA CONF. J. 625 (2018) (analyzing jumping ship, inevi-
table disclosure, and failed deal scenarios as the most common fact patterns giving rise to trade 
secret misappropriation claims). 
 193 See United States v. Williams, 526 F.3d 1312, 1316, 1318 (11th Cir. 2008) (Coca-Cola 
Company executive assistant, caught on camera stealing trade secrets, sentenced to ninety-six 
months in prison); United States v. Yang, 281 F.3d 534, 540–41 (6th Cir. 2002) (recounting 
FBI “sting” operation in which defendants were caught on camera exchanging Avery Den-
nison documents marked “confidential”). 
 194 See FLIR v. Parrish, 174 Cal. App. 4th 1270, 1279 (2009) (“‘[T]hreatened misappropria-
tion’ means a threat by a defendant to misuse trade secrets, manifested by words or conduct, 
where the evidence indicates imminent misuse.”): B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Wohlgemuth, 192 
N.E.2d 99, 104 (Ohio Ct. App. 1963) (enjoining trade secret misappropriation threatened by 
B.F. Goodrich employee Wohlgemuth, who when resigning said “loyalty and ethics had their 
price: insofar as he was concerned, [his new employer] was paying the price”); CITIZEN 
ESPIONAGE: STUDIES IN TRUST AND BETRAYAL 136 (Theodore R. Sarbin et al. eds., Praeger 
Publishers 1994) (“Few employees are so forthcoming as Wohlgemuth about the way they see 
things; or, at least, what employees say and think almost never finds its way into appellate 
court opinions.”) 
 195 18 U.S.C § 1836(b)(3)(A)(i)(I) (2018) (court may issue an injunction to prevent actual or 
threatened misappropriation, provided the order does not “prevent a person from entering 
into an employment relationship, and that conditions placed on such employment shall be 
based on evidence of threatened misappropriation and not merely on the information 
the person knows”). 
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The misappropriation element was not at issue in Plastronics, but it was very 
much at issue in Molon Motor,196 an Illinois case decided in 2017 on a Rule 12(b)(6) 
motion.  Molon Motor is especially illuminating because it implicated all facets of 
misappropriation.  Somewhat simplified, the facts were typical: Desai, Head of 
Quality Control for Molon Motor, had access to all Molon trade secrets through 
his work computer; Desai allegedly copied confidential Molon data onto a King-
ston thumb drive; and Desai then decamped to rival Nidec Motor, “taking up 
responsibilities similar to those he had at Molon.”197  Molon set forth the thumb 
drive-copied secrets in a sealed appendix to its third amended complaint and 
established Desai’s secrecy obligations by referencing his employment agree-
ment, which barred the unauthorized use of Molon data.  With no trade secret 
identification and secrecy measures seriously in dispute, Nidec trained its guns 
on the “plausibility” of Molon’s misappropriation claims, arguing (1) that Desai’s 
actions did not constitute “misappropriation” under the DTSA or its Illinois 
state law counterpart, the Illinois Trade Secrets Act (ITSA), and (2) that, even if 
Desai’s actions did amount to misappropriation, Nidec did not know or have 
reason to know about Desai’s alleged misappropriation.198  Desai himself filed 
nothing; he wasn’t named as a defendant. 
The tipping point for the court on the misappropriation question was Desai’s 
copying of “dozens of Molon’s engineering, design, and quality control files onto 
a personal Kingston portable data drive” before leaving Molon to join Nidec, 
conduct the court thought suspicious since Molon did “not provide or use 
memory sticks for access to its computer network.”199  This was the thinnest of 
reeds; Molon corporate policy did not prohibit use of such devices, as the court 
 
 196 Molon Motor & Coil Corp. v. Nidec Motor Corp., No. 16-C-03545, 2017 WL 1954531 
(N.D. Ill. May 11, 2017). 
 197 Id. at *2. 
 198 Defendant Nidec Motor Corporation’s Motion to Dismiss Counts III and IV of Plain-
tiff’s Third Amended Complaint at 2, No. 16-C-03545, 2017 WL 1954531 (N.D. Ill. May 11, 
2017)(“While Molon does identify the allegedly proprietary information that was allegedly cop-
ied in 2013 by Molon’s former employee Manish Desai, Molon still has not pleaded any legit-
imate basis to assert that these files were wrongfully copied or that NMC was responsible for 
the acts of Mr. Desai or otherwise misappropriated a trade secret of Molon.”); Defendant 
Nidec Motor Corporation’s Memorandum in Support of Its Motion to Dismiss Counts III 
and IV of Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint at 7, Molon Motor & Coil Corp. v. Nidec 
Motor Corp., No. 16-C-03545, 2016 WL 6777681 (N.D. Ill. May 11, 2017) (“Molon has no 
legitimate basis to assert that NMC was responsible for the acts of Mr. Desai in 2013 or that 
NMC has otherwise misappropriated any of Molon’s trade secrets.  Molon provides no spe-
cific allegations that could plausibly show that Mr. Desai disclosed the alleged trade secrets to 
NMC or that NMC otherwise obtained and used any information allegedly copied by Mr. 
Desai.”); Defendant’s Reply in Support of Its Motion to Dismiss Counts III and IV of Plain-
tiff’s Third Amended Complaint at 4, Molon Motor & Coil Corp. v. Nidec Motor Corp., No. 
16-C-03545, 2016 WL 8453840 (N.D. Ill. May 11, 2017) (“Molon has also not provided a 
plausible basis that NMC ‘knew or had reason to know’ that the alleged trade secrets acquired 
by Mr. Desai were to be maintained under secrecy.”). 
 199 Molon Motor, 2017 WL 1954531, at *5. 
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acknowledged,200 and the propriety of Desai’s copying was unclear, as was the 
timing.201  Nonetheless, the court found this memory-stick copying sufficient to 
draw a plausible inference of misappropriation by Desai, especially since he took 
a similar position at competitor Nidec, evidently not long after the copying.202  
In other words, the court implicitly inferred Desai knew or had reason to know 
he was acquiring Molon’s secrets through “improper means” — breach of his 
duty to maintain secrecy — implicit because the court did not use the phrase 
“knew or had reason to know” in so holding.  In short, for purposes of evaluating 
Desai’s actions, access and misappropriation were supported by sufficient facts 
to satisfy Twombly and Iqbal. 
But did these circumstances really show access — much less misappropria-
tion — by Nidec, the sole defendant?  Nidec certainly didn’t think so, but it didn’t 
develop its “knew or reason to know” argument or cite case law glossing this 
statutory phrase (appearing in both the DTSA and the ITSA), apparently viewing 
the point as self-evident.  These statutes expressly condition liability on a defend-
ant’s actual or constructive knowledge that it is stealing secrets or acquiring them 
from someone who stole them.  There was no allegation that Nidec enlisted De-
sai to act as its mole while he was still a Molon employee, for instance, and there 
was certainly no allegation that Nidec itself hacked into Molon’s computers, 
broke into Molon’s premises, or employed some other improper means to ac-
quire Molon’s secrets.203  Nor was respondeat superior alleged against Nidec, 
 
 200 Id. at *5 n. 12. 
 201 On this timing question, the Third Amended Complaint simply alleged: 
On multiple occasions prior to the time Mr. Desai left Molon’s employment 
to begin employment at [Nidec], his computer was accessed under his 
username and password and a significant amount of files related to the en-
gineering and design, quality control protocols and data, and customer spe-
cific data for Molon Motor was copied to a Kingston portable data drive. 
Third Amended Complaint at 16, Molon Motor & Coil Corp. v. Nidec Motor Corp., No. 16-
C-03545, 2016 WL 8453840 (N.D. Ill. May 11, 2017).  Nidec’s Reply clarified that the “multiple 
occasions” occurred during “the months preceding [Desai’s] June 2013 departure from Mo-
lon,” citing paragraph 65 of the Third Amended Complaint.  Defendant’s Reply in Support of 
Its Motion to Dismiss Counts III and IV of Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint at 3 n.4, 
Molon Motor & Coil Corp. v. Nidec Motor Corp., No. 16-C-03545, 2017 WL 1954531 (N.D. 
Ill. May 11, 2017).  However, the phrase “months preceding” does not actually appear in par-
agraph 65 or anywhere else in the Third Amended Complaint. See Third Amended Complaint, 
Molon Motor & Coil Corp. v. Nidec Motor Corp., No. 16-C-03545, 2016 WL 8453840 (N.D. 
Ill. May 11, 2017). 
 202 Molon Motor, 2017 WL 1954531, at *5. 
 203 See DTSA, 18 U.S.C. § 1839(6) (2018) (improper means “include[] theft, bribery, misrep-
resentation, breach or inducement of a breach of a duty to maintain secrecy, or espionage 
through electronic or other means”); ITSA, 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 1065/2(a) (2019) (improper 
means “include[] theft, bribery, misrepresentation, breach or inducement of a breach of a con-
fidential relationship or other duty to maintain secrecy or limit use, or espionage through elec-
tronic or other means”); Matthew B. Kugler & Thomas H. Rousse, The Privacy Hierarchy: Trade 
Secret and Fourth Amendment Expectations, 104 IOWA L. REV. 1223 (2019) (exploring ambiguous 
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presumably because Desai’s misappropriation took place before he joined Nidec, 
not after.  And this assumes vicarious or secondary liability would have been a 
viable theory — hardly a given in light of the actual or constructive knowledge 
strictures imposed by the DTSA and the ITSA.204  To rescue Molon’s trade secret 
claims in the absence of these allegations, the court looked to a more controver-
sial theory: the inevitable disclosure doctrine. 
G. ALLEGING DISCLOSURE OR USE — AND “INEVITABILITY” 
Nidec not only emphasized the complete lack of allegations on actual or con-
structive knowledge; it also forcefully argued there was “no ground for inferring 
that it accessed or used any of the information Desai pulled.”205  As noted, some 
cases treat use, whether actual or threatened, as a separate element of a trade 
secret misappropriation claim, and the same is true of disclosure.206  It would be 
more precise to say, however, that that these are simply subsets of misappropri-
ation, along with “acquisition through improper means,” as all three are found 
in the “misappropriation” definition set forth in the DTSA and the ITSA, and 
all three are subject to the same “knew or had reason to know” requirement.  
 
applications of “improper means,” including corporate surveillance and investigator decep-
tion, and their relationship to “reasonable” secrecy measures). 
 204 See Tanya J. Dobash, Trade Secret Theft & Employer Vicarious Liability in Hagen v. Burmeister 
& Associates, Inc., 29 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 375 (2002) (discussing trade secret vicarious lia-
bility under Minnesota law); Robert G. Bone, Secondary Liability for Trade Secret Misappropriation: 
A Comment, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 529, 536 (2006) (noting that case 
law examining respondeat superior liability for trade secret theft was “quite thin and the opinions 
relatively recent” as of 2006 and questioning the need for secondary liability since trade secret 
theft is not based on strict liability, unlike patent and copyright law).  As Professor Bone cor-
rectly observed: 
The principal trade secret doctrine imposing liability on third parties is in 
fact based on a form of primary rather than secondary liability. This doc-
trine holds that a third party is liable when the third party acquires a trade 
secret from another and then discloses or uses the secret under circum-
stances where he knows or should have known that the trade secret was 
wrongfully acquired. The third party is liable for his own use or disclosure, 
and the knowledge requirement assures some degree of individual culpabil-
ity. 
Id. at 536 (footnote omitted.) 
 205 Molon Motor, 2017 WL 1954531, at *2 (citation omitted). 
 206 See, e.g., Lakeview Tech, Inc. v. Robinson, 446 F.3d 655, 657 (7th Cir. 2006) (applying 
Illinois law) (district court erred in denying injunctive relief based solely on ex-employee’s 
promise not to disclose secrets in light of employee’s previous lies); Lucini Italia Co. v. Grap-
polini, 288 F.3d 1035, 1038 (7th Cir. 2002) (applying Illinois law) (“voluntary cessation” de-
fense should be rejected in trade secret case unless there is no reasonable chance the wrongful 
use or disclosure will be repeated, and the defense bears the burden of proof); Metallurgical 
Indus. Inc. v. Fourtek, Inc. 790 F.2d 1195, 1204-05 (5th Cir. 1986) (applying Texas law) (dis-
cussing meaning of “disclosure” and “use” in trade secret law with reference to §757 of the 
Restatement of Torts). 
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The difference is that disclosure or use can trigger a claim against a third party 
who did not steal the secrets, so long as the third party knew or had reason to 
know the secrets it was using or disclosing were acquired by someone else 
through improper means.   
In response to Nidec’s “no use” argument, Molon invited the court to visit 
the inevitable disclosure doctrine embraced by the Seventh Circuit in its famous 
preliminary injunction decision, PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond.207  Nidec put up a furious 
fight on this issue, arguing (1) that Desai’s role at Nidec did not materially overlap 
his role at Molon and hence presented an insufficient threat of “inevitability,” (2) 
that the district court’s own decision in Saban v. Caremark Rx, L.L.C.208 had re-
jected a comparable “inevitability” claim because the executive’s responsibilities 
at the old and new employers there were dissimilar, and (3) that unlike other 
inevitable disclosure cases, here the new employer was sued but the purportedly 
dangerous employee was not.209 
The court accepted Molon’s invitation to tour the wondrous world of ITSA 
inevitable disclosure case law – case law that arguably allowed the court to infer 
access, use, and knowledge on Nidec’s part.210  From its reading of PepsiCo and 
other Illinois inevitable disclosure cases, the court found that two of three re-
quired factors were demonstrated: (1) the employee’s old and new employers 
were competitors, and (2) the employee’s old and new positions were compara-
ble.  Factor (3), whether the new employer has taken steps to prevent the incom-
ing employee from using or disclosing the former employer’s trade secrets, was 
plainly not alleged, yet the court allowed the third amended complaint to survive: 
On the third factor that courts examine when deciding whether 
the inevitable disclosure doctrine has been triggered, namely, ac-
tions the new employer has taken to prevent the incoming em-
ployee from using or disclosing the former employer’s trade se-
crets, the record is silent. At this stage of the litigation, that 
silence is not surprising, because a complaint is not likely to 
 
 207 PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262 (7th Cir. 1995) (affirming inevitable disclosure 
injunction under ITSA against ex-employee who left to take a directly competing position). 
 208 Saban v. Caremark Rx, L.L.C., 780 F. Supp.2d 700 (N.D. Ill. 2011). 
 209 Defendant’s Reply in Support of Its Motion to Dismiss Counts III and IV of Plaintiff’s 
Third Amended Complaint at 4–9, Molon Motor & Coil Corp. v. Nidec Motor Corp., No. 16-
C-03545, 2017 WL 1954531 (N.D. Ill. May 11, 2017). 
 210 See, e.g., Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. Sinele, 139 N.E.3d 1036, 1042-44 (Ill. App. Ct. 
2019) (discussing nuances of inevitable disclosure doctrine under the ITSA, and distinguishing 
PepsiCo as involving an employee who joined a direct competitor, in reversing trade secret 
injunction against employee who left to become a general broker); Destiny Health, Inc. v. 
Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 39 N.E.3d 275 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015) (rejecting ITSA inevitable disclo-
sure claim against company that declined deal and later emerged with a new partner); Strata 
Mktg., Inc. v. Murphy,  740 N.E.2d 1166 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (denying motion to dismiss com-
plaint alleging ITSA claim against employee who left to take a directly competing position). 
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contain any allegations about what, if anything, the competitor 
did to safeguard the plaintiff’s secrets. 
All told, Molon’s allegations on the direct competition between 
the parties, as well as the allegations on the employment breadth 
and similarity of Desai’s quality control work at the two compa-
nies, are enough to trigger the circumstantial inference that the 
trade secrets inevitably would be disclosed by Desai to Nidec. To 
be sure, going forward, Molon ultimately will bear the burden 
of proving—not just alleging—enough facts such that disclosure 
is not premised on a mere unsubstantiated fear. PepsiCo, Inc., 54 
F.3d at 1268-69; Saban, 780 F. Supp. 2d at 734; Teradyne, 707 F. 
Supp. at 357. For now, Molon has pled enough for the trade se-
crets claims to avoid the Rule 12(b)(6) chopping block.211 
I leave for another day whether this three-factor test really represents the in-
evitable disclosure doctrine under the ITSA; you won’t find its paternity in the 
Seventh Circuit’s PepsiCo decision from which Molon Motor and other decisions 
claim descent, as the Molon Motor court itself conceded.212  What is more im-
portant for our purpose here was the Molon Motor court’s uncertainty over which 
facts suffice to state an inevitable disclosure misappropriation claim against a 
new employer, a question the court acknowledged as the “closest” in the case.213  
Inferring Nidec’s access was easy given Desai’s hiring and his alleged copying.  
The court’s hesitancy on the remaining issues, however, was understandable: 
Nidec’s disclosure, use, and actual or constructive knowledge were all shrouded 
in mystery at the pleadings stage.  Even assuming the inevitable disclosure doc-
trine satisfied the disclosure or use requirement, it plainly did not meet the 
knowledge prong of the DTSA and ITSA with respect to Nidec, and neither did 
Molon’s conclusory knowledge allegations:  
 58.  Nidec Motor, through its subsidiaries and divisions, knew or 
should have known that the employees they hired from Molon 
would be covered by employment contracts with restrictive cov-
enants.  Despite this knowledge, Nidec Motor conspired with a 
former Molon employee after he voluntarily terminated his po-
sition at Molon to engage in unfair and unlawful competition 
with Molon, namely, Manish Desai who was Molon’s Head of 
 
 211 Molon Motor, 2017 WL 1954531 at *7 (footnote 18 omitted). 
 212 See id. at *5 n.13 (“It is worth noting that calling a line of reasoning a ‘doctrine’ poses the 
risk of ossifying the ‘factors’ into a rigid test.  At bottom, whether a trade secret would be 
inevitably disclosed is really a question of circumstantial evidence, and those types of questions 
defy straitjacket formulas.”).   
 213 Id. at *5. 
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Quality Control and left Molon to go to [Nidec predecessor] 
Merkle-Korff in June 2013. 
  59.  Upon information and belief, Nidec Motor has used and 
disclosed Molon’s trade secrets and confidential information in 
violation of both Federal law and the law of the State of Illinois. 
. . . . 
  67.  Upon information and belief, Mr. Desai unlawfully dis-
closed Molon’s trade secrets, that he had wrongfully copied from 
his Molon work computer.  Mr. Desai left Molon for employ-
ment in a similar position with Molon’s competitor and Nidec 
Motor’s predecessor, Merkle-Korff.  Under these circumstances, 
given Mr. Desai’s prior employment with Molon and his wrong-
ful copying of Molon’s trade secrets . . . Nidec Motor’s use of the 
trade secrets can be inferred under the “inevitable disclosure 
doctrine.”214 
As these paragraphs show, there were no alleged facts relating to Nidec which, 
if believed, made Nidec’s knowledge more likely than not, or “plausible,” as 
Twombly and Iqbal put it.  Desai’s “restrictive covenant” was just a confidentiality 
agreement, the “conspiracy” was just his hiring, Molon’s “information and be-
lief” was just a conclusion, and Desai’s “inevitable disclosure” spoke to his con-
duct, not Nidec’s “knowledge.”  These deficiencies no doubt account for the 
court’s failure to analyze the factual basis for Nidec’s supposed knowledge at the 
start of its misappropriation discussion as well as the court’s own conclusory 
treatment of Nidec’s knowledge at the very end of its opinion:   
The next question arises from the second half of the federal and 
Illinois trade secrets acts’ “misappropriation” definition: did 
Nidec know or have reason to know that the trade secret was 
acquired by “improper means”? Nidec argues that Desai’s be-
havior does not fit this definition. Nidec’s Mot. to Dismiss at 6. 
It contends that Desai’s access to the files in the Molon computer 
system was authorized. Id. To Nidec’s way of thinking, nothing 
improper happened because Desai was still an employee when 
he put the data on the thumb drive, and used his normal 
username and password to get access. Id. So even if what Desai 
 
 214 Third Amended Complaint at 15, 17, Molon Motor and Coil Corp. v. Nidec Motor Corp., 
No. 1:16-CV-03545, 2017 WL 1954531 (N.D. Ill. May 11, 2017).   
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took was ultimately a trade secret, he did not, in Nidec’s view, 
take it through “improper means.”. . .   
. . . . 
. . . Molon need not allege that Nidec was responsible for Desai’s 
downloading at the time it happened in order to state a claim for 
trade secret misappropriation. It is enough that Desai (allegedly) 
later disclosed the information to Nidec and that Nidec made use 
of it, knowing (or having reason to know) that the secrets were 
acquired by improper means.215 
Whether intentionally or not, the court conflated Nidec’s argument about 
Desai’s lack of “improper conduct” at Molon with Nidec’s separate argument 
about Nidec’s lack of knowledge concerning Desai’s improper conduct at Mo-
lon.  Again the court begged the question of Nidec’s knowledge when, at the end 
of its opinion, it offered a series of non sequiturs to the effect (1) that Molon did 
not have to allege Nidec urged Desai to steal while Desai was still at Molon (true 
but irrelevant to Nidec’s knowledge); (2) that Molon alleged Desai later inevitably 
disclosed Molon’s information to Nidec (true but irrelevant to Nidec’s 
knowledge); and (3) that Molon alleged Nidec made use of this information (true 
but irrelevant to Nidec’s knowledge).  These allegations and non-allegations may 
have sufficiently shown Desai’s guilty knowledge, but they did nothing, without 
more, to distinguish innocent acquisition from wrongful acquisition on Nidec’s 
part, and Nidec was the only defendant.216   
In Twombly terms, these allegations offered a state of equipoise: there were no 
facts alleged which, if believed, made it “plausible,” meaning more likely than 
not, that Nidec knew or had reason to know there was something amiss with 
what Desai was doing while at Molon, or for that matter, that Nidec knew or had 
reason to know there was something amiss with what Desai was doing while at 
Nidec.  These were no small omissions, given the Supreme Court’s subsequent 
holding in Iqbal that the complaint there did not “contain any factual allegation 
sufficient to plausibly suggest petitioners’ discriminatory state of mind.”217  In-
deed, the Supreme Court in Iqbal made it clear that even when a pleading rule 
otherwise allows plaintiff to allege a person’s state of mind generally — as Rule 
 
 215 Molon Motor, 2017 WL 1954531, at *4, *7 n.18. 
 216 Innocent acquisition takes on even more significance when defendants are further re-
moved from the original thief, as with downstream defendants who unknowingly acquire in-
fected products and are later advised that the products are “derived” from stolen secrets.  See 
generally Benjamin J. Bradford & Remi Jaffre, The Uncertain Protection of “Derivative” Trade Secrets, 
18 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 241 (2019). 
 217 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 683 (2009); cf. Intel Corp Investment Policy Committee 
v. Sulyma, 140 S. Ct. 768, 779 (2020) (discussing proof of “actual knowledge” under ERISA, 
including proof through “circumstantial evidence” and proof of “willful blindness”). 
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9(b) does — that “does not require courts to credit a complaint’s conclusory 
statements without reference to its factual context.”218   
The proper course, then, was for the Molon Motor court to dismiss Nidec.  
This straightforward outcome was made difficult by Molon first suing Nidec in-
stead of Desai, thereby running the risk of Nidec being dismissed with prejudice 
and res judicata attending that dismissal.  This is not to say that plaintiff must 
always skip the new employer and first sue the ex-employee; if plaintiff has 
enough facts against the new employer,219 it need not sue the ex-employee first 
or at all.220  But the safer approach would have been for Molon to sue Desai, to 
depose him about his conduct with Nidec and Nidec’s knowledge of that con-
duct, and then to add Nidec as a defendant based on newly-discovered and now-
alleged facts showing Nidec’s role and knowledge.221  Indeed, the reverse se-
quence – suing the new employer first without adequate facts – could amount in 
many cases to “sue first, investigate later,” a prescription for Rule 11 sanctions.222  
To repeat: “It may be that little more is needed, but falling a little short is still 
 
 218 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 686; accord CleanFish, LLC v. Sims, No. 19-CV-03663-HSG, 2020 WL 
1274991, at *8, *10 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 2020) (in case brought under DTSA and California 
law, citing Iqbal at the outset of its Rule 12(b)(6) analysis and then later ruling that no facts 
were alleged to show the Island Sea Farm defendants, as mere suppliers to defendant Sims, 
knew or had reason to know Sims had stolen trade secrets from his former employer, plaintiff 
CleanFish: “Plaintiff must allege facts that . . . tend to exclude an innocent explanation.”) (in-
ternal citations omitted). 
 219 Cf. Experian Info. Sols., Inc. v. Nationwide Mktg. Servs. Inc., 893 F.3d 1176, 1188-89 
(9th Cir. 2018) (applying Arizona law) (reversing summary judgment and holding that Ex-
perian could sue Nationwide for trade secret theft due to suspicious circumstances under 
which Nationwide acquired its data closely resembling Experian’s secret data — even though 
Experian had not sued the person or firm that sold the data to Nationwide). 
 220 See In re Muhs, 923 F.3d 377, 380 (4th Cir. 2019) (discussing bankruptcy litigation arising 
out of plaintiff’s trade secret theft suit against its ex-employee Muhs, under a collateral estop-
pel theory, after plaintiff first obtained a $20 million trade secret theft judgement against Muhs’ 
new employer); Dara Kerr, Ex-Uber Engineer Levandowski Ordered to Pay Google $179 Million, 
CNET (Mar. 5, 2020), https://www.cnet.com/news/ex-uber-self-driving-car-head-ordered-
to-pay-google-179-million/ (reporting court confirmation of Google’s $179 million trade se-
cret theft arbitration judgement against Anthony Levandowski after Google first obtained a 
$245 million settlement with Uber in earlier trade secret theft litigation). 
 221 See Comput. Assoc. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc. 982 F.2d 693, 718-20 (2d Cir. 1992) (extended 
discussion of evidence suggesting Altai knew or had reason to know that its new employee, 
Arney, was using his ex-employer Computer Associates’ source code to develop source code 
for Altai); Union Carbide Corp. v. UGI Corp., 731 F.2d 1186, 1191 (5th Cir. 1984) (inferring 
AmeriGas’ knowledge because AmeriGas “took no precautions to insulate Sutton from [the] 
strategy meetings” concerning his ex-employer Carbide’s secret pricing); William Lynch Schal-
ler, Secrets of the Trade: Tactical and Legal Considerations from the Trade Secret Plaintiff’s Perspective, 29 
REV. LITIG. 729, 761-71 (2010) (discussing tactical considerations in choosing theories and 
defendants in trade secret misappropriation cases). 
 222 See Bus. Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Commc’ns. Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 531, 537–38, 554 
(1991) (witness and law firm assumed, without investigating, that affidavit describing business 
directory information was accurate when it was not, triggering Rule 11). 
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falling short.”223 
H. INEVITABLE DISCLOSURE AND THE DTSA 
I have deconstructed Molon Motor at the risk of belaboring it because its in-
tersection with Twombly highlights some problematic aspects of deploying the 
inevitable disclosure doctrine in DTSA cases.  Five stand out.   
First, as noted, Molon Motor is one of the few inevitable disclosure cases where 
a new employer was sued but not the employee who jumped ship, a fact properly 
flagged by Nidec in its Rule 12(b)(6) motion.  Even if one believes inevitable 
disclosure is a useful gap-filler under state law, it only fills gaps against certain 
employees and only does so under certain state laws.  All or nearly all such cases, 
however, never dwell on the “knows or had reason to know” language found in 
the UTSA (and the ITSA, and now the DTSA), apparently on the unstated as-
sumption that the targeted employees necessarily know or have reason to know 
they will inevitably disclose or use their former employers’ trade secrets even 
when their intentions are benign.  This assumption is not self-evident.224   
Second, even assuming employees can be said to know what they’re doing in 
these cases, the same knowledge level cannot be attributed to their new employ-
ers, who rarely have independent access to another employer’s secrets and thus 
are in no position to know what’s in a new employee’s seemingly well-intentioned 
head.  PepsiCo itself was such a case; there was no discussion of whether (much 
less how) Quaker Oats, the new employer, knew or had reason to know what 
Redmond was about to inevitably disclose, although Quaker Oats took prophy-
lactic steps to prevent disclosure of whatever PepsiCo secrets Redmond might 
have possessed.225  Indeed, a close reading of PepsiCo reveals no explicit discus-
sion of how Redmond’s own plight met the “knows or had reason to know” 
 
 223 PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1269 (7th Cir. 1995) (quoting Teradyne, Inc. v. 
Clear Commc’ns. Corp., 707 F. Supp. 353, 357 (N.D. Ill. 1989)). 
 224 See C & F Packing Co. Inc. v. IBP, Inc., No. 93 C 1601, 1998 WL 1147139, at *8 -*9 
(N.D. Ill. Mar. 16, 1998) (offering verbatim questions and answers showing that ex-employee 
McDaniel tried to honor his confidentiality obligations owed to C & F Packing, that if he 
violated them “it was completely unintentional,” and that he did not knowingly draw on his C 
& F Packing experience: “I tried to keep things separate.  Whether I did it unknowingly or 
not, I cannot say.”); Charles Tait Graves, Is There an Empirical Basis for Predictions of Inevitable 
Disclosure?, 18 WAKE FOREST J. BUS. & INTELL. PROPERTY L. 190, 193 (2018) (highlighting lack 
of expert testimony on, and lack of empirical basis for, assumption that ex-employees will 
inevitably disclose secrets upon joining a competitor).   
 225 PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1266 (“The defendants also pointed out that Redmond had signed a 
confidentiality agreement with Quaker preventing him from disclosing ‘any confidential infor-
mation belonging to others,’ as well as the Quaker Code of Ethics, which prohibits employees 
from engaging in ‘illegal or improper acts to acquire a competitor’s trade secrets.’ Redmond 
additionally promised at the hearing that should he be faced with a situation at Quaker that 
might involve the use or disclosure of PCNA information, he would seek advice from 
Quaker’s in-house counsel and would refrain from making the decision.”). 
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standard, even though the Court of Appeals cited that standard in its opinion.226  
So understood, inevitable disclosure, at least in its “pure” form (meaning switch-
ing jobs without bad acts or bad intent), is a form of unwitting conduct and thus 
the very opposite of the conscious wrongdoing contemplated by the UTSA and 
now the DTSA.227  Given this explicit statutory “knowledge” requirement, given 
its location in a criminal statute, and given the rule of lenity, it remains a very real 
possibility the Supreme Court will reject inevitable disclosure under the DTSA 
as a matter of statutory construction based upon the statutory definition of mis-
appropriation alone.228 
 
 226 Id. at 1268 n.6. 
 227 To borrow from Jeffrey Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 
1124, 1160 (2012) (commenting on discrimination litigation), “[W]hen judges turn to their 
judicial experience and common sense [as commanded by Twombly and Iqbal on Rule 12(b)(6) 
motions], what will this store of knowledge tell them about whether some particular comment 
or act happened and whether such behavior evidences legally cognizable [misappropriation]?”  
Or as psychologist William James said long ago, “a great many people think they are thinking 
when they are merely rearranging their prejudices.”  Emily Bobrow, ‘The Intelligence Trap’ Review: 
How Smart Is Too Smart?, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 5, 2019 6:49 PM), https://www.wsj.com/arti-
cles/the-intelligence-trap-review-how-smart-is-too-smart-11565045370.  There are more than 
a few doubters about the “science” behind implicit bias in general and inevitable disclosure in 
particular.  See Jesse Singal, The Creators of the Implicit Association Test Should Get Their Story Straight, 
INTELLIGENCER (Dec. 5, 2017), http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2017/12/iat-behavior-
problem.html (collecting methodological criticisms of Implicit Association Test widely as-
sumed to predict implicit bias on racial matters); Gregory Mitchell & Philip E. Tetlock, Facts 
Do Matter: A Reply to Bagenstos, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 737 (2009) (reviewing then-existing litera-
ture on Implicit Association Test); Michael Noon, Pointless Diversity Training: Unconscious Bias, 
New Racism and Agency, Debates & Controversies (2018), https://jour-
nals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0950017017719841  (reviewing the literature and ques-
tioning the value and use of implicit bias training); Graves, supra note 224  (questioning evi-
dentiary basis for the inevitable disclosure assumption that honest employees will disclose 
secrets upon joining a competitor).   
 228 See, e.g., Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191, 2196 (2019) (“Scienter requirements 
advance this basic principle of criminal law by helping to ‘separate those who understand the 
wrongful nature of their act from those who do not.’”) (quoting United States v. X-Citement 
Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 72-73 n.3 (1994)); Morisette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 251 (1952) 
(defendant must be proven to have known the facts that made conversion wrongful, meaning 
they had not been abandoned by its owner; in the Anglo-American legal tradition, crime is 
“generally constituted only from concurrence of an evil-meaning mind with an evil-doing 
hand”); United States v. Ford, 821 F.3d 63, 73 (1st Cir. 2016) (analyzing jury instruction using 
the “knew or had reason to know” formulation and distinguishing “know” from “reason to 
know,” as the latter “suggests a negligence standard”); Paul Larkin, Jr., Jordan Richardson & 
John-Michael Seibler, The Supreme Court on Mens Rea: 2008-2015, THE HERITAGE FOUND. (Jan. 
14, 2016), https://www.heritage.org/courts/report/the-supreme-court-mens-rea-2008-2015 
(“‘Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., was on to something when he said that even a dog knows the 
difference between ‘being stumbled over and being kicked.’ Anglo–American criminal law tra-
ditionally has marked a person as a criminal only if he or she committed a morally blamewor-
thy act, known as the actus reus, along with an ‘evil’ frame of mind, known as mens rea or 
scienter.  A mens rea requirement distinguished individuals who break the law only acci-
dentally or inadvertently from ones who do so wantonly, with only the latter being held crim-
inally responsible for their actions.  Requiring the government to prove that a defendant acted 
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Third, unlike the UTSA or its ITSA cousin at issue in Molon Motor, the DTSA 
contains language that appears to be an express limitation on inevitable disclo-
sure — a limitation that would seem to prohibit injunctions solely based on 
what’s in an employee’s head.  Section 1836(b)(3)(A)(i) of the DTSA provides: 
(3) Remedies.—In a civil action brought under this subsection 
with respect to the misappropriation of a trade secret, a court 
may— 
(A) grant an injunction— 
(i) to prevent any actual or threat-
ened misappropriation described in paragraph (1) on 
such terms as the court deems reasonable, provided the 
order does not— 
(I)  prevent a person from entering into an employ-
ment relationship, and that conditions placed on 
such employment shall be based on evidence of 
threatened misappropriation and not merely on the 
information the person knows; or 
(II) otherwise conflict with an applicable State law 
prohibiting restraints on the practice of a lawful 
profession, trade, or business[.]229 
This language went unremarked upon in Molon Motor, perhaps because Molon 
invoked inevitable disclosure under the ITSA rather than the DTSA.  Section 
1836(b)(3)(A)(i) modifies injunctive relief as a remedy, yet it apparently does not 
have a role with respect to other forms of relief under the DTSA, such as dam-
ages, disgorgement or reasonable royalties, all of which are set forth later in the 
statute.230  I recognize that inevitable disclosure can be put to a variety of uses,231 
but by far its most common application is in injunction cases — the one place 
where Section 1836(b)(3)(A)(i) expressly bars it.  The first subclause, Section 
1836(b)(3)(A)(i)(I), could hardly be clearer: injunctions are prohibited based 
 
with criminal intent was a hallowed feature of Anglo–American criminal law.”) (footnotes 
omitted). 
 229 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(3)(A)(i)(I) (2018). 
 230 See 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(3)(B), § 1836(b)(3)(C). 
 231 See William Lynch Schaller, Trade Secret Inevitable Disclosure: Substantive, Procedural & Practical 
Implications of an Evolving Doctrine (Part I), 86 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 336 (May 2004) 
(analyzing inevitable disclosure cases in a wide range of settings besides injunctions, including 
jury instructions, summary judgement inferences, protective orders, and lawyer and expert 
witness disqualification). 
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“merely on the information the person knows,” the heart and soul of inevitable 
disclosure injunctions.232  The immediately following subclause, Section 
1836(b)(3)(A)(i)(II), reinforces this prohibition on inevitable disclosure injunc-
tions by incorporating state-level rules against “restraints on the practice of a 
lawful profession, trade, or business.”  The most prominent of these would seem 
to be California’s rejection of inevitable disclosure in view of California’s general 
bar on noncompetition agreements, as Ken Vanko, Dave Bohrer and others have 
pointed out.233  It seems a safe bet the Supreme Court will enforce Section 
1836(b)(3)(A)(i)’s anti-inevitable disclosure language according to its plain 
terms,234 but that might end up meaning only “pure” inevitable disclosure in-
junctions are barred under the DTSA, while expansive, inevitable disclosure-like 
“threatened misappropriation” injunctions carry the day, as has been argued else-
where.235   
Fourth, dressing up conclusory “inevitable” disclosure allegations with “in-
formation and belief” labels also should make no difference in DTSA cases.  Mo-
lon pursued this strategy,236 as have others.237  This approach runs directly coun-
ter to Twombly, where the Supreme Court directed its entire Rule 12(b)(6) analysis 
at the complaint’s defective “information and belief” allegations attempting to 
show an antitrust conspiracy on nothing more than parallel conduct facts.238  
 
 232 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(3)(A)(i)(I) (2018). 
 233 See Kenneth J. Vanko, Revisiting the Seventh Circuit’s Decision in PepsiCo: Inevitable Disclosure 
Injunctions in the Wake of the Federal Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, CIRCUIT RIDER, Apr. 2017, 
at 46, 50 (highlighting DTSA’s restriction on inevitable disclosure); David Bohrer, Threatened 
Misappropriation of Trade Secrets: Making a Federal (DTSA) Case Out of It, 33 SANTA CLARA 
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 506, 524-30 (2017) (reviewing inevitable disclosure decisions 
in California, collecting DTSA commentary, analyzing the DTSA’s language, and predicting 
the DTSA will be construed to bar inevitable disclosure consistent with the California ap-
proach). 
 234 Cf. Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC  139 S. Ct. 881 (2019) 
(enforcing Copyright Act registration requirement as a precondition to lawsuits). 
 235 See M. Claire Flowers, Facing the Inevitable: The Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine and the Defend 
Trade Secrets Act of 2016, 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2207, 2225-41 (2018) (reviewing language 
and legislative history of the DTSA and arguing that “threatened misappropriation” has often 
been read expansively to include inevitable disclosure or circumstances very near it). 
 236 Third Amended Complaint at 15, 17, Molon Motor & Coil Corp. v. Nidec Motor Corp., 
No. 16 C 03545, 2017 WL 1954531 (N.D. Ill. May 11, 2017).   
 237 See, e.g., Jazz Pharms., Inc. v. Synchrony Grp., LLC, 343 F. Supp. 3d 434, 445, 445–46 
nn. 50 & 52 (E.D. Pa. 2018) (approving “information and belief” allegations in support of 
“threatened” misappropriation claim and endorsing “inevitable disclosure” in DTSA case). 
 238 See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 551 (2007). The Supreme Court explicitly 
quoted the following allegations in the complaint: 
In the absence of any meaningful competition between the [ILECs] in one 
another’s markets, and in light of the parallel course of conduct that each 
engaged in to prevent competition from CLECs within their respective local 
telephone and/or high speed internet services markets and the other facts 
and market circumstances alleged above, Plaintiffs allege upon information and 
belief that [the ILECs] have entered into a contract, combination or 
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That some facts may be within the defendant’s control does not excuse plaintiff’s 
duty to allege facts sufficient to trigger a complaint.  Plaintiff must offer enough 
facts to move beyond speculation and satisfy Twombly, and information in the 
defendant’s head — without more — is not enough in light of Section 
1836(b)(3)(A)(i)’s prohibitions. 
Fifth, but less clear, is the impact these exclusions might have on state-law 
inevitable disclosure claims brought in federal court.  The prefatory language of 
Section 1836(b)(3)(A) ties its inevitable disclosure restrictions to “a civil action 
brought under this subsection with respect to the misappropriation of a trade 
secret.”239  The reference to “this subsection” means Section 1836(b), as Section 
1836(b) — the subsection that codifies the DTSA’s private right of action — 
opens with “[a]n owner of a trade secret that is misappropriated may bring a civil 
action under this subsection[.]”  The Supreme Court has said a claim “arises un-
der” federal law only when “the well-pleaded complaint establishes either that 
federal law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiff’s right to relief neces-
sarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal law.”240  If fed-
eral question jurisdiction under the DTSA is the sole basis for federal subject 
matter jurisdiction, and if injunctive relief under the DTSA pursuant to “pure” 
inevitable disclosure is the sole theory, the claim both arises under and is 
“brought under this subsection” and thus triggers the inevitable disclosure bars 
found in Section 1836(b)(3)(A)(i)(I) and (II).  The court in this narrow situation 
should therefore dismiss the case for lack of subject matter under Rule 12(b)(1), 
as I noted earlier in this paper.241   
The same result would not obtain, however, if a state law inevitable disclosure 
claim was brought and the federal court’s subject matter jurisdiction instead 
rested exclusively on either diversity jurisdiction or some other statute, like the 
Patent Act or the Copyright Act;242 in those circumstances the inevitable 
 
conspiracy to prevent competitive entry in their respective local telephone 
and/or high speed internet services markets and have agreed not to com-
pete with one another and otherwise allocated customers and markets to 
one another. 
Id. (emphasis added) (alterations in original). 
 239 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(3) (2018). 
 240 Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 808 (1988) (quoting Franchise 
Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Tr., 463 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1983).  See also Am. Well 
Works v. Layne, 241 U.S. 257, 259–60 (1916) (Holmes, J.) (“A suit for damages to business 
caused by a threat to sue under the patent law is not itself a suit under the patent law. . . A suit 
arises under the law that creates the cause of action.”); Intellisoft, Ltd. v. Acer America Corp., 
No. 19-1522, ___ F.3d ___ (Fed. Cir. April 3, 2020) (holding that a state court claim under 
state trade secret law does not “arise under” the federal patent law, for removal purposes, just 
because the defendant files a patent inventorship counterclaim relating to the alleged trade 
secret theft).  
 241 See Part I, supra. 
 242 See, e.g., Computer Assoc. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 719 (2d Cir. 1992) (state 
law trade secret misappropriation claim supplemental to copyright infringement claim). 
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disclosure claim could not be thought to “arise under” or to be “brought under” 
the absent DTSA.  The DTSA would not form any part of or be necessary to the 
state law claim, and it’s hard to see how plaintiff’s right to relief would turn on 
resolution of a substantial question relating to the DTSA, especially since the 
DTSA expressly states in Section 1838 that it does not preempt state law.  The 
same would be true even if plaintiff included a DTSA claim in the mix.  In this 
circumstance, the DTSA would not be necessary to the state law trade secret 
claim because separate federal question jurisdiction would exist under the Patent 
Act or the Copyright Act.  This assumes, of course, that the state trade secret law 
claim shares sufficient factual overlap with the patent or copyright claims, 
whether under the old “common nucleus of operative fact” test originated in 
United Mine Workers v. Gibbs243 or under the new “case or controversy” test found 
in Section 1367.244 
Indeed, about the only way Section 1836(b)(3)(A)(i)(I) or (II) might come 
into play on a state-law inevitable disclosure claim would be if the state-law claim 
was included as a supplemental claim to bolster a weak DTSA claim and no di-
versity or other federal question existed.  This was actually the case in Molon 
Motor.  Molon alleged patent infringement claims in Counts I and II, but it did 
not tie its ITSA claim to its patent claims, nor did it allege diversity of citizenship 
as an alternative subject matter ground for its ITSA claim.  Rather, Molon ex-
pressly alleged that its DTSA claim in Count III served as the basis for supple-
mental jurisdiction over its ITSA claim in Count IV.245  Given this claim presen-
tation, the court should have been forced to conclude it could not reach the ITSA 
claim under PepsiCo for lack of a viable claim against Nidec under the DTSA, if 
 
 243 United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966) (“The state and federal claims 
must derive from a common nucleus of operative fact.”). 
 244 See, e.g., Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 506 (2006) (stating that “under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1367, federal courts may exercise ‘supplemental’ jurisdiction over state-law claims linked to 
a claim based on federal law,” without specifying what test that “link” needs to meet); Acht-
man v. Kirby, McInerney & Squire, 464 F.3d 328, 335 (2d Cir. 2006) (“When both pendent 
and ancillary jurisdiction were codified in 1990 as §1367, however, the [Gibbs] ‘common nu-
cleus’ test was retained by nearly all the Circuits to interpret the statute’s ‘case or controversy’ 
language.”) (citing 16 MOORE & PRATT, MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE §106.21[1] (3d ed. 
1998)); Jones v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 358 F.3d 205, 213 n.5 (2d Cir. 2004) (expressing 
uncertainty as to whether Section 1367’s “case or controversy” language is co-extensive with 
“common nucleus” test of Gibbs); Channell v. Citicorp Nat’l Servs., 89 F.3d 379, 385 (7th Cir. 
1996) (a “loose factual connection between the claims” satisfies Section 1367); F. Andrew 
Hessick III, The Common Law of Federal Question Jurisdiction, 60 ALA. L. REV. 895, 926 (2009) 
(noting the Court in Arbaugh adopted “a presumption against reading federal statutes as re-
stricting federal court jurisdiction”). 
 245 See Third Amended Complaint at 2–3, Molon Motor & Coil Corp. v. Nidec Motor Corp., 
No. 16 C 03545, 2017 WL 1954531 (N.D. Ill. May 11, 2017) (“This Court has supplemental 
or pendent jurisdiction over the remaining claims [in Count IV] pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367 
because such claims are so closely related to Molon’s claim for misappropriation of trade se-
crets under the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016 that they form part of the same case or 
controversy.”). 
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Molon was seeking injunctive relief as its sole remedy, as Section 
1836(b)(3)(A)(i)(I) foreclosed a DTSA inevitable disclosure claim and Molon of-
fered no other allegations to show Nidec’s use or disclosure.  Whether the state 
law inevitable disclosure claim was or was not in some sense “brought under” 
the DTSA was irrelevant; without the DTSA claim there was no federal question 
jurisdiction to support Section 1367 supplemental jurisdiction.  Of course, if 
plaintiff has enough facts to allege a sufficient DTSA misappropriation claim, 
whether for injunctive or monetary relief purposes, plaintiff has no need to resort 
to a state law inevitable disclosure claim. 
IV. PLEADING UNDER THE DTSA: A UNIFIED THEORY 
AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 
A. PROPER PLEADING 
On the whole, the DTSA resembles its model, the UTSA.  The DTSA gen-
erally provides the same claims and the same relief as the UTSA, using nearly the 
same definitions of “trade secret” and “misappropriation” for claims, but goes 
slightly further on relief by omitting the “head start” injunction limitation found 
in the UTSA and by authorizing ex parte searches and seizures.246  In keeping with 
the UTSA, the DTSA also generally tracks the UTSA’s defenses available to em-
ployees and other “persons” accused of trade secret theft,247 by allowing them to 
defend on the grounds of reverse engineering and independent development.  
The DTSA goes a bit further than the UTSA, though, by explicitly allowing “any 
other lawful means of acquisition” as a defense as well.248  This last limitation 
might prove pivotal in “commercial morality” cases involving questionable but 
not necessarily illegal conduct, such as sky surveillance, dumpster diving, and 
other sharp investigative practices.249  It might also provide a statutory window 
 
 246 I say “slightly further” because unlimited injunctions remain possible under the UTSA, 
as in Wyeth v. Nat. Biologics, Inc., 395 F.3d 897, 902-03 (8th Cir. 2005) (applying Minnesota law), 
and because ex parte orders to preserve evidence, though rare, have always been permitted in 
principle under Rule 65 and its state law equivalents, as in In re Vuitton et Fils S.A., 606 F.2d 1 
(2d Cir. 1979); Am. Can Co. v. Mansukhani, 742 F.2d 314, 322 (7th Cir. 1984), and Mitchell v. 
Mitchell, 135 N.E.2d 109, 112 (Ill. App. Ct. 1956). 
 247 “Person” — left undefined in the DTSA itself—defaults to the broad definition in 1 
U.S.C. § 1: “In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, unless the context indicates 
otherwise . . . the words ‘person’ and ‘whoever’ include corporations, companies, associations, 
firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well as individuals[.]” 1 U.S.C. § 1 
(2018). 
 248 8 U.S.C. § 1839(6)(B) (2018). 
 249 See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481 (1974) (trade secret law fosters 
commercial ethics); E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1016–17 
(5th Cir. 1970) (flight surveillance of plant under construction violated commercial morality); 
Frank W. Winne and Son, Inc. v. Palmer, No. 91-2239, 1991 WL 155819, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 
7, 1991) (permitting dumpster diving); Brunswick Corp. v. Outboard Marine Corp., 404 
N.E.2d 205, 207 (1980) (reciting commercial morality as a trade secret concern); Kurt M. 
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for arguing “general skill and knowledge” as a defense if the reference to “an-
other person” in the definition of “trade secret” does not.250 
These general similarities mask important differences between the DTSA and 
the UTSA, however.  For example, subject matter jurisdiction under the DTSA 
is cabined by the federal statute’s “commerce” and “relatedness” conditions, un-
like the state law-based UTSA.251  In addition, the DTSA’s placement within the 
EEA, a criminal statute, likely implicates “the rule of lenity” and hence demands 
narrow construction of shared terms like “trade secret” and “misappropriation” 
as well as the identical “commerce” and “relatedness” jurisdiction conditions 
found in both laws.  This statutory interpretation constraint finds no equivalent 
in the purely civil UTSA. The rule of lenity’s power should not be underestimated 
in close cases: its bearing on jurisdiction was outcome-determinative in the fa-
mous federal criminal prosecution that failed in Aleynikov.252  Even though the 
DTSA’s jurisdiction language is slightly different from the language at issue in 
Aleynikov, Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdiction challenges still lurk on lenity, “commerce,” 
and “relatedness” grounds in all DTSA cases involving purely local products and 
services.   
These jurisdictional concerns underscore a larger DTSA statutory construc-
tion issue: To what extent will the Supreme Court follow the UTSA rather than 
the Restatement of Torts or even the common law?  Will Masland arise and bring 
with it “breach of confidence,” or will Ruckelshaus prevail with its “property” 
view?  The DTSA is a blend of both. I suspect the “property” approach will carry 
greater weight, if not control, however, largely because it is more protective of 
defendants and thus more consistent with the rule of lenity.  For the same reason, 
the restrictive “property” theory also seems a better fit with the “not generally 
known” prong of the DTSA’s “trade secret” definition, as this prerequisite op-
erates to forgive thieving defendants if (unbeknownst to them) the “secret” they 
sought to steal turns out to be well known to others in the industry.  On this 
view there’s no theft if there’s no property. 
Twombly and Iqbal represent another set of pro-defense hurdles, particularly if 
the “property” concept takes center stage.  The tendency to date, as reflected in 
the almost complete absence of federal appellate precedent on trade secret plead-
ing, has been for courts and counsel to treat trade secret cases as fact-intense 
 
Saunders, The Law and Ethics of Trade Secrets: A Case Study, 42 CAL. WEST. L. REV. 209 (2006) 
(discussing trade secret law and then analyzing various ethics approaches, including formalism, 
rights, utilitarianism, and justice theories); William M. Fitzpatrick, Uncovering Trade Secrets: The 
Legal and Ethical Conundrum of Creative Competitive Intelligence, 68 SAM ADVANCED MGMT J. No. 
3, at 4 (Summer 2003) (general discussion of trade secrets and competitive intelligence prac-
tices). 
 250 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3)(B) (2018). 
 251 See id. at § 1832(a). 
 252 See MICHAEL LEWIS, FLASH BOYS: A WALL STREET REVOLT (W.W. Norton & Co. 2014) 
(best-selling book opening the introduction with Sergey Aleynikov’s arrest and then devoting 
all of Chapter Five to his plight). 
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affairs better left to discovery.  This approach is wrong on my reading of Twombly 
and Iqbal.  At a minimum, Twombly and Iqbal teach that a “trade secret” and “mis-
appropriation” must both be properly alleged at the outset so that discovery, if 
necessary, is properly tailored to the needs of the case.  This is notice pleading 
and issue narrowing at their most basic.  For Rule 12(b)(6) purposes, how can 
the court decide whether a secret exists and whether it has been stolen if the 
court doesn’t know the metes and bounds of the secret?  How can the court 
determine if all or part of the secret is in the public domain if it doesn’t know 
what the secret is?  If reasonable secrecy measures are a function of the secret 
they are designed to protect, how can the court assess the reasonableness of 
those measures without knowing what they are intended to guard?  How can an 
employee or other “person” with authorized access “know or have reason to 
know” he is engaging in misappropriation when he doesn’t know what he is for-
bidden from taking or using?  How can that person’s new employers or new 
partners “know or have reason to know” something is amiss if the person who 
had authorized access doesn’t even know himself?   
If all roads lead to Rome, in trade secret litigation they all lead to “identifica-
tion.”  To satisfy notice pleading under Twombly and Iqbal, plaintiffs should attach 
(under seal) the secrets in issue in the same manner and in the same detail as they 
were disclosed to the defendant who allegedly misappropriated them.  To meet 
reasonable secrecy requirements, the designated secrets should be password-pro-
tected and otherwise restricted to those with a “need to know,” and they should 
bear a “confidential,” “secret,” or “proprietary” legend warning the recipient that 
the information is not to be disclosed or used other than for authorized purposes, 
thereby putting the recipient on explicit notice as to what is specifically off limits.  
To the extent secrets are kept only in “intangible” form — as expressly allowed 
by the DTSA’s definition, in a departure from the UTSA’s silence on the subject 
— evidence of the description actually given to users should be made exhibits.  
“Click” screen acknowledgments and signed confidentiality agreements should 
be attached to show the recipient understood the information was to be kept 
secret.  The trade secret owner should also allege how the secrets were developed 
or perfected in-house or under confidentiality agreements with outsiders and 
why, as a result, the secrets have “economic value” by giving the owner and oth-
ers a market advantage — an advantage that cannot be readily gleaned from pub-
lic or industry sources.  If this is a correct understanding of Twombly and Iqbal, 
the Plastronics complaint would not have passed muster. 
Assuming a complaint satisfies the “trade secret” definition, it should also 
allege “misappropriation” by reciting facts reflecting unauthorized activities 
knowingly undertaken.  To get beyond equipoise, to establish “plausibility” un-
der Twombly and Iqbal, those facts must show more than mere interviewing, pre-
paring to compete, divorcing a partner, dropping a deal, joining a competitor, or 
entering a market.  They must show downloading, copying, or taking (or in rare 
cases, memorizing) by someone who “knows or has reason to know” he is not 
authorized to do it.  An authorized user’s failure to return documents, without 
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more, is not enough; a proper “trigger” allegation should offer facts showing the 
owner’s demand followed by the defendant’s knowing refusal, whether at an exit 
interview or in response to a demand letter.  The same is true for downstream 
recipients, meaning persons who did not steal the secrets but have received them 
from someone who did: facts showing their knowledge are needed to meet the 
“knows or had reason to know” language found in the DTSA’s “misappropria-
tion” definition.  Common law conversion cases supply a useful model for these 
trade secret scenarios, if one is needed.253  Of course, “knowledge” on the part 
of any of these potential defendants returns us to the “identification” require-
ment – they can’t know they are stealing or receiving a stolen secret if they don’t 
know it is a secret in the first place. 
The “knowledge” requirement alone should also bar “pure” inevitable disclo-
sure claims under the DTSA; they turn on unwitting, unavoidable conduct.  If 
federal Courts of Appeals hold that the “knowledge” condition precludes such 
claims under the DTSA, one has to wonder whether those same appellate courts 
will say the same about state law inevitable disclosure claims given the identical 
“knowledge” language in all UTSA-based trade secrets laws.  We see most clearly 
how this might play out in Molon Motor, where lack of knowledge on defendant 
Nidec’s part was a glaring problem.  If Molon’s ex-employee Desai didn’t know 
he was engaged in wrongdoing, how could his new employer?  And even if Desai 
did know he was engaged in wrongdoing, it didn’t follow that Nidec knew.  The 
proper course was for Molon to sue Desai first, to learn what he said and did at 
Nidec, and then to add Nidec if newly-discovered evidence justified it.  Instead, 
Molon Motor sued Nidec first without a proper basis and then tried to transmute 
Desai’s lack of knowledge into Nidec’s fount of knowledge in an effort to bridge 
the Third Amended Complaint’s “knowledge” gap. 
DTSA inevitable disclosure injunction claims face a second bar: Section 
1836(b)(3)(A)(i)’s express ban on injunctions that preclude employment “merely 
on the information the person knows” or that “otherwise conflict with an appli-
cable State law prohibiting restraints on the practice of a lawful profession, trade, 
or business.”  These limitations should also work to stop state law inevitable 
disclosure claims like the one in Molon Motor.  If federal supplemental jurisdiction 
over state-law claims is linked solely to a DTSA claim, and if an injunction is the 
sole relief sought (as is typical of such state-law claims), the DTSA claim should 
founder under Section 1836(b)(3)(A)(i) and the state law trade secret claim 
should sink with it for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  This should have been 
the result in Molon Motor, as the ITSA inevitable disclosure claim there was tied 
exclusively to the DTSA claim and only injunctive relief was sought.  However, 
state-law inevitable disclosure injunction claims should escape Section 
 
 253 See, e.g., Van Diest Supply Co. v. Shelby County State Bank, 425 F.3d 437, 439 (7th Cir. 
2005) (applying Illinois law) (to establish a conversion claim, a plaintiff must show: “(1) a right 
to the property; (2) an absolute and unconditional right to the immediate possession of the 
property; (3) a demand for possession; and (4) that the defendant wrongfully and without 
authorization assumed control, dominion, or ownership over the property.”). 
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1836(b)(3)(A)(i)’s prohibitions when such claims rest on diversity jurisdiction or 
are supplemental to federal claims other than ones “brought under” the DTSA. 
B. CONSEQUENCES OF IMPROPER PLEADING 
What, then, should be the consequences of this unified theory of pleading 
under the DTSA?  Early dismissal should certainly be one, and denial of leave to 
amend should be another, if amendment would be futile.  Amendment would be 
futile in most of the scenarios described above; information in the public domain, 
lack of identification, or the absence of secrecy measures should be fatal to “trade 
secret” allegations, and the absence of true “trigger” facts should be fatal to “mis-
appropriation” allegations.  The one circumstance in which amendment should 
be routine is when plaintiff seeks to add claims or defendants based on new evi-
dence learned during discovery directed at the original defendant.  Plaintiff 
should not be penalized for exercising procedural caution by first stating a claim 
against the original defendant, and plaintiff may need discovery to determine if 
other defendants “knew or had reason” to know as a result of dealing with the 
original.  However, the engines of discovery should not be started without plain-
tiff first stating a viable claim. 
If we take to heart the Seventh Circuit’s observation in PepsiCo that “falling a 
little short is still falling short,” Rule 11 sanctions should be imposed as a matter 
of course when trade secret complaints suffer from incurable defects.  Because 
Rule 11 warrants sanctions whenever plaintiff has failed to conduct an objectively 
reasonable factual and legal investigation,254 Rule 11 is easier to meet than the 
DTSA’s “bad faith” standard for fee award purposes.255  If a readily ascertainable 
patent or publication discloses plaintiff’s “secret,” for example, plaintiff cannot 
be thought to have done a reasonable pre-filing investigation.  Similarly, if plain-
tiff’s complaint (in a sealed appendix) cannot identify with particularity the se-
crets in issue, plaintiff has no business suing.  And the complaint’s identification 
should match the description given employees or other users at the time the 
owner granted them access; lack of sufficient access identification back then 
should be deemed an unreasonable secrecy measure as a matter of law for Rule 
12(b)(6) purposes.  Most important, if all plaintiffs can allege “is that defendants 
could misuse plaintiffs’ secrets, and plaintiffs fear they will,” as the PepsiCo court 
put it, then plaintiffs have not done an adequate investigation and should not be 
suing. 
An adequate pre-filing investigation should look like the one undertaken in 
 
 254 See Bus. Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Commc’ns Enters., 498 U.S. 533, 540-51 (1991) (Rule 
11’s objective standard—calling for a reasonable investigation of the facts and law—applies 
to lawyers and their clients). 
 255 See 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(3)(D) (2018) (“[I]f a claim of the misappropriation is made in bad 
faith, which may be established by circumstantial evidence, a motion to terminate an injunction 
is made or opposed in bad faith, or the trade secret was willfully and maliciously misappropri-
ated, award reasonable attorney’s fees to the prevailing party.”). 
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Experian Information Solutions, Inc. v. Nationwide Marketing Services Inc.,256 where in-
formation a data broker provided to plaintiff Experian caused Experian to sus-
pect the broker’s source, defendant Nationwide, had wrongfully obtained it from 
Experian in some manner.  Instead of immediately suing, Experian first tested 
the data from the broker and determined it matched Experian’s data 97% of the 
time.  Experian thereafter confronted Nationwide with this evidence and then 
followed up with a lawsuit that revealed other suspicious circumstances, includ-
ing Nationwide’s lack of a written agreement with its source and Nationwide’s 
payment of an unusually low fee to that source — suspicious circumstances that 
bolstered the inference that Nationwide “knew or had reason to know” its source 
had acquired the information improperly.   
One particular complexity is the sanction, if any, for “overclaiming” trade 
secrets.  In Rockwell Graphic Systems, Judge Posner dismissed the notion that 
“overclaiming” some trade secrets should result in forfeiture of others.257  As 
mentioned earlier, I am not so sure about this.  First, as cases like GlobalTap 
demonstrate, courts sometimes deny trade secret status to purported secrets bur-
ied in larger documents containing non-trade secret material.  As a matter of fact, 
the Seventh Circuit, Judge Posner’s own court, has frequently criticized lengthy 
descriptions that fail to identify secrets or that bury them in long documents that 
do not distinguish aspects known to the trade from those that are secret.258  Sec-
ond, claiming secrecy rights in things that are not secret borders on improper 
pleading and, in fact, crosses the line when reasonable minds would conclude the 
information does not constitute a trade secret.  The Supreme Court in Business 
Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enterprises,259 for example, had no difficulty 
allowing Rule 11 sanctions against a client who wrongly identified “seeds” 
planted in documents to detect competitor copying, when it turned out no seeds 
had actually been planted.260  In other words, for pleadings purposes, the Court 
held, a company must be responsible for knowing the contents of its own docu-
ments. Third, and most important, Judge Posner’s view privileges property over 
people. Not only are trade secret owners in a better position than employees and 
other authorized users to know what is and is not a secret;261 owners may face 
 
 256 Experian Info. Sols., Inc. v. Nationwide Mktg. Servs. Inc., 893 F.3d 1176 (9th Cir. 2018) 
(applying Arizona law). 
 257 Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc. v. DEV Indus., Inc., 925 F.2d 174, 176-77 (7th Cir. 1991) 
(Posner, J.) (rejecting DEV’s argument “that if a firm claims trade secret protection for infor-
mation that is not really secret, the firm forfeits trade secret protection of information that is 
secret”). 
 258 See William Lynch Schaller, Secrets of the Trade: Tactical and Legal Considerations from the Trade 
Secret Plaintiff’s Perspective, 29 REV. LITIG. 729, 801-02 (2010) (discussing Seventh Circuit trade 
secret identification opinions). 
 259 Bus. Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Commc’ns Enters., 498 U.S. 533 (1991). 
 260 Id. at 540-41. 
 261 Cf. Glenayre Elecs., Ltd. v. Sandahl, 830 F. Supp. 1149, 1152 (C.D. Ill. 1993) (“Defend-
ants state that the first mention of the technology at issue appears in documents prepared 
months after Tanner’s departure. Also, when Tanner left, Glenayre’s vice-president sent him 
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potential liability for tortious interference, defamation, and other business torts 
for overclaiming in statements to third-parties.262  Indeed, it seems only a ques-
tion of time until an enterprising ex-employee sues a former employer for over-
claiming in statements made only to the employee himself, perhaps framing such 
a claim as an independent tort for wrongful dismissal or for some other adverse 
employment action,263 or perhaps pursuing it as free-standing tort of unfair com-
petition.264  In short, overclaiming, whether before or during litigation, should 
be revisited as a matter of first principle, with sanctions the consequence. 
Finally, orders staying discovery should be granted almost as a matter of 
course if a trade secret complaint is defective on its face, either for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction or for failure to state a claim.265  Fishing expeditions should  
 
 
be thwarted, not encouraged.  Here, Rule 9(b) comes to mind.  Fraud allegations 
are supposed to be alleged with “particularity” under Rule 9(b), and courts rou-
tinely stay discovery when a Rule 12(b)(6) motion challenges a fraud complaint 
for lack of particularity in accordance with Rule 9(b).  Indeed, though it’s un-
common, one can make a fairly strong argument that Rule 9(b) should govern 
trade secret actions: most trade secret actions involve species of actual or fiduci-
ary fraud,266 at least with respect to the primary wrongdoers who acquired the 
 
a letter stating that Glenayre believed that he had trade secrets which should be kept confi-
dential. Tanner replied that he would respect the confidentiality of any valid trade secrets he 
possessed and requested that Glenayre identify such information which he possessed. Gle-
nayre did not respond to this request.”). 
 262 See William Lynch Schaller, Jumping Ship: Legal Issues Relating to Employee Mobility in High 
Technology Industries, 17 LAB. LAW. 25, 93-94 n.286 (2001) (collecting cases). 
 263 See D’Sa v. Playhut, Inc. 85 Cal. App. 4th 927 (2000) (employer may be liable in tort for 
wrongful termination if it fires employee for refusing to sign an employment agreement con-
taining an unenforceable noncompetition agreement); Palmateer v. Int’l Harvester Co., 421 
N.E.2d 876, 879 (Ill. 1981) (approving employee’s independent tort action for wrongful dis-
missal in violation of Illinois public policy favoring cooperation with criminal law enforcement 
authorities); Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 384 N.E.2d 353, 357 (1978) (approving employee’s in-
dependent tort action for wrongful dismissal in violation of Illinois public policy favoring 
workers’ compensation claims). 
 264 Cf. Elizabeth Smith, Eliminating Predatory Litigation in the Context of Baseless Trade Secret 
Claims: The Need for a More Aggressive Counterattack, 23 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1095, 1125-28 
(1983) (arguing for recognition of a new predatory litigation claim for trade secret litigation 
abuse). 
 265 See Kevin J. Lynch, When Staying Discovery Stays Justice: Analyzing Motions to Stay Discovery 
When a Motion to Dismiss Is Pending, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 71 (2012) (discussing the tension 
between permitting and staying discovery when a potentially dispositive Rule 12(b)(6) motion 
to dismiss is pending). 
 266 See 18 U.S.C. § 1839(6)–(6)(A) (“[T]he term ‘improper means’— (A) includes theft, brib-
ery, misrepresentation, breach or inducement of a breach of a duty to maintain secrecy, or 
espionage through electronic or other means.”); UNIF. TRADE SECRET ACT WITH 1985 
AMENDMENTS § 1.1 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1985) (“‘Improper means’ includes theft, bribery, 
misrepresentation, breach or inducement of a breach of a duty to maintain secrecy, or 
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secrets through improper means.267 
V. CONCLUSION 
Trade secrets are important assets.  Indeed, for many if not most firms, they 
are the most important assets, often the proverbial “crown jewels.”  Companies 
should protect them and courts should too.  Congress plainly recognized these 
concerns in passing the DTSA, which allows trade secret owners and their licen-
sees to bring federal claims in federal court.   
Given these powerful concerns, why should the Courts of Appeals, and ulti-
mately the Supreme Court, insist upon strict pleading compliance along the lines 
I’ve outlined here?  The reasons the Supreme Court offered in Twombly and Iqbal 
are reasons enough: ferreting out baseless claims and ending unwarranted litiga-
tion long before discovery clogs conscientious courts and overwhelms innocent 
defendants.  But if more reasons are needed, consider these supplied by Profes-
sor Orly Lobel: 
Entrepreneurship is especially harmed when workers fear leaving 
their employers. If employees are unable to use their knowledge, 
or human capital learned through their employment with estab-
lished firms, they are not only less likely to leave, they are partic-
ularly less likely to go to less established, more vulnerable entities. 
Consequently, employees are less likely to consider starting their 
own businesses, build their own products, or create new services. 
Competitors might also be reluctant to hire away employees for 
fear of being criminally or civilly prosecuted. Smaller, newer 
companies can be restricted from growing or entering a market 
by larger, long-established firms with more resources. Such 
 
espionage through electronic or other means.”); Mueller Indus., Inc. v. Berkman, 927 N.E.2d 
794, 809 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010) (holding that intentional breach of fiduciary duty is analogous to 
the tort of fraud for purposes of the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege), 
abrogated on other grounds, People v. Radojcic, 998 N.E.2d 1212 (Ill. 2013); Morwenna Borden, 
Note, Particulars of Particularity: Alleging Scienter and the Proper Application of Rule 9(b) to Duty-Based 
Misrepresentations, 98 MINN. L. REV. 1110, 1113-14, 1115-27 (2014) (describing minimal history 
behind Rule 9(b) and conflicting interpretations of its application outside of traditional fraud 
context). 
 267 See Foam Supplies, Inc. v. The Dow Chem. Co., No. 4:05CV1772 CDP, 2006 WL 
2225392, at *14 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 2, 2006) (“[W]here a plaintiff alleges fraud as the improper 
means by which a party misappropriated trade secrets, Rule 9(b)’s particularity requirement 
applies.”); Hannah Ruth Roberts, Anything But General: Pleading Scienter in Rule 9(b) Claims, AM. 
BAR ASS’N (May 23, 2017), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/commit-
tees/business-torts-unfair-competition/practice/2017/pleading-scienter-in-rule-9b-claims/ 
(discussing varying approaches of Courts of Appeals on pleading scienter under Rule 9(b) in 
light of Twombly and Iqbal). 
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established firms can threaten IP litigation for the purpose of 
stifling entrepreneurs as well as new startups, and competitors.268 
Professor Lobel’s worries bring to mind the “Traitorous Eight” — Julius 
Blank, Victor Grinich, Jean Hoerni, Eugene Kleiner, Jay Last, Gordon Moore, 
Robert Noyce and Sheldon Roberts.  They worked for Shockley Semiconductor 
Laboratory until 1957,269 when they quit and founded Fairchild Semiconductor.  
Although Nobel Prize-winner William Shockley considered their departure a be-
trayal (no small irony, since he himself had quit Bell Labs in 1956 to form Shock-
ley Semiconductor), the Traitorous Eight and their proteges eventually spawned 
the “Fairchildren,” firms like Intel and AMD that, along with Fairchild, came to 
form the backbone of modern Silicon Valley.270  Surely this runaway success was 
due in no small part to employee mobility and knowledge “spillover.”271  If courts 
fail to police the DTSA’s boundaries, how many firms will risk massive litigation 
expenses just to hire away competitors’ partners and employees?  How many 
partners and employees will do the same?  With the “Organization Man” long 





 268 Orly Lobel, The DTSA and the New Secrecy Ecology, 1 BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & TAX L. 
REV. 369, 377 (2017).  See also David S. Levine & Ted Sichelman, Why Do Startups Use Trade 
Secrets?, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 751 (2018) (exploring the lack of empirical research on trade 
secret use by startups). 
 269 Together with John Bardeen and Walter Brattain, William Shockley invented the transis-
tor at Bell Labs, for which the three received the Nobel Prize in Physics in 1956 (“for their 
researches on semiconductors and their discovery of the transistor effect”), ushering in mi-
croelectronics, integrated circuits, semiconductors and the Information Age.  See generally JON 
GERTNER, THE IDEA FACTORY: BELL LABS AND THE GREAT AGE OF AMERICAN INNOVATION 
(Penguin Press 2012). 
 270 See generally MARGARET O’MARA, THE CODE: SILICON VALLEY AND THE REMAKING OF 
AMERICA 41, 52 (Penguin Press 2019) (“Modern Silicon Valley started with Fairchild and the 
‘Traitorous Eight’ who founded it . . .  A swelling number of young men spun out new semi-
conductor firms of their own.  Many had worked at Fairchild, and their start-ups became 
known, naturally, as ‘the Fairchildren.’”). 
 271 See Laura G. Pedraza-Fariña, Spill Your (Trade) Secrets: Knowledge Networks as Innovation Driv-
ers, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1561 (2017) (arguing innovation in complex fields is often the 
product of networks of learning and collaboration across firms rather than within a single 
firm). 
 272 See Nicolas Lemann, When Corporations Changed Their Social Role – and Upended Our Politics, 
WALL ST. J., Sept. 7, 2019, at C1 (describing the rise of financial engineering and globalization 
starting in the late 1970s:  “There was no more payoff, evidently, to being an exemplar of that 
venerable type, the Organization Man.  Now the payoff was for the Transaction Man or 
Woman, someone who took established economic institutions apart and reassembled them in 
a more strictly market-oriented form.”). 
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